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Agricultural nonpoint source pollution is recognised as a major cause of water pollution. The 
characteristics of nonpoint source pollution suggest that an efficient approach should focus 
on a source control and hence land-use management. Recently, the concept of Payments for 
Ecosystem Services (PES) has been advanced as an efficient market-based approach to 
protect in-stream water quality, while simultaneously supporting agriculture. Farmers can be 
rewarded for the adoption of certain ‘Best Management Practices’ (BMPs) in farming 
systems. But little is known about the adoption of BMPs in the context of Thai agriculture.  
 
This thesis examines the adoption of twelve BMPs on citrus farms in the Ping river basin in 
northern Thailand.  In the context of potential PES development, three studies were 
undertaken using frameworks from economics and psychology. The first study used 
a bottom-up engineering approach to estimate economic costs of twelve BMPs at the farm-
scale. The total annualised costs, including installation, maintenance, and land opportunity 
costs of each BMP were compared. The results indicated that land opportunity cost was the 
largest proportion of total costs. These estimates provided a basis for discussion on how the 
farmers’ perception of cost may influence their stated adoption intention.  
 
The second study used the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), to investigate farmers’ 
intentions on adoption of twelve BMPs.   A survey of 218 citrus farmers was undertaken in 
the application. Descriptive statistics and frequency of BMP selection were presented. The 
results showed that soil analysis was the most preferred BMP.  A graphical analysis of other 
preferred measures suggested that these were not always consistent with the known cost 
information derived (above) and thus farmers’ perceived costs might not be the most 
important factor influencing adoption decisions.  
 
Further analysis based on TPB investigated other factors thought to be significant in farmers’ 
decision-making. Other potential external and psychological factors influencing adoption 
were investigated using a multinomial logistic model. The results indicated that the 
probability of adopting BMPs was associated with other psychological factors and external 
factors, rather than perceived costs.  The significant psychological factors were farmers’ 
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attitudes towards consumers and perception about farm returns, while the significant external 
factors were, for example, access to information and contribution of family labour to farm 
workload. 
 
The third study was based on the application of Q-Methodology, and aimed to obtain a 
deeper understanding of farmers’ perception towards BMPs. Seventy two participants were 
purposively selected from the 218 TPB observations. The results revealed four distinctive 
farmer groups holding different perceptions towards BMPs. The four groups were 
conservationist, traditionalist, disinterested, and risk-averse. These provided a specific 
segmentation to guide policy towards influencing attitudes and behaviours. The results 
suggested that farmers were not motivated solely by a profit maximisation goal. 
 
Overall, key findings from these three studies revealed some fundamental requirements for 
developing a water-related PES programme. These were: i) factors affecting eligibility to 
participate; ii) factors affecting desire to participate; and iii) factors affecting ability to 
participate. This information provided the basis for a set of recommendations addressing the 
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1.1 Background of the Study 
 
1.1.1 Overview of water pollution problems in Thailand 
A decade of economic expansion in Thailand has changed the country from being one of the 
most resource-abundant countries to being one of the most resource-constrained. A variety of 
environmental problems are increasing pressures on natural resources. As a result, the 
Pollution Control Department (PCD) was established in 1992 under the Royal Decree on 
Organisational Division of Pollution Control Department, Ministry of Science, Technology 
and Environment B.E. 2535 (1992) (Enhancement and Conservation of the National 
Environment Quality Act B.E. 1992). PCD’s mission is to protect human health, and to 
safeguard the natural environment upon which life depends. The Enhancement and 
Conservation of the National Environment Quality Act B.E. 1992 is the cornerstone of 
environmental protection in Thailand. The World Bank (2000) revealed severe cases of 
water quality degradation. A report by the World Bank in 2000 showed that 37% of surface 
water bodies in Thailand were classified as low quality. The Bank estimated that water and 
air pollution costs amounted to between 1.6% and 2.6% of Thailand’s GDP (The World 
Bank 2004). Accordingly, the government has been heavily investing on water pollution 
abatement and control, and more than 40% of environmental budget have been spent to 
water pollution management (PCD 2005).  
 
The major sources of water pollution in Thailand are domestic sewage, industrial effluents 
and agricultural runoff. Agricultural activity is the third largest source of water pollution, 
behind urban pollution and industry (FAO 2006). PCD (2005) has identified three main 
agricultural activities generating nonpoint source pollution to watercourses. These are 
livestock, coastal aquaculture, and plantations. To protect water bodies from pollutants, the 
government has established the ambient water quality standards mandated by the 
Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environment Quality Act B.E. (1992). 
Surface water quality standards are divided into five classes according to the major 
beneficial uses (The Royal Government Gazette 1994) (Table 1-1). 
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Table 1-1: Surface water quality standard 
Classification Objectives/ Conditions and beneficial use 
Class I Extra clean water used for conservation purposes 
Class II Very clean water used for: 
  - Consumption which requires ordinary water treatment process before use 
  - Aquatic organism of conservation 
  - Fisheries 
  - Recreation 
Class III Medium clean water used for: 
  - Consumption, but passing through an ordinary treatment process before 
using  
  - Agriculture 
Class IV Fairly clean water used for: 
  - Consumption, but requires special water treatment process before using 
  - Industry 
Class V The sources which are not classified in the above mentioned classes and can be 
used only for navigation 
Source: The Royal Government Gazette (1994) 
 
Influenced by the polluter pays principle (PPP), the government has put in place policies, 
plans, and water quality standards in an effort to combat water pollution. The emergence of 
pollution management policies in Thailand has increased in response to environmental 
conditionality linked to low interest loans from interested development agencies. The 
Enhancement and Conservation of the National Environment Quality Act B.E. (1992) 
applies laws and regulations for utilising environmental technologies, and mainly focuses on 
point source pollution control (Akihisa 2008). 
 
Concern over nonpoint source pollution was publicly aired in the late 1990s (Tonmanee and 
Kanchanakool 1999). Current measures to manage nonpoint source pollution from 
agricultural sectors are effluent charges, an environment fund1, subsidies, and a certification 
scheme (Table 1-2). Recently, PCD is considering the role of Best Management Practices 
(BMPs) as tools to control agricultural nonpoint source pollution at the watershed level 
(Water Quality Management Bureau 2006). PCD (2006) conducted a study investigating 
threats to water quality presented by farming activities in Thailand with a particular 
reference to surface water2
 
.  
                                                          
1  The environmental fund was established under the Enhancement and Conservation of National 
Environmental Quality Act of 1992. It functions as a financial measure supporting grants and loans 
to environmental polluters. Major sources of funding are from state governments through the fuel oil 
fund, and international loans. 
 




Table 1-2: Experience with economic incentive measures in Thailand 
Measure 
Wastewater source 
Community Industry Agricultural sector 
Taxes, charge/ fees    
 Product charge/ tax /   
 Tax/ fee exemption  /  
 Effluent charge / / / 
Financial support    
 Environment fund / / / 
 Subsidies /  / 
Certification/ labelling / / / 
Public disclosure / /  
Source: Thomas (2006) 
 
The study revealed six farming activities, which contribute to potential pollution hazards. 
These are maize, paddy rice, para rubber, citrus, cattle, and Nile tilapia. Table 1-3 illustrates 
the planted area of four crops that have a significant level of pollution hazard. Though the 
production of citrus is small scale, the severity of pollutant generates (i.e. high chemical 
applications) calls for urgent action for controlling pollutant emission.  
Table 1-3: Planted area of crops with significant level of hazard pollution 
 Unit: 1,000 rai* 
Plantation 
Year 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Citrus 322 343 348 365 410 446 466 479 
Paddy rice 62,698 64,444 66,492 66,272 66,440 66,404 44,565 67,677 
Maize 9,008 7,719 7,802 7,685 7,317 6,943 7,040 6,626 
Para rubber 11,008 11,444 11,637 12,131 12,425 12,612 12,946 13,610 
Source: OAE (2007) 
Note: *rai is a land measurement unit in Thailand; 1 rai = 0.16ha 
 
 
Accordingly, this thesis focuses on the pollution from citrus cultivation, and the promotion 
of plans to address water quality issues. The next section gives an overview of citrus 
production in the Ping river basin, a river basin of high economic significance where farmers 
are facing increasing competition from alternative water uses. This is followed by a review 
of the international view on citrus BMPs, and the basis used to select the BMPs evaluated in 
this thesis.  
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1.1.2 Citrus production in the Ping River Basin 
The Ping river basin is the major watershed in northern Thailand (Figure 1-1; left). The basin 
is strategically important in terms of its upstream location, population density, economic 
integration, and as a cultural centre (Thomas 2006). The headwaters of the Ping river are in 
Chiang Dao district, Chiang Mai province, and it stretches to Nakorn Sawan province in the 
central area of Thailand. The Ping river basin covers an area of 33,898 km2. It is divided into 
upper and lower portions at the Bhumibol Dam in Tak province. The upper Ping contains 15 
sub-basins, while the lower portion comprises eight sub-basins. According to the surface 
water quality standard, the Ping river is classified as class III (PCD 2005). The Ping river 
basin is one of the four upper tributary basins forming the Chao Phraya river system, the 
most important river basin in Thailand. Functioning as the upstream of the Chao Phraya river 
basin, the Ping river is viewed as an area to be protected from any activity that would 
threaten water consumption downstream. 
 




For a decade, cultivation patterns in the basin have shifted from paddy fields to perennial 
crops because of higher returns, relatively low labour intensity requirement for orchard 
production, and previous policies promoting monocrop plantation. Among the new 
horticultural practices carried out in the river basin, citrus is one of the most preferred fruits 
grown. Figure 1-1 (right) illustrates the high density of citrus cultivation in the Ping river 
basin. There is an obvious difference in the cultivation systems between upstream and 
downstream areas (Figure 1-2). Drip irrigation and mini-sprinkler system are widely seen in 
the upstream part of the Ping river where farms are located in hilly areas. A water pump is 
needed to lift the water, or the mountainous terrain allows gravity flow to the tanks if water 
is tapped at upstream sites. In contrast, a raised-bed system of cultivation with ditch 
irrigation systems is mainly seen in the downstream part of the Ping river. Citrus trees are 
grown in raised-beds and water is distributed throughout the field via unlined canals. 
 
 
Figure 1-2: Cultivation system in upstream area (left) and downstream area (right) 
 
Citrus farmers from the central area of Thailand are increasingly migrating to the Ping river 
basin to find new arable land. Cultivated areas have expanded rapidly and become a source 
of nonpoint source pollution. It is reported that citrus cultivation has the highest average 
intensity of insecticide usage compared to other cash crops (Jungbluth 2000). Excess 
application of chemicals, such as fertiliser and hormones is also applied to boost yield and to 
preserve quality of the fruit (Namruengsri 2005). Moreover, encroachment of citrus farms 
into reserved forest areas causes forest loss and acceleration of soil erosion, which is as high 
as 7.77kg/m2 per annum (Marod et al. 2005). For these reasons the Ping river basin is 
susceptible to pollutant contamination, and prevention measures are needed to regulate the 
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discharge of pollutants into waterways. Recently, PCD has initiated the use of BMPs to 
control pollution at the farm level (Water Quality Management Bureau 2006). The next 
section gives an overview of citrus BMPs, and discusses the criteria to select BMPs for this 
thesis. 
 
1.1.3 Best Management Practices (BMPs) on citrus farms 
Improperly managed agricultural activities in citrus farms such as overuse of pesticides and 
nutrients, insufficient soil erosion control and inappropriate water resource management 
have substantially affected water quality (PCD 2005; US EPA 2000; Tonmanee and 
Kanchanakool 1999). The discharge of nonpoint source pollution is unobservable due to its 
characteristics. Therefore, the best alternative to control this pollution is to manage the 
source and delivery of pollutants by restricting them from contacting watercourses, or a 
source management approach (Loehr 1984). Global experience suggests that there is a 
general regulatory preference for voluntary behavioural changes rather than more punitive 
measures or more administratively complex economic incentive measures (Yeager 2007; 
Segerson and Wu 2006; Woodhead et al. 2004). One of the solutions to the pollution 
problem lies in finding adequate management techniques often called Best Management 
Practices (BMPs). 
  
BMPs are farm-scale management practices to control the generation and delivery of 
pollutants into water resources. BMPs are widely introduced in order to intercept pollutants 
before entering watercourses. Concerns over nonpoint source pollution abatement to improve 
water quality have been gradually changed from programme-by-programme, source-by-
source, and pollutant-by-pollutant methods, to more holistic watershed-based strategies (Ioris 
2004; Helmer and Hespanhol 1997). The history of BMPs development includes recognition 
of a potential water quality problem, identification of alternative management solutions, 
adoption of practical BMPs, implementation of the BMPs and monitoring the success of the 
adoption (Ice 2004). The United States has recognised the problem of diffuse pollution from 
citrus cultivation for many years, and established a regional programme of action to address 
the issue (Parsons and Boman 2006; Florida Department of Consumer Services 2005; 2004; 
US EPA 2000).  The BMP concept, as developed in the United States, therefore provides a 




Recent concerns with environmental health in a watershed have highlighted the need for 
citrus farmers to minimise the adverse effects of their farm operations. In general, the most 
pressing concerns identified as injurious to watershed are sufficient amount of water supply, 
sediment transport, pesticides, nutrients and aquatic plants. The major groups of BMPs and 
their main objectives are presented in Table 1-4. BMPs are operational procedures that are 
normally introduced to farmers as a total package. However, not all BMPs are applicable to 
any particular citrus operation. Therefore, prior to adoption of any BMP the issue of BMP 
applicability should be considered.  
 
Table 1-4: Major BMP groups and objectives 
BMP groups Objectives 
Water supply Minimise off-site discharges after excessive rainfall 
Sediment transport Minimise the movement of sediment off-site 
Pesticides Minimise the off-site transport of pesticides and metals 
Nutrients Minimise the movement of nutrients off-site 
Source: adapted from US EPA (2000) 
 
 
The question is how to define and select BMPs for the evaluation in this thesis, and to what 
extent the selected BMPs might be applicable in the Ping river basin. In order to set standard 
on the selection of BMPs, the author assembled a set of what might be termed as 
‘benchmark’ reference documents. Literature search was conducted, and sources of 
information were from the US EPA (2000), Florida Department of Agriculture and 
Consumer Services (2004; 2005), and Parsons and Boman (2006). The complexity in BMP 
selection dealt with the breadth of practices and their effectivenesses. These issues are 
beyond the personal judgement of the authors, and the selection was undertaken in 
consultation with academics and representatives from government agencies. 
 
To do this, BMPs from the benchmark studies were listed and presented to the experts3
                                                          
3  The expert panels included i) Dr Sanchai Tantayaporn, former Deputy Secretary-General, 
Deparment of Agriculture; ii) Assoc Prof Dr Charlie Navanugraha, Faculty of Environment and 
Resource Studies, Mahidol Univeristy; iii) Wit Namruengsri, Horticultural Research Institute, 
Department of Agriculture; iv) Pornsiri Kanayai, Royal Irrigation Department; and v) two 
anonymous government officials. 
. A 
data matrix (Figure 1-3) was used to categorise BMPs. The matrix consisted of two 
dimensions, which were purposes of BMPs adoption and functional categories of BMPs. The 
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purposes of adoption were classified into four groups, and were: water resource 
management; erosion control and sediment management; pest management; and nutrient 
management. The functional categories represented BMP management approach, and were: 
Good Husbandry; Vegetative Practice; and Structural Practice.  
 
 
Purposes of BMP adoption 
Functional categories of BMPs 
Good Husbandry Vegetative Practice Structural Practice 
Water resource management    
Erosion control & sediment 
management    
Pest management    
Nutrient management    
Figure 1-3: Data matrix to categorise BMPs 
 
The next step was a BMP selection. In general, effectiveness is an important criteria in the 
selection of BMP. However, in this thesis neither field experiment nor simulation model was 
done to examine BMP efficiency. As such, information of the effectiveness of all BMPs in 
terms of key pollution variables (e.g. BOD, N and P) is not available. Rather, a broader array 
of BMPs from literature was identified as appropriate for managing citrus farm pollultion. 
The experts then evaluated and selected BMPs based on other four criteria.  
 
First, to gain farmers’ acceptance the selected BMPs should have a low cost especially 
installation costs such as materias and labours. Second, the selected BMPs should be easy to 
implement. This means that the technology is not complex and does not dramatically change 
farmers’ routine practices. Third, the selected BMPs should be feasible and practical. There 
should not be any physical constraints at the site that may restrict or preclude the use of 
BMPs. Forth, a regular maintenance for selected BMPs should not be costly regarding who 
should responsible for the maintenance and what equipment is required to perform the 
maintenance. Additionally, it should be noted that most of the experts are policymakers who 
are apt to know applicable national policies regarding the implementation of BMPs. 
Accordingly, to a degree, the selection of BMPs is based on the likeliness that they will be 
promoted in the Ping river basin.  
 
Based on the expert judgement, the short list in each of the categories was decided, and 
twelve measures were selected for the analysis. Table 1-5 outlines the final twelve BMPs. 
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Twelve BMPs included in this thesis are consistent with, or exceed minimum requirements, 
contained in the benchmark documents. Based on the main functionality of each BMP, there 
were three BMP categories. First, Good Husbandry contained four BMPs, which were a 
maintenance of watering system, an herbicide application within tree canopy, restrictions in 
pesticide application and a soil analysis. Second, Vegetative Practice included a vegetative 
cover, mulching techniques, vegetative buffer strips, and grassed waterways. Third, 
Structural Practice contained an on-site pond, a terracing system, a mix-load and wash-down 
site, and riparian setbacks. 
 
 Table 1-5: Descriptions of selected BMPs 
Good Husbandry 
Work load based on the daily work and personal responsibility of farmers. 
Scheduling water structure Maintenance irrigation or watering structures during dry season.  
Apply herbicide within tree 
canopy 
Apply herbicide or mow only within the canopy dripline of the 
tree. 
Basic restrictions for pesticide 
application 
Keep record of all pesticide applied. This includes brand/ 
product name, total amount applied, target site/ location of 
application site, application time, and method of 
application. Also, maintenance and calibrate all spraying 
machines.  
Soil analysis Test of organic matters and apply fertiliser, in particular organic 
fertiliser, to match with crops’ need. 
Vegetative Practice 
Need a regular interval of inspection in order to ensure proper functioning. 
Vegetative cover Keep grass or vegetation cover on the soil surface in between 
tree line. 
Mulching Use protective blanket of straw, residue, gravel or synthetic 
material on soil surface. 
Vegetative buffer strip Buffer strips consisting of planted or naturally occurring 
vegetation, such as shrubs, trees, and plants are 
recommended for any cultivated land with less than a 45 
degree slope. 
Grassed waterway Construct grassed waterways, repair and reseed bare or eroded 
spots quickly. 
Structural Practices 
Mainly engineered control devices and systems requiring high amount of initial investment costs. 
On-site retention storage Build of retention pond.  
Terracing Create wide steps on a gentle gradient. This is recommended 
for cultivated land with more than 30 degree slope. 
Mix-load and wash-down site Build permanent station minimally consisting of a concrete 
containment pad with a collection sump, a water supply 
and a roof to minimise entry of wind-driven rain.  
Riparian setbacks Establish distances, approximately 30 meters width, between 
natural watercourse and cultivated area. 
Notes:   
1) The benchmark documents were US EPA (2000); Florida Department of Agriculture 
and Consumer Services (2005; 2004); and Parsons and Boman (2006). 




On the other hand, four BMP groups were identified based on the purpose of, and the major 
consequences from, the adoption. First, a maintenance of watering system, vegetative cover 
and on-site pond were recommended in order to secure water resource. Second, herbicide 
applications, mulching, and terracing farming aimed to reduce the rate of soil erosion. Third, 
safe applications of pesticide, vegetative buffer strips, and a mix-load and wash-down site 
were to reduce the impacts from pesticide application. Fourth, a soil analysis, grassed 




1.2 Research Objectives 
 
1.2.1 General statement 
The nature of nonpoint source pollution suggests that direct effluent discharge regulation is 
unfeasible and managing pollutants at source might be more cost-effective. BMPs, from an 
economic perspective, are a preferable solution for nonpoint source pollution management 
with the side-effect of broader environmental benefits (Stanley 2000). Considering BMP 
adoption as a common voluntary approach to tackle farm pollution, many studies have 
attempted to investigate factors that determine farmers’ willingness to adopt BMPs 
(Campbell et al. 2004). However, in the promotion and marketing of voluntary approaches, 
there is often an implicit assumption that farmer behaviour towards adoption are 
homogenous, suggesting a surprising lack of research around behavioural responses to 
environmental policy instruments (Shogren and Taylor 2008). This suggests that more 
research needs to be focussed on identifying underlying attitudinal positions that may then 
explain alternative behavioural responses.   
 
Further, the study of BMP adoption entails a challenging problem in cooperation because 
BMPs often involve short-term costs for a producer, while the benefits are often long-term 
and uncertain (Lubell and Fulton 2008). The ensuing debate is not helped by an absence of a 
scientific evidence-base specifically linking the emerging agricultural causes and impacts of 
nonpoint source pollution. As the adoption of BMPs imposes costs on farmers, government 
might consider an intervention to provide incentives for farmers to participate. A study to 
understand farm level costs and to assess the costs and benefits involved across the whole 
life of the BMP programme is needed to inform policy decisions.  
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1.2.2 Objectives of the study 
The general objectives of this thesis are: i) to understand the behaviours and attitudes of 
citrus farmers in their decision on BMP adoption; and ii) to consider policy implications in 
the context of potential payment for ecosystem services (PES) programmes in Thailand. The 
more specific objectives of this thesis are outlined as follows: 
A) Cost investigation 
A1) To investigate the cost components of each BMP;  
A2) To explore the extent to which farmers’ perceived costs can affect stated 
adoption intention  
B) Behavioural intentions 
B1) To understand farmers’ conservation behaviours and underlying determinants 
of behaviour; 
B2) To identify the most preferred BMP amongst farmers; 
C) Attitudes study 
C1) To address differences and similarities in farmers’ beliefs and attitudes 
towards BMPs 
D) Policy implications 
D1) To make policy recommendations regarding the development of PES 
programme to protect water quality from farm pollution 
 
1.3 Research Methods 
 
The ultimate aim of this thesis is to make policy implications. Typically, policymakers are 
faced with at least three challenges. The first is how to investigate real information from 
stakeholders, and to understand the underlying logic that could result in adoption behaviour. 
The second are the factors that potentially affect willingness to adopt such policies. The third 
is how to translate the needs of stakeholder to development agencies. The array of objectives 
addressed in this thesis requires multiple approaches for collecting and verifying 
information, which then will offer insights for policy implications. As such, three 
independent studies are proposed and are: i) a farm cost analysis; ii) an application of the 
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Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and associated statistical analysis; and iii) an 
application of Q-Methodology and Q factor analysis.  
 
Figure 1-4 illustrates stand-alone objectives of each study and its contribution value for 
policy implication addressing a water-related PES programme. First, the farm cost analysis is 
proposed to investigate the cost component of each BMP. It is expected that information on 
economic costs can be used to further explore the extent to which farmers’ perceived cost 
may affect their stated intention to adopt a variety of BMPs. Overall, results offer an 
understanding of the total costs incurred by farmers and to provide information on incentive 
levels for policymakers, given that financial assistance is needed to induce farmers’ 
participation.  
 




Second, the application of TPB and statistical analysis are expected to give insights into 
dominant factors influencing the adoption, and to identify the most preferred BMPs amongst 
farmers. These findings will provide basic information for the design of more responsive 
environmental policy according to differences in psychological and socio-economic 
variables between farmers. Third, the Q application is used to investigate farmers’ latent 
attitudes and to identify the ways environmental issues are perceived. The technique of 
factor analysis can segment farmers based on their perceptions towards BMPs. This 
information is useful for an in-depth analysis to discover farmers’ concerns, which could 
deter BMP adoption.  
 
1.4 Thesis Structure 
 
This thesis contains seven chapters (Figure 1-5). Chapter 1 presents the background to water 
pollution in Thailand, and highlights farm nonpoint source pollution as one of the major 
causes. It reviews the current state of citrus production in the Ping river basin, which is the 
case study in this thesis. A risk of water contamination from intensive farming has suggested 
a need for preventive measures. In this chapter, twelve BMPs have been proposed as tools to 
control and manage farm pollution at the point of origin. This is followed by research 
objectives and research method.  
 
Chapter 2 reviews the research rationale and methodologies. It presents a general overview 
of water pollution, and its negative impacts. The economic perspective on the causes of 
water pollution is reviewed. This is followed by a series of pollution control approaches, 
which highlight the command and control approach and market-based instruments. Particular 
attention is paid to payment for watershed service (PWS) as a forming market-based 
transaction.  This chapter also reviews the methodologies proposed in this thesis. It discusses 
the weaknesses of the rationality assumption inherent in traditional economic theory, and 
suggests that alternative approaches are needed to investigate underlying factors in adoption 
decisions making.  
 
With the notion that cost is the main barrier for adoption new practices, chapter 3 offers the 
analysis of costs incurred by farmers. Total costs of twelve BMPs, including first year 
installation costs, annual maintenance costs, and opportunity costs of land are estimated. For 
14 
 
the comparison purpose, these costs are subjected to annualisation. The cost estimates also 
provide information for the investigation of how perceived costs may affect farmers’ 
adoption decision, which is proposed in chapter 5. 
 
 
Figure 1-5: Thesis structure 
 
Following the theme discussed in chapter 2, chapter 4 offers a study based on TPB. It 
outlines the main constructs of TPB, and discusses psychological variables and other 
external variables to the theory. This chapter also sheds light on elicitation study and content 
analysis, which are needed in the early stage for questionnaire development. It then 
introduces the fieldwork which focused on the household survey, explaining the sampling 
method, sample size calculation, and data collection. The personal interviews are conducted 
with 218 farmers. Of these, 126 are upstream farmers and 92 are downstream farmers. 
Moreover, this chapter provides a descriptive characterisation of farmers, explores the most 
preferred BMPs amongst farmers, and illustrates the differences between farmers in the 
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upstream and downstream of the Ping river basin. These findings offer basic information for 
the analysis in chapter 5 and chapter 6.  
 
Chapter 5 takes up the issue of the factors influencing BMP adoption in greater detail. 
Drawing information from chapter 3 and chapter 4, it first explores the way perceived cost, 
occurring at the time decision is made, may influence farmers’ stated adoption intention. To 
illustrate a relationship between these two variables, data are presented in a graphical form. 
This interpretation is supported by the results from farmer interviews. Moreover, adopting 
information from the descriptive statistics in chapter 4, this chapter then proceeds to examine 
the influence of psychological and external factors that influence farmers’ adoption 
intention, through a logistic model. The results from the best fit model are presented and 
discussed.  
 
Chapter 6 adopts Q-Methodology and focuses on the study of subjective positions based on 
farmers’ perception of BMPs.  A TPB sample of 218 farmers is used as a sampling frame for 
this study. To get a representative samples of farmers based on farm size, education level and 
age, 72 farmers are selected for the Q analysis.  This chapter discusses the development of 
concourse and criteria to select statements for a sorting process. In the survey, farmers are 
asked to sort these statements and are followed-up with the interviews. Factor analysis is 
used to segment farmers according to their preferences towards each statement. 
Characteristics of each farmer group are explained based on salient statements and 
supporting information from the interviews.  
 
Chapter 7 concludes the key findings from the empirical works in each chapter. These 
findings then contribute to a discussion about the possibility to development a water-related 
PES programme, and offer insights for policy implications. This chapter then outlines the 
limitations of methodologies employed in this thesis and recommends directions for future 
improvement.  Finally, the recommendations for future work in the context of knowledge 






2 RESEARCH RATIONALE AND METHODOLOGY REVIEW 
 
Nonpoint source pollution generated by farm activities can spread throughout the watershed 
and discharge into water bodies. In Thailand, the problem of water pollution is one of the 
greatest national concerns. Thailand has witnessed an increase of organic water pollution 
since 1980s (The World Bank 2001). Recently, the government has initiated a BMP 
programme to control farm nonpoint source pollution at the watershed level. In this thesis, 
citrus farming in the Ping river basin is used as a case study because traditional farm 
management, such as intensive use of chemicals and fertiliser, and forest encroachment 
(which induces soil erosion), have contributed to water contamination. As applied in 
developed countries, such as the United States, BMPs are accepted as a potential tool for 
coping with nonpoint source pollution (US EPA 2003). However, the extent to which these 
practices will be voluntarily adopted by Thai citrus farmers is questioned.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis aims to investigate farmers’ behaviour and attitudes towards the 
adoption of BMPs in the management of farm pollution, targeting the improvement of water 
quality. This chapter presents a general overview of water pollution as a consequence of 
farm nonpoint source pollution, and reviews methodologies proposed in this thesis (Figure 2-
1). The first section (section 2.1) offers an overview of water quality degradation and is 
followed by a discussion of water pollution problems from an economic perspective. It then 
proceeds to highlight the command and control approach (CAC), and market-based 
instruments (MBIs), mainly focusing on payment for ecosystem services (PES) and the 





Figure 2-1: Thesis structure 
 
The second section (section 2.2) presents methodologies used in this thesis. Specifically, an 
analysis of the limitations of neoclassical economic assumptions in relation to adoption 
behaviours, calls for an alternative analytical approach to guide effective policy intervention. 
Alternative decision theory, the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), and Q-Methodology 
are reviewed. This chapter closes with a summary (section 2.3) of key issues. 
 
2.1 A Global Perspective of Agricultural Nonpoint Source Pollution 
 
This section reviews the problem of water quality deterioration as a result of farm pollutants, 
often known as nonpoint source pollution. It begins with a definition of nonpoint source 
pollution, and the impacts of farm discharges on the water quality of the receiving water. 
Causes of water pollution are discussed in an economic context. Further, the roles of a 
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traditional CAC and MBIs, which are inspired by the polluter pays principle (PPP), are also 
discussed. This leads to a review of the concept of PES as an economic incentive approach 
for any individual providing flows of ecosystem services. The review in the following 
section further focuses on a typical characteristic of payment for watershed service (PWS) at 
a global scale. This section is closed by a review of the establishment of designed contracts, 
known as BMPs, in developed countries.   
 
2.1.1 An overview of water quality degradation  
Water pollutants are normally sorted into point and nonpoint sources (Peirce et al. 1998). 
Some differences between point and nonpoint sources are shown in Table 2-1. Point source 
pollution, especially from industrial and urban wastewater, is regarded as a main source of 
water pollution. Point source pollution has been managed through command and control 
strategies, and the construction of wastewater treatment plants in pollution prone areas. 
Currently, challenges are presented by nonpoint source pollution and specifically water 
pollution as a result of agricultural activities. This has become a major concern in many 
countries (Segerson and Wu 2006; Gunningham and Sinclair 2005; Xepapadeas 1995).   
 
Table 2-1: Comparisons between point and nonpoint source pollution 
Point source pollution Nonpoint source pollution 
Enter the receiving water bodies at some 
identifiable single or multiple point location 
carrying pollutants. 
Enter the receiving surface waters in a diffuse 
manner at intermittent intervals that are 
related mostly to the occurrence of 
meteorological events. 
Efforts to clean point source pollution intensify 
and billion were spent on the installation of 
treatment plants. 
Difficult or impossible to be monitored at the 
point of origin. 
In most countries these sources are regulated, 
their control is mandated and a permit is 
required for the waste discharges from 
these sources. 
Abatement of diffuse load is focused on land 
and run-off management practices. 
Source: adapted from Campbell et al. (2004); Novotny (2003) 
 
Water pollution happens when the pollutants move from land to water bodies (Frost 1999). 
The US EPA (2003) identifies six main sources of water pollution caused by agricultural 
practices. These are erosion and sedimentation, animal waste, nutrient, pesticide, grazing 
management and irrigation water management. The relative importance of pollutant 
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concentration for each agricultural activity is different (Table 2-2). For example, crop 
production in non-irrigated farms contributes to high concentrations of suspended 
solid/sediment, nutrient, and pesticide in water, but it might have negligible acidity effect on 
overall water quality. 





BOD Nutrients Toxic metals Pesticides Pathogens 
Salinity




H M H N-L H N-L N N N 
Irrigated crop 
production 
L L-M H N-L M-H N H N N 
Pasture and 
rangeland 
L-M L-M H N N N-L N-L N N 
Animal 
production 
M H M N-L N-L L-H N-L N N 
Notes: 1) TDS = Total Dissolved Solid; BOD = Biochemical Oxygen Demand 
 2) N = Negligible; L = Low; M = Moderate; H = High 
Source: Peirce et al. (1998) 
 
Consequences of nonpoint source pollution on water quality are typically different from 
place to place and from time to time (examples of studies are Wang 2006; Ichiki et al. 2003; 
Nakasone and Yamamoto 2003; Agrawal 1999; Bendoricchio et al. 1999). In general, 
nonpoint source pollution from agricultural activities contributes to poor water quality by 
means of, for example, deterioration of aquatic habitats, eutrophication, in-stream 
photosynthesis reduction, and turbidity (Campbell et al. 2004). The negative environmental 
impacts from poor water quality represent a market failure, in that these negative 
externalities impose unwanted costs on society (Bromley 2007). As water quality is not 
always traded in the market, this results in a socially inefficient level of output and/ or 
consumption. The term market failure is used to describe the condition in which equilibrium 
in markets fails to achieve an efficient allocation of goods and services, or the condition in 
which social marginal benefit is not equal to social marginal cost (Zerbe and McCurdy 





2.1.2 Water pollution: an economic perspective 
In terms of economics, a market refers to any set-up that enables an interaction between 
consumer and producer to exchange a well-defined commodity. By ‘set-up’ a market needs 
not require a location where exchanges are operated, for example an online market (Aldridge 
2005). In microeconomic theory a buyer’s behaviour is illustrated by demand, while a 
seller’s behaviour is presented by supply. Demand is defined by the quantity of goods and 
services that consumers will buy at each and every price charged, whereas supply is the 
quantity of goods and services offered by producers at each and every possible price. A 
transaction may happen at a dictated price, but an equilibrium price can be established by the 
interaction of demand with the quantity available of supply (Begg et al 2003). However, 
sometimes the market is unable to perform its function effectively. In the context of water 
pollution, it does not reflect all costs of products or where demand is not clear. Three main 
causes of market failure are appeared: the characteristics of common pool resources (CPR), 
externality, and lack of property rights. 
 
2.1.2.1 Characteristics of common pool resources (CPR) 
Goods and services are defined by two important attributes, which are excludability and 
subtractability (Figure 2-2). Excludability refers to a prevention of an individual who does 
not pay for that thing from enjoying the benefit of it. Subtractability deals with the situation 
whenever consumption of someone diminishes the availability to consume by another. Water 
quantity and water quality are examples for a typical CPR (Sarker et al. 2008a). It is difficult 
to exclude others from consumption and the water body is easily depleted. For example, 
access to watershed services such as flow regulation and water quality control are not easily 
limited, and the amount of water consumed or polluted by people living upstream is 
unavailable for those living downstream. 
 
 
  Subtractability 
  Low High 
Excludability 
Difficult Public goods or free goods 
Common pool 
resources 
Easy Toll or club goods Private goods 
Figure 2-2: Natures of goods and services 




Regarding the characteristics of CPR in which all users have equal access to the resources, 
degradation of resource systems is likely to continue as long as individuals enjoy the value 
derived from resource units (Dietz et al. 2002). Difficulty in exclusion of consumption and a 
high degree of subtractability can cause excessive resource exploitation. This is a rationale of 
the so-called ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (Hardin 1968). Hardin explained that since private 
costs of consumption do not reflect total social costs and users logically act to maximise their 
benefits, whereas the costs of use are generally shared amongst all users. This leads to the 
destruction and the collapse of the resource.  
 
2.1.2.2 Theory of externalities 
Water pollution can also be viewed as an externality issue. Externality exists whenever the 
activities of an acting party affect the welfare of another party, and the acting party is not 
faced with the cost of the impact (Prato 1998). In the case of CPR, externalities can be 
classified into two types, and are within-boundary and cross-boundary externalities (Sarker 
et al. 2008b). Within-boundary externality occurs when contaminated water reduces the 
quality of water available to other uses of the same system. Cross-boundary externality 
occurs when contaminated water affects water quality in downstream catchments. Problems 
of water pollution also involve unidirectional externalities in that impacts flow downstream 
(Sarker et al. 2008a). 
 
With pure externalities, people can take no account of costs and benefits that their action 
imposes on others, and a market failure arises because there is neither a market nor a market 
price for externality (Begg et al. 2003). An existence of externalities brings about economic 
inefficiency leading to private equilibrium, and undersupply or oversupply of externalities is 
not a Pareto optimal (Haab and McConnell 2002). Consider Figure 2-3 (left) under a 
perfectly competitive market, suppose there are broader costs to society, and the social costs 
of supply will exceed the private costs. If the producer does not take account of a negative 
externality by supplying at point E1 where private maximise profit equals to Marginal Cost 
(MC) = Demand (D) = P1= Q1 , this leads to an oversupply which equalled to Q1Q2. If the 
producer does not concern for external costs, they are likely to produce/ supply at point E1. 
However, faced with extra external costs will suggest a rational supply (marginal cost) 
scheduled marginal social cost (MSC). By counting marginal supply costs with demand, the 
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new MSC will suggest that point E2 is the optimal level of supply. Hence, by faced with the 
external cost suggested, the producer reduces their supply of Q2Q1. 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Negative externality (left); Positive externality (right) 
 
The negative external costs are oversupplied. In contrast, positive externalities are 
undersupplied. Consider Figure 2-3 (right), for example, D presents private marginal benefit 
while D′ presents social marginal benefit. The private marginal benefit includes only benefits 
received by producers. Suppose that a new technology for pollution abatement is introduced, 
it will have a social marginal benefit that is higher. If the producer takes only his/ her private 
benefit into account, the producer will operate at E1 using less technology rather than at E′. 
In this case; therefore, total undersupply equals to Q′Q1. 
 
2.1.2.3 Lack of property rights 
Market failure can be viewed in terms of an absence of, or weak, property rights (Prato 1998; 
Papandreou 1994; Boadway and Bruce 1984). Property rights are social arrangements that 
permit the use and disposal, govern the ownership, and transfer of the ownership of goods 
and services (Callan and Thomas 2000; Parkin et al. 1997; Bromley 1992). The Coase 
Theorem (Coase 1960) shows that when property rights are not clearly defined, producers or 





Consider Figure 2-4 with an assumption of perfect competition in which a market will 
perform effectively, D presents the market demand curve, and MC presents the market 
supply curve. MC is the sum of the marginal cost curves above average variable costs for all 
producers. The market equilibrium is point E1 where the profit maximising production is Q1, 
where P1 = MC is the privately efficient level of production. At this point, private producers 
typically do not consider environmental damage caused by their production. For example, 
runoff from farms carrying inorganic chemicals is released directly into adjacent streams and 




Figure 2-4: Property rights and market failure 
 
Suppose that environmental damages are included in the marginal costs of production, it 
gives the marginal social costs, MSC, of production. Therefore, the socially efficient level of 
production is Q2 where P2 = MSC. Considering the definition of property rights if farmers are 
granted a right to pollute water, they discard the environmental damage and select to produce 
at Q1, which is their privately profit maximisation quantity. In contrast, if farmers do not 
have right to pollute water, they must accept to produce at Q2 which represents a socially 
optimal quantity. The example clearly shows that with an absence of well-defined property 





In the context of CPR, resource degradation occurs because well-defined and enforceable 
property rights do not exist (Quinn et al. 2010; Bromley 1991). Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
identified five property rights with respect to natural resources. These are access, 
withdrawal, management exclusion and alienation. Access is the right to enter a resource. 
Withdrawal is the right to obtain products from a resource. Management is the right to make 
decisions on the resource allocation. Exclusion is the right to decide who should have access, 
withdrawal and management rights. Alienation is the right to sell or lease a resource. These 
different bundles of property rights are distributed to different types of property right holders 
(Table 2-3). For example, the owner of the property holds all five rights, while the authorised 
user is only allowed to enter and to extract the resource. The sources of these rights may be 
either enforced by government or defined among resource users (Schlager and Ostrom 
1992).   
 
Table 2-3: Bundles of rights associated with right holders 
 
Property rights 
Types of right holders 
Owner Proprietor Claimant Authorised user 
Access x x x x 
Withdrawal x x x x 
Management x x x  
Exclusion x x   
Alienation x    
Source: Schlager and Ostrom (1992) 
 
In terms of agricultural policy, Bromley and Hodge (1990) defined two starting points for an 
analysis of property issue. The first property structure is the one where property rights are 
given to farmers. The other is the property right allocated to the state, who acts as an agent 
for others, such as urban residents, and rural poor. Different property right arrangements                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
will have different production effects, and thereby causing different levels of pollution 
produced. Hodge (1989) suggested that a reference point can be used to identify who should 
be responsible for a desirable level of environmental quality (i.e. who should bear the costs 
of achieving the environmental goals). Two different mechanisms to appropriate the costs of 




Under the PPP, government sets mandatory standards to control and manage farm pollution, 
and farmers must conform to these regulations. In this circumstance, farmers bear the costs 
such as forgone production income, and investment in new technologies. On the other hand, 
the BPP proposes that desired environmental goals could be achieved through government 
incentives and a voluntary adoption of conservation practices. Farmers adopt innovations for 
the available funds, which are normally collected from taxpayers.  
 
Overall, the issue of market failure in relation to water pollution is characterised by the 
problem of externality, ill-defined property rights, and the characteristics of CPR. The 
existence of externalities leads to a private equilibrium which is not optimal. Externalities 
can be solved if an affected party is compensated for a loss of welfare (Aldridge 2005). 
Coase (1960) proposes two stringent approaches: an institution of legal property rights and 
direct government regulations to specify rights and lessen the externality problem. Coase 
(1960) proposes that the establishment of defined legal property rights in a perfectly 
competitive market, with zero transaction costs, can remove existing externalities. If 
externality is internalised, economic efficiency where the marginal social costs equal to the 
marginal benefit costs is achieved.  
 
However, the establishment of property rights is sometimes practically ineffective in the 
political process (Rose 2002). Government has power to establish property rights, but 
different political goals could bend the assignment of property rights. For example, 
policymakers may be faced with different types of incentive in enforcing claims to 
properties. Land allocation could be viewed as an additional instrument to favour and gain 
supporters. Moreover, in the real world, transaction costs are always greater than zero (Zerbe 
and McCurdy 2000). Accordingly, direct government regulation is often preferable in 
dealing with externality problems.  
 
The nature of agricultural nonpoint source pollution is that pollutants are normally 
discharged into surface water by land-based agricultural activities (Frost 1999), which then 
will be spread throughout a watershed. An incident is an intermittent interval related to 
climatic conditions, in particular, rainfall, and it is unlikely to be monitored or controlled at 
the point of origin (Novotny 2003). In an attempt to correct market mechanisms, government 
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agencies have intervened and chosen a number of different policy instruments. A summary 
of pollution control approaches is discussed as follows. 
 
2.1.3 Pollution control approaches 
The nature of nonpoint source pollution requires that efficient regulation should focus on 
land-use activity, rather than end-of-pipe control. Farm nonpoint source pollution is an 
externality that can be addressed using various forms of government regulation (Novotny 
1998). Policies focusing on pollution control have been inspired by the polluter pays 
principle (PPP), which is influenced by Pigou’s (1920) writings. PPP was first defined and 
recognized as an internationally agreed principle by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in 1972 (OECD 1972). The PPP expresses that 
agents generating pollution should be faced with its full costs. In order to enact the PPP, 
definitions of pollution and polluter must be clearly defined. According to the OECD (2002), 
pollution has been identified as direct and indirect substances or energy introduced by 
humans into the environment causing harmful effects on nature as to threaten human 
welfare, while the polluter is the party responsible for the polluting activities.  
 
By adopting the PPP, externalities can be internalised because the costs of environmental 
destruction are distributed between producers and consumers who are engaged in the 
activity. The costs may be shifted downward or upward in the market, and the costs of 
pollution are internalised into the costs of the product (Rogers 1996). To date, the PPP is 
being implemented through two different policy approaches. These include a command and 
control approach, and the use of market-based instruments. The mechanism, advantages and 
disadvantages of each approach are outlined as follows. 
 
2.1.3.1 Command and control approach 
A command and control (CAC) approach is established to discourage environmentally 
harmful activities. Stavins and Whitehead (1992) state two broad types of CAC approach. 
These are technology-based and performance-based CAC approach. The technology-based 
CAC approach specifies the methods and equipment that producers must adopt to reach a 
target, while the performance-based CAC approach implies setting an overall target for every 
producer, and giving freedom to producers on how to manage to achieve the standard. 
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Asafu-Adjaye (2005) presents three types of standard relating to the CAC approach. Firstly, 
the ambient standard limits the maximum level of pollutants in a given environment. It is 
typically represented as an average concentration level over some period of time. Secondly, 
the emission standard allows a maximum level of permitted discharge. Lastly, a technology 
standard indicates the specific technologies, techniques or practices that producers must 
adopt or install. Examples of CAC are guidelines and permits, federal regulation, uniform 
pollution standards, and technology mandates.  
 
CAC approach offers numerous potential advantages (Harrington and Morgenstern 2004; 
Barde 1994), for example: 
1. There is a longstanding experience with the application of CAC approach in other 
fields, such as health and safety. 
2. CAC approach is the most efficient measure if, for every polluter, the marginal 
cost of abatement equals to the marginal cost of pollutant damage.  
3. Since the standard is precisely set, the objectives can be attained quicker with 
greater certainty.  
4. The polluter prefers CAC approaches to other instruments because of lower 
implementation costs. That is, the polluter is responsible for only expenses relating to 
pollution abatement. 
 
Despite these strengths, there are some concerns about the shortcomings of the CAC 
approach. Harrington and Morgenstern (2004) explain a rationale of high administrative cost 
caused by the huge amount of interaction between the regulator and regulated source and the 
complexity of arranging and applying obligations.  Portney (2003) argues that under the 
CAC approach there is no incentive to invent new technology or modify present processes, 
and a pollution control technique will be fossilised. Pagiola and Platais (2002) state that 
polluters will be penalised if they do not follow the regulations, so polluters may have an 
incentive to conceal their actions. Moreover, Tomich et al. (2004) believe that the CAC 
approach is not suitable to apply with environmental policy because of its nature that 





2.1.3.2 Market-based instruments 
Another approach to control pollution is known as market-based instruments (MBIs). MBIs 
are generally defined as mechanisms within which property rights are voluntarily exchanged 
through pecuniary compensation (Whitten et al. 2003). According to Portney (2003), MBIs 
is a maneuver of government intervention to protect resources by fostering and pushing a 
market to work in the service of the environment. The use of MBIs is becoming more 
widespread, and it is obvious that MBIs are used as complementarities with CAC approach 
in mixed systems other than being used as substitutes for regulations (Nicolaisen et al. 1991). 
OECD has identified seven types of MBIs (Barde 1994). These are emission charges or 
taxes, user charges, product charges or taxes, administrative charges or fees, marketable 
permits, deposit-refund systems, and subsidies.  
 
The implementation of MBIs offers numerous advantages (Bishop et al. 2006; Harrington 
and Morgenstern 2004; Gouyon 2003; Pagiola 2002; Austin 1999) as follows: 
1. Compared with a traditional direct government regulation, MBIs are more cost 
effective and more flexible in promoting innovation over times.  
2. By employing the measure, enforcement costs are reduced due to better alliance 
between private and public interests.  
3. MBIs, such as tax, can be a source of revenue for government because rights to 
pollute can be formally traded in arranged markets.  
4. MBIs, such as payment for ecosystem services, can be an additional source of 
income for the rural poor if the poor families are providers of natural resources. 
5. MBIs offer greater capacity in dealing with smaller and nonpoint source pollution 
such as agriculture runoff. Moreover, they allow for hands-off regulation and decentralised 
decision-making as well as allowing polluters to act freely provided that all requirements are 
met.  
 
Though MBIs are superior to CAC regulation mechanisms in terms of efficiency of 
implementation and effectiveness of outcomes (Harrington and Morgenstern 2004; Austin 
1999), the approach suffers some drawbacks. Harrington and Morgenstern (2004) claim that 
polluters under MBIs are charged higher costs than those directed by the CAC approach 
because they are asked to pay a fee for the remaining pollution. Moreover, the application of 
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MBIs can cause unpredicted amounts of pollution especially in cases of taxation where 
polluters are allowed to release waste as much as they want as long as they can pay for the 
tax. Tomich et al. (2004) argue that the development of MBIs in the real world is difficult 
since each polluter faces different cost structures and the optimal reward is not easily 
determined. Finally, the implementation of MBIs possibly leads to undesirable outcomes if 
they are designed to promote political or ideological agendas instead of compensating an 
affected party. 
 
It is obvious that most MBIs have been initiated through public policies despite the fact that 
privately negotiated incentive-based solutions are possible. Recently, interest in payments 
for more direct transactions (e.g., private-public, private-private) has led to a focus on PES. 
PES has been introduced as a policy solution for realigning the private and social benefits 
resulting from decisions relating to the environment (Jack et al. 2008). PES has a 
characteristic of MBIs, and it is different from CAC in that it lets the price mechanism works 
to allocate resources. Though CAC may also affect the market, it does not have a direct 
impact on either cost or price. Level of farm pollution is fixed by mandatory regulations, but 
not by individual’s economic preferences. 
 
2.1.3.3 Payment for ecosystem services  
An ecosystem service is a benefit of nature, directly or indirectly enjoyed and/or consumed 
to sustain and raise human wellbeing (Costanza et al. 1997; Daily 1997). The Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment (2005; 2003) identified four categories of ecosystem functions as 
provisioning, regulating, supporting and cultural services4
                                                          
4  Provisioning services are products obtained from ecosystems such as food and fibre and fresh 
water. Regulating services are benefits from the regulation of ecosystem processes such as the 
regulation of climate and water. Supporting services refer to natural processes that are necessary 
for the production of other ecosystem services. These are, for example, soil formation and 
retention, nutrient cycling and water cycling. Cultural services are benefits humans obtain from 
ecosystems through spiritual enrichment, recreation such as aesthetic values. 
. The PES programmes have been 
adopted by several institutions, such as the World Bank, the International for Environment 
and Development, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, and the Centre for 
International Forestry Research. Though there is no global definition of PES programme, 
PES is commonly classified by five criteria, which are: 1) a voluntary transaction, with 2) a 




4) from an environmental service provider 5) given the service is continuously delivered 
only when payments are made (Wunder 2005; Wunder et al. 2005).  
 
The rationale of PES is that since landholders do not receive compensation for the services 
their land generates for the others, they have little economic incentive to take these services 
into account in the management of their land. Basically, PES is a reward mechanism to 
support positive environmental externalities. Rewards, or payments, in terms of money or in-
kind incomes are transferred from beneficiaries to landholders who provide certain 
ecosystem services (Figure 2-5) (Wunder 2005; Mayrand and Paquin 2004). The maximum 
payment from beneficiaries should at least be equal to or greater than the minimum cost 
incurred by the landholders (Sierra and Russman 2006).  
 
Two extreme cases of cost incured by farmers could happen in the BMP adoption, decreased 
returns and increased costs. Considering figure 2-5 (left), upstream farmers receive less 
benefit from BMP adoption ( B) than the benefits they receive from the current farming 
practices ( A) (i.e. the reduction in fruit quality results in the lower selling price). A transfer 
payment from downstream beneficiaries ( C) can make the BMP adoption more attractive 
for the upstream farmers. Figure 2-5 (right) presents the case when cost is increased from the 
BMP adoption. Operation and maintenance costs, for example, are additional costs ( X) to 
the current farming practices ( W). A transfer payment from downstream beneficiaries 
should at least be equal to ( Y) or greater than ( Y +  Z) the total costs incurred by 
landholders. The ultimate aim of PES is to reconcile conflicting interests through 
compensation and to find solutions for preserving ecosystem services that are vulnerable 
because of mismanagement by establishing a missing market and promoting the protection 





Figure 2-5: Logic of payment for ecosystem services: i) decreased returns (left); and ii) 
increased costs (right) 
Source: adapted from Pagiola and Platais (2007; 2002) 
 
PES is one of the market mechanisms that will properly function only if the potential gains 
from trade outweigh the costs incurred in the market process. The concept of PES derives 
from the notion of allocative efficiency, where marginal external benefit is added to marginal 
private benefit to internalise a positive externality. The possibility to establish PES depends 
on the concurrence of direct compensation either in monetary terms or in-kind incomes, and 
development of markets for specific environmental services. The success of PES at any scale 
requires the right combination between local capacity and a willingness to participate from 
all stakeholders (Rosa et al. 2004; Whitten et al. 2003).  
 
PES is considered to be more efficient than a conventional CAC approach, especially when 
applied within a developing countries context (Engel et al. 2008). Past performance of many 
regulatory and public investments suggested that regulations are difficult to apply if 
landholders are spatially dispersed (Pagiola and Platais 2002). Additionally, the regulation 
possibly impose costs on poor land users, preventing them from undertaking individually 
profitable activities. The public investment especially remedial measures are regularly 
imperfect and sometimes more costly than preventive measures (Tomich et al. 2004). PES is 
also superior to the CAC approach in that it can work by creating the incentive system for 
conservation where the government policy promoting redistribution of resource has failed 




Furthermore, a PES programme can be adopted as a business-type approach for 
conservation, which certainly leads to a more sustainable outcome. This is because it offers 
continuous flows of payments and a viable business in the long run (Bishop et al. 2006; 
Wunder 2006; Mayrand and Paquin, 2004). PES, in principle, can complete the goal of both 
environmental protection and poverty reduction. Duncan (2006) defined an ‘equitable PES’ 
as any PES that aimed to conserve nature as well as to bring substantial benefits to the poor 
in a just and equitable way. She argued that the rural poor, including indigenous people, 
were the key active players in conservation programmes thus they should not be excluded 
from the beginning of the plan. Rosa et al. (2004) believed that the rural poor had an ability 
to turn degraded natural resources into an environmentally rich system, producing ecosystem 
services which could then be sold to outsiders. It is expected that PES as a multipurpose tool 
will ultimately lead to equitable wealth distribution, increased awareness on the economic 
value of ecosystems, and economic development as a whole (Kosoy et al. 2007; Pagiola 
2005; Landell-Mills 2002). 
 
Though a PES programme offers several advantages, there are some criticisms about its 
efficiency and payment scheme.  The criticisms to programme efficiency are relevant to the 
lack of permanence and the tangible of additional services. Engel et al. (2008) argued that a 
permenance of PES programme could be hindered by changes in external conditions such as 
changes in market prices of agricultural crops competing with natural resource conservation. 
Further question is whether there is any difference in the provision of ecosystem services 
between the with- and without-PES programmes (Wunder 2007).  Policymakers should 
aware of these limitations when making policy implications; otherwise a PES programme 
may put tensions between service sellers and buyers. For example, to address the criticism 
on PES efficiency, PES contracts should be flexible and provide enough rooms for further 
amendments such as when new conditions are needed (Engel et al. 2008). It is also necessary 
that a baseline should be established so that additionality as an incremental service delivered 
from a PES programme can be determined (Wunder 2007).  
 
Another criticism focuses on the payment scheme leading to the questions of equity and 
fairness. The PES approach contrasts with PPP in that PES compensates those who provide 
positive externalities other than imposing additional costs to those who create negative 
externalities. That is, PES payment mechanism relies on the BPP, and leads to the questions 
regarding policy implications: Do we pay the right people? Do we pay for the rights that 
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farmers never had? From a pure efficiency perspective, there is no difference either the PPP 
or BPP is applied (Pagiola et al. 2005). Both PPP and BPP will bring about the same results 
provided that markets are competitive, property rights are well-defined, and transaction cost 
is zero (Coase 1960). However, these conditions are unlikely to happen in the real world. As 
such, a key challenge is to determine the appropriate reference level, or an analysis of 
property issue raised by Bromley and Hodge (1990).  
 
Most PES programmes are driven by beneficiaries’ demand (Landell-Mill and Porras 2002), 
and this implicitly arranges a demand-driven de facto property rights to farmers or 
landowners. Accordingly, a payment mechanism based on BPP sounds reasonable since 
farmers have the rights over agricultural land. Salzman (2005) asserted that this situation is 
different from the case when pollution regulations are set to limit emissions from point 
sources, such as factory. This is because PPP is inefficient to enforce dispersed nonpoint 
sources, and we are asking the poors to adopt activities above and beyond what they would 
have done. Therefore, if beneficiaries want an improvement beyond the current standards, 
they should pay. This discussion is in favour of conservation of ecosystem services in 
developing countries, and where the adoption of PPP would impose costs on poorer 
landowners rather than on better-of beneficiaries (Wertz-Kanounnikoff 2006; Pagiola et al. 
2005). 
 
2.1.4 Payments for watershed services  
As discussed above, PES is comparatively an effective, flexible and cost efficient 
mechanism than any other conservation approaches. It can be implemented where the 
application of other government policies would be impossible due to socioeconomic or 
political aspects. Furthermore, PES mechanism fulfills ecosystem conservation and poverty 
reduction goals. Among the vast services ecosystems provide, four most common services 
with ongoing payment programmes are carbon sequestration and storage, biodiversity 
protection, watershed protection, and landscape beauty (Wunder 2005; Wunder et al. 2005). 
The scale on which the four sorts of ecosystem services are perceived differs (Table 2-4). 
Carbon sequestration and storage and biodiversity protection are the greatest concern at 
















Local rural community 0 ++ ++ +++ 
Provincial/ district public & 
policymakers + + ++ +++ 
National public & policymakers + + + +++ 
Global public & policymakers +++ +++ 0 ++ 
Notes: +++ Very important; ++ Important; + Some significance; 0 Not a direct concern 
Source: Jeanes et al. (2006) 
 
In this thesis, particular attention is given to watershed protection. Watersheds provide 
several services, which are products of ecosystem processes. Landell-Mills and Porras 
(2002), and Mayrand and Paquin (2004) defined five services delivered at the watershed 
level. These were water flow regulation, water quality maintenance, erosion and 
sedimentation control, land salinisation reduction, and maintenance of aquatic habitats. 
Tomich et al. (2004) remarked that a peak in public interest regarding watershed always 
happened on five controversial issues, which were on-site effects of soil erosion, off-site 
effects of soil transfer, flooding, seasonal drought, and water pollution. Of the five points, 
pollution from land use was the greatest concern on every scale. In short, watershed services 
are ecosystem services provided by a watershed. These services provide benefits 
downstream, typically in the form of water quantity and water quality, which are obviously 
influenced by upstream land use and farming practices. 
 
A growth of payment for watershed service (PWS) is necessary due to the fact that demand 
for clean water is rising and conventional policies may not be compatible with privately 
owned land. Landell-Mills and Porras (2002) identified 287 PES initiatives, of which 61 
cases were for watershed services, applied in 22 countries. Hope et al. (2007) revealed that 
global interest in the arrangement of PWS was growing as demonstrated by the number of 
projects jumping to over 100 by 2005. The success for applying PES approaches depends on 
many factors. Past experiences revealed that the overall chances of negotiated reward 
mechanisms have relied on (Engel et al. 2008; Jeanes et al. 2006): 
• how shared perception regarding ecosystem functions shapes the interests of 
stakeholders; 
• the extent the trade-offs between providers and buyers affect ecosystem functions; 
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• in what way the existing local institutions restrict decision-making of individuals; and  
• by what method confidence among stakeholders works to reach agreement. 
In the following sections, there is a review of the dimensions and general characteristics of 
PWS programmes. 
 
2.1.4.1 Commodities in the context of payment for watershed services 
The transformation of ecosystem services into commodities that can be sold in the market is 
one of the challenges in establishing PES programmes (Mayrand and Paquin 2004; Landell-
Mills and Porras 2002). A precise service is a prerequisite in defining a commodity since 
each potential beneficiary has a different perception and views regarding needs and values of 
service. Demand for watershed services should be clearly defined and understood in the 
same way. The question of ‘who demands what?’ must be thoroughly answered. For 
example, local residents always request standardised water quality, while downstream 
ecosystems requires enough water to maintain their functions.  
 
Watershed services can be translated into tradable commodities as shown in Table 2-5. IIED 
(2004) suggests a tradable commodity should have at least three features. Firstly, it must be 
tangible. Secondly, it must be included in making any judgment, and finally it is preferably 
based on sound science5
                                                          
5 Tomich et al. (2004) reveal that most of economic valuation of watershed functions depends on the 
studies of soil scientists, hydrologists or physical geographers 
.  Watershed services typically fall into five categories which are 
water quality, water table regulation, water quality and regulation, soil contaminant control, 
and aquatic habitat protection. Each service can be translated into several types of 
commodity. Water quality, for example, can be transformed into four commodities that are 





Table 2-5: Converting watershed services into commodities 
 
Watershed service Commodity Description 
Water quality Designed contract A contract agreed among service providers and downstream beneficiaries in setting series of 
‘best management practice’ for a specific purpose. Landholders must confirm the 
contract in return for set payment.  
 Water quality 
credit 
Point source polluters are allowed for excessive release of pollution as long as they 
invest in nonpoint source pollution reduction 
 Land acquisitions A purchase of land where ecosystem services are available. By this method, land tenures are 
totally transferred from one to another.  
 Conservation 
easement 
A contract between landholders and whoever wants to protect natural ecosystems in a 
particular area. Landholders are paid to manage their land corresponding to the 
conservation objectives. 
 Pollution permit An agreement to set upper limit for pollution released from point source pollution, and 
polluters who discharge less than their quotas can trade the rests to others. 
Water table 
regulation 
Salinity credits Salinity emission limits are traded, while tree planting campaign is promoted in critical areas 
where salinity of surface soil and water body is a major problem.  
 Transpiration 
credits 




Payments for salinity control services are added into existing products. 
 Stream flow 
reduction licenses 
A tradable permit for land-based activities reducing water supply for downstream users. 
Landholders who can decrease their stream flow reduction can sell an excess license to 
the others. 





Contract negotiated between watershed landholder and downstream beneficiaries that 
specifies watershed management activities that will be undertaken in return for set 
payments. 
 Protected area A defined boundary promoted as an ecosystem protection and maintenance area. It is 
normally managed through legal or other effective means. 
 Land acquisition A purchase of land where ecosystem services are available. By this method, land tenures are 
totally transferred from one to another. 
 Water rights An endowment of property rights upon water use. 











Watershed service Commodity Description 
Soil contamination 
control Ecolotree planting Plantation and vegetation systems that filter and absorb contaminated water from soil.  
Aquatic habitat 
protection 
Designed contract  A contract agreed among service providers and downstream beneficiaries in setting series of 
‘best management practice’ for a specific purpose. Landholders must confirm the 
contract in return for set payment. 
 Land leases The rights to protect and conserve the resources are transferred from government to 
whoever devotes for natural ecosystem protections. Government will receive an up-front 
payment and annual fees in return. 
 Salmon safe 
products 
Landholders who comply with arranged management practices regarding salmon sensitive 
land management obtain a financial reward in terms of cap on existing products. 
 Salmon habitat 
restoration 
contracts 
A designed contract aims to protect salmon habitats. Those who provide a service get set 
payments in return. 
 Salmon habitat 
credits 
A system requires that landholders in salmon sensitive-prone area, such as riparian buffer, 
must develop the habitat as long as they balance this by purchasing habitat credits in 
more valuable habitat zones. 
 Water rights An endowment of property rights upon water use. 





2.1.4.2 Market for watershed services 
Watershed services, like other ecosystem services, are not explicitly traded in markets. 
Therefore, their quantity and quality are neither regulated by the price mechanism, nor by 
demand and supply relationships. In order to set up a market for a watershed service, it is 
necessary as a first step to identify the service that will be in exchange, i.e. a clearly defined 
commodity. Plenty of services provided by water-related ecosystems are available; therefore, 
it is a vital process to match a particular service from ecosystems with a direct and 
demonstrable benefit to consumers (Powell and White 2001). In case of the market for 
watershed services, landholders or suppliers of the services will receive rewards and are 
encouraged to conserve, and protect watershed for producing valuable watershed services to 
beneficiaries or buyers of the services. Supplies of watershed service are quantity, quality 
and timing of water flows generated by upstream landholders, while demands for services 
are normally from downstream beneficiaries for a specific use, such as domestic use, 
hydropower plant, fisheries, and irrigation.  
 
Landell – Mills and Porras (2002) report that demand, illustrated by the growing willingness 
to pay from both government and private authorities, is the main driver for establishing a 
market for watershed service. Supply-side driver, on the other hand, is typically not a major 
force because the characteristic of watershed that is not possible to exclude beneficiaries. 
However, it is the case if all beneficiaries are convinced of the threats to supply. The key for 
success in establishing markets is that the creation of market guarantees for the lowest 
transaction cost associated with that market. This is due to the fact that a market will work 
effectively when no other institutional arrangements exists with lower transaction costs 
(Whitten et al. 2003; Davidson and Weersink 1998). 
 
2.1.4.3 Payment mechanism 
In the market for watershed services, a service providing a positive externality from 
providers will happen only if there is reasonable compensation from potential beneficiaries. 
Payment mechanisms in the market for watershed services have various forms. Eight 
categories of payment mechanisms are identified for watershed services (IIED 2004; 
Landell-Mills and Porras 2002): 
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1. Direct negotiation: this is probably the most direct payment method arranged 
between service providers and beneficiaries. The method is popularly applied with best 
management practice contracts. 
2. Intermediary-based transaction: mediator such as trust fund, local or 
international NGOs, or government is involved to control transaction costs and risks.  
3. Pooled transaction: this payment method is suitable when investors are 
interested in different commodities. The mechanism will spread risks amongst several 
buyers. 
4. Retail based trade: certifications or labelling schemes are required for putting 
additional price onto existing consumer purchase. This mechanism is mostly applied with 
salinity-friendly product and salmon safe product. 
5. Over-the-counter trade and user fee: this mechanism is available with 
commodity pre-packaged for sale such as water quality credit. Watershed services are 
offered at a standard rate for different users through user fees. 
6. Clearing-house transaction: this is rather a new mechanism deployed greatly in 
developed countries, and still in its introduction stage. An intermediary proposes a central 
trading platform for both buyers and seller. By this method, government must enact and 
enforce regulations to smooth the transactions. 
7. Internal trading: transactions are taken within an organisation. By this way, 
organisations will internally perceive their willingness to pay before making decision for 
further external trading. 
8. Auction: this method is like clearing-house and over-the-counter trading 
mechanisms. The method allows for an establishing of competitive market where supply of 
and demand for watershed services are played on the same ground.  
 
Global experience suggests that PWS as a market-based instrument can be introduced to 
tackle water pollution. A mutual commitment between upstream service providers and 
downstream users is a key factor driving a sustainable programme. So far, the practice of the 
payment programmes varies from place to place with controversial issues regarding degrees 
of government involvement. The next section presents a review of PWS by investigating 
current commodities, potential market drivers, and payment mechanisms, and comparing the 
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differences of programmes between developed and developing countries in a quantitative 
review.   
2.1.5 A review of payment for watershed service studies 
A review in this section is based on the concept of meta-analysis, which is a statistical 
procedure that integrates the results of several independent studies considered to be 
combinable. The advantage of meta-analysis is that it allows a more objective appraisal of 
the evidence than narrative reviews (Egger et al. 1997). This section aims to integrate data 
and understand common characteristics of PWS prevailing in developed and developing 
countries. To do this, literature searches were conducted during January 2007 on numerous 
databases, such as bibliographic databases, subject gateways and other internet resources. 70 
PWS programmes, representing 47 cases in developing countries and 23 cases in developed 
countries, were selected (Annex 1). Results from the analysis are presented as follows. 
 
2.1.5.1 Current commodities in exchange 
In developing countries, the most popular traded commodity was a re-allocation of the right 
to regulate natural resources (i.e. water quality), which was as high as 40% of all transactions 
(Table 2-6). Right re-allocation was typically taken the form of a claim on water-related 
resources from a government authority charging a direct fee from users, such as hydropower 
plants, industries, or domestic water users.  
 
 
Table 2-6: Current traded commodities 
 
Commodities  
Developing countries Developed countries 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Designed contract 15 22.7 12 18.2 
Credit scheme - - 5 7.6 
Ecolabel product 3 4.5 1 1.5 
Transfer of land tenure 2 3.0 2 3.0 
Emission trade 1 1.5 6 9.1 
Re-allocation of the right to regulate resources 26 39.4 - - 
Scientific proof - - 2 3.0 
Trade of water rights 3 4.5 - - 
Voluntarily extra payment 2 3.0 - - 




Designed contracts, such as BMPs and a restoration contract, were prevalent in both 
developing and developed countries. More complicated products, such as credit schemes, 
emission trades, and scientific proof6
 
 were apparently seen in developed countries.  
2.1.5.2 Market drivers 
Generally, a government authority was the key driver for establishing a market for watershed 
services. In developing countries, the frequency of solely a government authority acting as 
the market driver was as high as 55% (Table 2-7). A few cases showed that a market was 
established by cooperation between a government authority and other agencies, such as 
NGOs, multilateral organizations, and local communities. In developed countries, besides 
government enforcement, pressures from private agencies also activated the market. 
Examples were Vittel mineral bottled water company in France, Stadtwerke München in 
Germany, and Ecolotree in the United States. Driving forces from communities were 
seemingly rare, and mostly arose in developing countries mainly in the form of a 
beneficiary-collective group, such as farmer associations.  
 






Frequency % Frequency % 
Government authority 36 54.5 15 22.7 
Government authority and NGOs 1 1.5 1 1.5 
Government authority and multilateral organisation 1 1.5 - - 
Government authority and community 1 1.5 2 3.0 
Community 3 4.5 - - 
Community and NGO 2 3.0 - - 
Private concerned agency 2 3.0 5 7.6 
Government authority and NGOs and Private agency 1 1.5 - - 
Note: more than one type of market driver can be seen within a programme 
                                                          
6  This type of commodity is supported by sound science evidences to illustrate how ecosystem 
services could be improved by the adoption of such commodity. An example is Ecolotree planting 
providing a soil contaminant control. The research showed that the adoption of Ecolotree planting 




2.1.5.3 Payment mechanism 
The PWS programme can have several possible payment methods depending on the 
characteristics of buyers and sellers, commodity attributes, and roles of stakeholders within a 
specific watershed. In both developing and developed countries, intermediary-based 
transactions were a dominant mechanism (Table 2-8). Mediators were introduced to the 
programme so as to manage and eliminate risks, uncertainties, and transaction costs. 
Intermediary-based transactions can be taken by a government authority, trust funds, NGOs, 
communities or even private companies.  
 
Table 2-8: Potential payment mechanisms 
Payment mechanisms 
Developing countries Developed countries 
Frequency % Frequency % 
Direct negotiation 6 9.1 3 4.5 
Intermediaries-based 43 65.2 15 22.7 
Pooled-transaction 9 13.6 1 1.5 
Retail-based - - 1 1.5 
Over the counter/ user fee 11 16.7 2 3.0 
Clearing house - - 4 6.1 
Internal trading 2 3.0 - - 
Auction - - 3 4.5 
Ecological ICMS 1 1.5 - - 
Note: more than one type of payment mechanism can be available within a programme 
 
The most popular form was the government-intermediary based transaction, which was as 
high as 70% in developing countries and 87% in developed countries (Figure 2-6). This was 
followed by NGOs-based and trust fund-based transactions. A trust fund-based transaction is 
a trust fund to finance payment by establishing pooled-demands for watershed service 
amongst various beneficiaries (Postel and Thompson 2005). The occurrences of community-
based transactions were rare in developed countries.  
 
Besides the aforementioned mechanisms, a case in the State of Paraná, Brazil offers an 
example of payment mechanism which is explicitly different from other PWS programmes. 
The state government allocated transfer payments to municipalities with more water 
reserves, conservation units or protected areas. The financial payment was funded by 
‘Ecological ICMS’ (an indirect tax charged on consumption of goods and services) to 
encourage and promote watershed and biodiversity rehabilitation. The system has been 






Figure 2-6: Types of intermediary-based transaction in developing countries (left) and 
developed countries (right) (%) 
 
Overall, the concept of PWS can be used to control agricultural nonpoint source pollution as 
it offers a shared benefit between stakeholders in a specific watershed, and ensures 
acceptable standards in water bodies by source control techniques. PWS also has a superior 
characteristic compared to other pollution control approaches in that it is a tailored-contract 
matching local conditions. It has a characteristic of decentralised policy which contributes to 
an improvement of service provision by making it more responsive to the people being 
served. Accordingly, the market for PWS is growing and there is increasing interest as water 
becomes scarce and the effects of water pollution are impacting human health and 
environment.  
 
2.1.6 A review of best management practices 
Land is an important input in agriculture, and private property right, either de facto or de jure 
right, is normally granted to farmers. Agricultural land provides food and fibre, and supplies 
ecosystem services (i.e. changes in agricultural practices, such as BMP adoption, can 
contribute to improved water quality) (Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). As an 
improvement in an ecosystem services is often produced as a by-product of private 
productions, users and beneficiaries who consume and enjoy this benefit stream do not pay 
for it. If a government promulgates policies requiring BMPs to control farm pollution, this 
adds external costs in farm production. Based on private decisions, farmers may not want to 
adopt BMPs because of low profits, uncertain returns, or length of time to realise the 
benefits. However, a growing awareness of agricultural nonpoint source pollution in 
developed countries, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, has led to the 
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establishment of ‘designed contracts’ to compensate farmers for the generation of positive 
externalities.  
 
The United States enacted the Clean Water Act of 1972, which is the national policy for the 
control of nonpoint source pollution. The Act introduced BMPs as a measure to manage 
water pollution at watershed level (US EPA 2003). The US EPA (2010) classifies 
agricultural BMPs as the most effective and practicable (including technological, economic, 
and institutional considerations) means of controlling agricultural nonpoint pollutants at 
levels compatible with environmental objectives. BMPs are defined as management practices 
controlling the generation and pollutants into water resources or remediating or intercepting 
pollutants before they enter watercourses (US EPA 2003). The implementation of BMPs is 
undertaken by the US EPA.  
 
Recognising that agricultural nonpoint source pollution is mainly from mismanagement and 
misuse of land inducing erosion, nutrient and pesticide, US EPA encourages farmers to adopt 
a series of good practices and to reduce or eliminate poor practices. BMPs can be 
implemented in the form of both management incentives and management practices (Centner 
et al. 1999). The management incentives are procedural practices, which conform to good 
husbandry. Examples are the use of optimal rate of fertiliser at the right time, and the 
adoption of pesticide spraying techniques that prevent spray drift into watercourse. The 
management practices are divided into vegetative and structural practices. Vegetative 
practices are measures controlling erosion and run-off from the field, while structural 
practices are permanent barriers or buffers generated through construction or site 
modification. All measurements can be applied before, during, and after pollution-producing 
activities (Brown et al. 2007). 
 
Similarly, the Water Framework Directive established in 2000 sets a timetable for the next 
27 years to protect, improve, and sustain water use in EU countries (Collins 2004). The 
Directive has been transposed into the UK law, where the Department for Environment, 
Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) acts as a leader for the implementation in England and 
Wales. The Scottish Environment Protection Agency is responsible for that in Scotland. 
Codes of Good Agricultural Practice are set out to provide an important point of reference 
for farm operations. Under the Codes, good agricultural practice means a practice that 
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minimises the risk of causing pollution while protecting natural resources and allowing 
economic agriculture to continue (Defra 2003: 3). The Codes advise that farmers should 
acknowledge causes and effects of pollution as a result of poor agricultural practices, and 
they should know how to operate in sustainable ways, and what to do in an emergency.  
 
With an increase in awareness over water pollution, one particular concern is that the UK 
might need to learn from the United States and elsewhere on developing best management 
agricultural practices (D'Arcy and Frost 2001; D'Arcy et al. 1998). Accordingly, Defra 
introduced a user manual called ‘An Inventory of Measures to Control Diffuse Water 
Pollution from Agriculture’ (Cuttle et al. 2007). The manual lists forty four measures for 
controlling nonpoint source pollution, especially nitrate, phosphorous, and faecal indicator 
organisms as a consequence of agricultural activities, such as land use, soil management, 
livestock management, and fertiliser management. It also identifies the effectiveness of each 
of the measures. In general, the UK Codes aim to elevate pollution prevention activity for 
each type of land use by the adoption of good practices and mutual agreements between 
farmers and government.  
 
A considerable amount of public budgets spent on agri-environmetnal programmes raises 
concerns about the environmental benefits and effectiveness of the proposed good practices 
(Schönhart et al. 2010). As such, an integrated model determining the links between ecology 
(i.e. characteristics, process and functioning) and economics (i.e. demand for goods and 
services supplied by ecosystem) is required. The challenge for policymakers is to bring 
economists to work closely with natural scientists to build understanding of ecological 
production functions from farms and to apply appropriate valuation exercises (Polasky 
2008).  
 
To simulate major processes in agricultural land use management, bio-physical model is a 
tool to understand and predict the environmental performance of alternative farming 
practices (Daily and Matson 2008). A variety of models can be used to simulate the 
effectiveness of BMPs at numerous scales, such as field- and watershed- levels. For 
example, Vinten et al. (2004) adopted three alternative approaches (i.e. a soil transport 
model, a regression using observed E. coli concentrations in surface water, and PAMIMO 
model) to predict delivery of faecal indicators from dairy farms to surface water in river 
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Irvine catchment. McGechan et al. (2008) used the combined model (i.e. MACRO 
hydrological model and a channel network model) to define transport of ammonium and 
E.coli form dairy farms and simulate contaminant delivery to rivers. Rao et al. (2009)  
employed a variable source loading function to simulate the impact of BMPs in P load 
reduction from the watershed. Nendel (2009) adopted an EU-Rotate_N model to compare a 
traditional fertiliser strategy with the recommended practices and found that the BMP 
adoption resulted in lower N leaching.  
 
Iovanna and Newbold (2007) argued that an assessment that could reflect ecological 
complexity, such as ecological process and ecological-economic interactions, can lead to 
better policy outcomes by increasing resilience. The outputs from bio-physical models 
generate inputs for economic valuations, such as Cost Benefit Analysis (CBA) and Cost 
Effectiveness Analysis (CEA) (Zhou et al. 2009). CBA is an approach to compare the 
desirability of alternative investments by representing all values (i.e. costs and benefits from 
BMP adoption) in monetary term. For CBA, the results from a bio-physical model could 
benefit an economic valuation in that ecological dynamics, uncertainties and irreversibilities 
are accounted for in a policy evaluation. In other words, a model predicts a potential 
environmental improvement which affects human well-being. This environmental 
improvement has its own economic values, which can then be measured under the concept of 
Total Economic Value (TEV). On the other hand, CEA is an approach to compare the 
relative costs and outcomes of options. The least cost method, given an environmental target, 
is chosen. A bio-physical model benefits a CEA in that it estimates the impacts from new 
farming practices; thereby determining environmental benefits which in turn are 
effectiveness sides of BMP. Overall, a bio-physical model provides scientific information 
about the usefulness of BMPs, and when integrated with an economic valuation it could be 
used to address ecological sustainability in an agri-environmental policy assessment. 
 
As the discussion above attests, the impacts of water pollution caused by agricultural 
pollutants are immense and result in the steady degradation of watershed ecosystems. Global 
experience suggests that on-farm BMPs, as a PWS programme, could control nonpoint 
source pollution. Tackling nonpoint source water pollution requires a good understanding of 
its nature and characteristics, and the effectiveness of BMPs. In the promotion and marketing 
of BMPs, a crucial assumption is that behaviours are rational as understood early in a 
rationality context, particularly the neoclassical theory of profit maximisation. However, 
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behaviours are not homogeneous, and needed to be explored further (Leiser and Azar 2008; 
Spash and Biel 2002; van den Bergh et al. 2000). Accordingly, this thesis deals with this 
challenge by employing a supplementary of social psychology theory to capture more 
complex behaviours of human.  
 
2.2  Review of Methodologies 
 
This section aims to review the methodologies and rationale of applications that are 
employed in this thesis. The review begins with a discussion of the notion that cost is the 
main barrier to the adoption of new conservation practices. It then proceeds to a discussion 
regarding farmers’ decision-making, which is typically assumed to be rational, and points to 
a gap in underlying assumptions between neoclassical economics and psychology in relation 
to behavioural responses. This suggests a need to incorporate a social psychology theory into 
the study of adoption behaviour, so as to capture complex aspects of farmers.   
 
2.2.1 Factors influencing farmer’s decision-making  
Traditional neoclassical economics assumes that farmers are profit maximisers, who are 
rational and behave in a way to maximise their utilities. Adoption behaviours are normally 
explained by the complexity of the social aspects of farm households, such as economic 
variables, and biological and physical variables within one objective function. In the 
traditional view, previous work suggests that many factors constrain the adoption of 
conservation practices, but the most frequently mentioned barrier to adoption is cost 
(Rodriguez et al. 2009).  
 
In the context of water pollution from agricultural land, the introduction of conservation 
practices, such as BMPs is expected to reduce negative externalities by controlling pollutant 
discharge. Wieland et al. (2009) argued that the true cost of reducing farm pollution from 
surface water is the payment for implementing qualified BMPs, not for directly reducing 
nonpoint source pollutant. At farm level, farmers are decision makers who bear substantial 
financial responsibility for any conservation practice being implemented on their land. The 
adoption of conservation practices is often characterised by high up-front costs, which could 
deter farmers’ adoption (Pannell et al. 2006). Thus, knowledge about costs is critical given 




A few studies investigated the cost of BMP implementation. For example, Sample et al. 
(2003) studied costs in the adoption of stormwater BMPs. The major costs considered 
included the initial capital costs and the present value of annual operation and maintenance 
costs that were incurred over time. Cubbage (2004) estimated the cost to comply with 
forestry BMPs and found that BMP costs per area were often highest on steep terrain. He 
further concluded that BMP costs increased over time as the standards and requirements 
become higher. Afari-Sefa et al. (2008) conducted a cost estimate for structural BMPs in 
farms. Their study provided insights into the magnitude and structure of on-farm costs to 
establish and maintain particular BMPs.  
 
Overall, the ultimate aim of BMP cost analysis is to guide regulators about how to allocate 
public resources in order to encourage BMP adoption (Afari-Sefa et al. 2008; Wossink and 
Osmond 2002). Given the importance of cost analysis in agriculture, and the increasing 
importance of, and interest in, agricultural BMPs, a good understanding of cost can provide 
basic parameters for potential agri-environmental policy. This is the case in Thailand where 
there is limited empirical data relating to the cost of conservation practices, particularly 
BMPs recommended for citrus farms.  
 
Apart from the cost of adoption, farmers’ behaviour is thought to be the consequence of a 
complex integration between socio-economic and psychological variables. Accordingly, the 
decision-making process of farmers could not be merely modelled by mathematical methods 
traditionally used by agricultural economists (Willock et al. 1999), and the rational man 
assumption for environmental policy may not be pertinent (Shogren and Taylor 2008). To a 
degree, several analytical approaches have been applied to agricultural economics to 
investigate farmers’ responses to policy initiatives (Burton 2004). A considerable amount of 
research has been conducted to understand the process of farmers’ decision-making and the 
question of which factors influence adoption of agri-environmental policy. Kaiser et al. 
(1999) suggested that two-thirds of all environmental-psychology publications include the 
notion of environmental attitudes in one form or another. Previous studies revealed that an 
inclusion of psychological variables into the adoption model of agri-environment schemes 
enables more predictive power (Edwards-Jones et al. 1998). Further, farmers’ segmentation 




In principle, neoclassical economics and psychology theory of attitude formation rest on 
relatively different assumptions regarding adoption decisions. Table 2-9 shows some major 
differences between economics and psychology. In the neoclassical paradigm, one common 
interpretation is that people have well-defined preference rankings, which can be discovered 
by examining evidence on choices and the principle of revealed preference. These rankings 
are then taken as the basis for welfare evaluations. In other words, neoclassical economics 
assumes rational human behaviour. The individual thinks logically about choices by using all 
available information and allowing for the effects that current choices will have on future 
choices and future outcomes. In contrast, the alternative theory of non-rational behaviour is 
based on psychological hypotheses, which postulate that behaviour is determined by many 
factors besides the simple economic contingencies. 
 
The literature on farm decision-making has increasingly recognised the diversity and 
complexity of farmers’ values, goals and objectives (Garforth and Rehman 2005). Smith 
(2005) argued that when people make choices that contradict with formal theory of 
rationality, this gives an opportunity to investigate: i) why they perform those decisions; and 
ii) how decision-making is processed and implemented. In practice, the economic model and 
cognitive model are complementary. A good understanding of pertinent psychological and 
neural processes is helpful in behaviour observation and can produce a more reliably 
predicted behaviour (Smith 2005). Studies to understand individual behaviour towards 
environmental concerns should equally combine cognitive variables and socio-economic 
determinants (van Liere and Dunlap 1980). According to van Raaij (1981: 6), ‘a better 
integration of psychological variables in economic science will be reached when both 
economic and psychological variables are entered into a model, hypothesis, or theory’. The 
following section offers a discussion of the roles of social psychological theory in the study 
of adoption behaviour.  
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Table 2-9: Differences in assumptions between the economic model and psychological model  
 
Assumptions Economics Psychology 
Reference level 
 
Each individual has stable and coherent preferences. Given a 
set of options and probabilistic beliefs, a person is 
assumed to maximise the expected utility of a chance. 
A person’s preferences are often determined by changes in 
outcome relative to his reference level, known as the status 




People deem to base on maximal-benefits criterion when 
making allocation. 
Many people feel that goods should be allocated according to the 
maximin criterion. That is, social preferences over other 
people’s consumption depend on the behaviour, motivations, 
and intentions of those other people. 
Biases in judgement  
 
When faced with uncertainty, people form their subjective 
probabilistic assessments according to the laws of 
probability. 
People rely on heuristic principles which reduce the complex tasks 
of assessing probabilities and predicting values to simpler 
judgement operations.  
Reciprocity and attribution 
 
People’s propensity to engage in any behaviour is primarily 
determined by whether or not it is in their financial 
interest. 
People determine their personality/ behaviour toward others 
according to motives attributed to these others, not solely 
according to actions taken.  
Misperceived utilities 
 
Each individual always selects the most preferred option from 
the feasible set.  
People do not always accurately predict their own future 
preference, nor even accurately assess their experienced 
well-being from past choices. 
Preference reversal 
 
People occupy the same preference, though there might be 
difference in the elicitation procedure. 
People prefer different choices in different circumstances.  That is, 
the presentation of a choice may draw our attention to 
different aspects of a problem. 
Time-variant preference 
 
Economists model people’s tastes by assuming the people 
discount stream of utility over time exponentially. In other 
words, an individual’s intertemporal preferences are 
time-consistent.  
Psychologists believe that an individual’s short term tendency to 
pursue immediate gratification is inconsistent with the long 
term preference. 
Sources: Smith (2005); Kurz (2002); Rabin (1998); Tversky and Kahenman (1986) 
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2.2.2 Roles of social psychological theories 
This thesis introduces the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB) and Q-Methodology to 
understand human behaviours. As discussed above, the inclusion of social psychological 
theories is useful to look beyond the rational economic assumption. It is expected that the 
integration of social psychological concepts can better explain human behaviours by 
informing and improving the understanding of farmers’ decision process and attitudes 
towards BMP adoption. The following sections offer a discussion regarding the development 
of social psychology theory in the context of environmental behaviour.  
 
2.2.2.1 Theory of Planned Behaviour  
In agricultural economics, the most common feature to elicit farmers’ objectives is the use of 
self-report questionnaires (Garforth and Rehman 2005). In the mid 1970s, the Theory of 
Reasoned Action (TRA) is a first model reliably demonstrating a link between attitudes and 
behaviour. TRA assumed that the most important determinant to predict actual behaviours is 
behavioural intention. The intention to perform is a combination of attitudes towards such 
behaviour, and subjective norms. The TRA assumption is limited when an individual 
perceives their ability to successfully carry out a behaviour to be low, and when a behaviour 
is not under full volitional control (Burton 2004). As a consequence, the Theory of Planned 
Behaviour (TPB) was added to the TRA model to address this inadequacy by adding a third 
element, known as perceived behavioural controls. The principle of TPB is incorporated into 
the economic framework of decisions and behaviour in order to explain and predict 
complexity of farm decision-making. TPB is applicable when studied behaviour is voluntary 
and not bounded by prior commitment, and where deliberated thought about performing 
choice is involved (East 1993).  
 
Beedell and Rehman (2000) highlighted that research work in the domain of adoption 
behaviour has moved from descriptive to predictive models in order to response to policy 
implementation. A number of studies have applied TPB to assess significant psychological 
factors in farmers’ decision-making processes. For example, Rehman et al. (2007) developed 
questionnaires with psychological constructs to predict farmers’ intentions to adopt new 
technologies on dairy farms. Hattam (2006) applied TPB to investigate psychological 
barriers to the adoption of organic production in Mexico. Fielding et al. (2005) used TPB as 
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a framework to understand the extent to which beliefs influenced decisions to develop 
riparian zone management on farm, and van Gossum et al. (2005) applied TPB to identify 
who encouraged farmers to adopt government policy of multifunctional forest management. 
In Thailand, TPB has been applied in information technology adoption (Kripanont 2007; 
Tetiwat and Huff 2003), clinical research (Saengcharoen et al. 2008), and recycling 
behaviour (Chaisamrej and Zimmerman 2007). This suggests that the application of TPB in 
the context of agricultural policies in Thailand is relatively new, and the behavioural study 
based on TPB could provide insights into psychological factors facilitating BMP adoption. 
 
TPB provides predictive advantages when modelling farmers’ behaviour in responding to 
policy change. Firstly, TPB provides an understanding between attitudes and behaviour 
through the incorporation of additional variables from social psychology. This allows an 
analysis based on individual perspectives. Secondly, TPB suggests beliefs and attitudes 
influencing behaviour, and at the same time it determines the relative importance of those 
factors. Thirdly, it combines both qualitative and quantitative analyses to understand, and 
predict potential behaviour (Ajzen 1991). Lastly, TPB can offer policymakers the potential 
to design a more targeted intervention to induce a desirable behaviour.  This combination of 
approaches lends depth and clarity to address decision-making related issues. 
 
2.2.2.2 Q-Methodology 
An application of social-psychology methods to improve understanding of farmers’ decision-
making is widespread (Garforth and Rehman 2005). Of many methods, Q-Methodology is 
applied to uncover different patterns of thought, and better understand the concerns of 
farmers in relation to an adoption of conservation practices. Q-Methodology is a technique 
for studying human subjectivity (Stephenson 1953). Originating in psychology research, the 
method has now been used in other disciplines including the fields of communication, 
political sciences, health sciences, and more recently, in ecological and environmental 
studies. Empirical studies show that there are no universally significant factors affecting 
adoption of conservation agriculture, and a targeted policy approach should be designed to 
the particulars of a locale, or preferably, to individual farmers and their farm operations 
(Knowler and Bradshaw 2007). Q-Methodology is applied in this thesis to segment farmers 
based on their salient attitudes towards BMP adoption, and to investigate different attitudinal 
variables influencing different groups, or subgroups, of farmers.  
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Evidence from Q-Methodology is increasingly being used to inform policy decisions. Hall 
(2008) investigated farmers’ attitude towards Genetically Modified crops cultivation in 
Scotland. Davies and Hodge (2007) employed Q-Methodology to investigate the perceptual 
frameworks of a sample of UK arable and mixed lowland farmers regarding the appropriate 
way in which to approach the environmental management of agricultural land. Further 
applications have been undertaken by Barnes et al. (2007) who investigated farmer attitudes 
to Nitrate Vulnerable Zone regulation. Brodt et al. (2004) considered the adoption of 
biologically integrated agricultural practices from the perspective of almond and wine grape 
farmers. Ellis et al. (2007) explored the nature of public acceptance of wind farms in 
Northern Ireland, and Kramer et al. (2003) focused on the reasons why some dairy producers 
in Uruguay had not participated in a registry system. In Thailand, the application of Q-
Methodology has been recently introduced in relation to policy perspectives of an epidemic 
disease (Brown and Wattanakul 2008).  
 
Q-Methodology offers several methodological advantages over other predictive multivariate 
analysis of behaviour or adoption.  The first is that Q-Methodology is self-referent, and does 
not require pre-defined attitudinal variables. Rather it draws directly on discourses from the 
population studied, hence it lessens the extent of researchers’ bias (Barnes et al. 2007). 
Secondly, the use of factor analysis in Q-Methodology relies on different approaches to the 
typical R-Methodology use of factor analysis7
 
. In Q-Methodology participants are the 
variables. They are correlated with each other to produce factors linking those who have 
similar attitudinal perspectives. In contrast, R-Methodology provides analysis based on 
differences amongst all participants for each variable, such as age and gender, and there is no 
interaction between participants (Steelman and Maguire 1999; Fairweather et al. 1998). The 
different philosophy in Q-Methodology provides an alternative lens through which to reveal 
preferences, values, and interests underlying the participants’ understanding of the research 
topic (Brown et al. 2008; Durning and Brown 2006). Lastly, a series of Q methodological 
steps comprise both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The combination of numerical 
analysis and qualitative interpretation combines statistical significance to clarity of attitudes 
(Barry and Proops 2000), and thereby increasing the level of research reliability and validity 
(Silverman 2006; Furlong et al. 2000).  
                                                          
7  R-Methodology is a typical factor analysis method, where researchers look for correlations amongst 





The above discussion highlights a number of salient issues that need to be kept in mind as 
this thesis evolves. At a global scale, nonpoint source pollution from agricultural activities 
stands as the primary cause of water quality problems. It is one of the most complex 
environmental problems and its impacts are extensive. The pollutant discharge results in 
degraded water quality, and preventive measures are needed to intercept pollutants before 
reaching water bodies. As sources of agricultural pollution are difficult to identify, it cannot 
be easily controlled by government regulation and monitoring. Experience in developed 
countries showed that control of pollution at its source is considered the best strategy for 
managing nonpoint source pollution. One option is to introduce BMPs for controlling 
agricultural pollution at a watershed level.  
 
However, in the development and promotion of BMPs it is assumed that farmers are 
homogeneous in goals and preferences, and it is suggested that behavioural theory may offer 
an alternative approach to investigate adoption reasons and behaviours. It is, therefore, 
essential to understand the adoption process beyond the purely economic-based model of 
farmer decision-making. Instead, BMP uptake should be perceived as a human behavioural 
issue, and the TPB and Q-Methodology are suggested by this thesis to supplement the 
economic model of adoption behaviour. The TPB is useful to explain adoption intentions, 
and to identify factors that will influence farmers to implement BMPs. Q-Methodology 
identifies different attitudes towards BMP adoption, segments farmers, and indicates which 
farmers are willing to adopt BMPs. 
 
The next chapter presents the costs of twelve BMPs that are proposed for citrus farms in the 
Ping river basin. Given the fact that cost is one barrier in the adoption of new technology, 
information about these costs gives a basic overview of compliance costs incurred by 
farmers. This information would then be useful in the design of water-related PES 





3 FARM-LEVEL COST ANALYSIS  
 
Cost is usually thought to be the main barrier to the adoption of new conservation practices. 
This chapter aims to investigate cost structures in citrus production, cost components in 
BMP installation and maintenance, and the magnitude of costs incurred by farmers. Its 
context is set out in Figure 3-1. Section 3.1 begins with a farm budget presenting fixed and 
variable costs in citrus production. Section 3.2 presents a description of BMP functionings, 
potential benefits from adoption and the effectiveness of BMPs. Section 3.3 presents the 
assumptions of costs categorisation and cost estimation for BMPs.   
 




In this section, the assessment represents an approximation of the costs that would be 
expected if BMPs were fully implemented. Calculated on the assumption that all practices 
are optimally sized and designed from an engineering point of view, BMP costs are divided 
into two components, which are installation and annual maintenance costs, and land 
opportunity cost. In section 3.4, to compare investment projects of unequal lifespans, 
annualised costs of all twelve BMPs are presented. Section 3.5 discusses the generalisation 
of these cost estimates and addresses the necessity of the cost study. This chapter closes with 
a summary of key findings in section 3.6. 
 
3.1 Farm Budget of Citrus Production 
Cost structure of citrus cultivation involves initial and annual costs. Initial costs are 
investment costs needed to set up the plantation, such as land preparation, furrow 
ploughings, irrigation system installation, seedlings, and labour hired for planting. These 
costs are unique to each farm. The most common classifications of annual costs are variable 
and fixed costs (Peris Moll and Julia Igual 2006; Julia Igual and Server Izquierdo 2000). In 
this thesis, the focus is on the annual cost of citrus production as this can provide basic 
information for an analysis of farm-level costs and the estimation of opportunity costs in 
relation to the BMP adoptions.  
 
Variable costs are the costs that vary with yield within a production period, while fixed costs 
are those remaining the same within a production period and do not vary with the level of 
yield. In this study, annual budgets of costs and revenues for mature trees (i.e. the pay back 
period is after the third year) are estimated. Estimated costs are average costs from year 2002 
to 2007, while estimated revenues are based on the average selling price from year 1984 to 
2008 (Table 3-1). Variable costs include labour cost, input cost, and interest on working 
capital8
 
, while fixed costs include land rent, equipment ownership costs and interst expense. 
                                                          
8  Julia Igual and Server Izquierdo (2000) argued that interest on working capital is an opportunity cost 
comprising the combined costs generated by factors of production invested during the production 




Table 3-1: Cost structure in citrus production 
 
Descriptions THB/ rai % 
Variable costs1   
1 Labour costs   
 1.1 Weeding, pruning and spraying    5,157.4          31.8  
 1.2 Harvesting    2,848.8          17.5  
2 Inputs   
 2.1 Fertiliser and manure    2,863.0          17.6  
 2.2 Pesticide, herbicide and fungicide    1,784.0          11.0  
 2.3 Equipment operating costs (i.e. fuel and lubricants)       649.8            4.0  
 2.4 Machinery rental       526.3            3.2  
 2.5 Repairs and maintenance       112.0            0.7  
3 Interest on working capital    1,045.6            6.4  
Total variable costs (A)  14,986.7          92.3  
     
Fixed costs2   
4 Land rent       510.1            3.1  
5 Equipment ownership costs (i.e. irrigation system depreciation)       677.9  4.2  
6 Interest expenses         61.1            0.4  
Total fixed costs (B)    1,249.0            7.7  
     
Total (C) = (A) + (B)  16,235.7        100.0  
     
Average yields (kg/ rai)3 (D)    6,500.0   
Selling price (THB/ kg)4 (E)         15.1   
Revenue (F) = (D) x (E)  98,215.0   
     
Returns over variable costs (G) = (F) – (A) 83,228.3  
Net returns (H) = (F) - (C)  81,979.3   
Given there are 65 trees/ rai, then 
Returns/ tree = THB1,280.4   
Return/ sq.m. = THB53.0   
Sources:  
(1) OAE (2007) 
(2) OAE (2007) 
(3) Farmers’s interview: 100kg/ tree; 65 trees/ rai 
(4) DOAE (2007b) 
Note: The costs and revenues from citrus production are calculated for the pay-back period 
after the third year. 
 
Variable cost is the most important cost in the production, and it is as high as 92.3% of the 
total costs. Within the variable cost category, labour cost on weeding, pruning and spraying 
has the highest share. This is followed by fertiliser and manure (17.6%), and labour cost for 
harvesting (17.5%). Fertiliser and manure represents the highest expenses within all the 
inputs used in the production. This information is similar to Namruengsri’s study (2005) 
which revealed that approximately 20% of farm expenses are for fertiliser. The total variable 
cost is estimated at THB14,986.7/ rai. The fixed cost is related to fixed factors in citrus 
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production, and it is estimated at THB1,249/ rai. The farm revenue is calculated by 
multiplying average yield per rai with average selling price, and this is equal to THB 98,215/ 
rai. The returns over variable costs remain THB 83,228.3/ rai, and the net return is THB 
81,979.3/ rai.  
 
 
3.2 Functions of BMPs 
 
 
The Ping river is close to or passes through many of the major cities, including Chiang mai 
and Nakorn Sawan. Moreover, the Ping river is one of the four upstream tributaries flowing 
southwards to form the Chao Phraya river, located the largest alluvial plain. Accordingly, 
water management in the Ping river basin needs to address both freshwater quantity and 
quality. Twelve BMPs, providing flexibility to accommodate local needs and site specific 
conditions, were selected from expert judgement. The functions, environmental benefits and 
effectiveness of each BMP based on literature are presented. In some cases, there is no 
available research predicting the BMP effectiveness, and it is fully recognised that additional 
research is required to establish this study. 
 
Scheduling water structure 
The traditional method of flood irrigation is widely seen in the lowland of the Ping river 
basin. Farmers rely on the techniques including diking, polderisation and the use of raised-
bed plots (Figure 3-2). Water flows between the main irrigation canal or river and the plots. 
Water intake and drainage can be done by gravity (i.e. through intake), or by pumping. 
Inside each polder, raised-bed plots lie in parallel with unlined ditches, in which water 
stagnates permanenetly. The raised-bed plots are normally 6m wide. The width of ditches is 
usually 1.5m, and the depth is approximately 1m. Irrigation sprayed from a small boat is 






Figure 3-2: Irrigation system in the downstream area of the Ping river basin 
 
This BMP requires farmers to check on the conditions of on-farm irrigation structure (i.e. 
intake, drain) and to maintain the farm ditches (i.e. bottom slope, ditch cleaning). The 
objective of this BMP is to ensure that the irrigation structure can properly function, and the 
ditches can provide additional storage and reduce the impacts associated with heavy rainfall 
(i.e. reduce sudden discharge) (Florida Department of Agricultre and Consumer 2004; US 
EPA 2000) . This BMP also provides habitats for a range of species if properly managed. 
The effectiveness of this BMP is site dependent (SEPA 2010). 
 
Apply herbicide within tree canopy 
According to the Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (2005), grassed 
soil beyond the canopy line can serve as filters and prevent sediment movement from the 
fields into the drainage systems. Excessive herbicide band width may result in considerable 
erosion of soil particles in particular during rainfall. The effectiveness of this BMP is site 
dependent (Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 2005). 
 
Basic restrictions for pesticide application 
BMP in the context of this discussion is to i) promote the proper handling of pesticides, 
fungicides and herbicides (i.e. storage); ii) improve application techniques (i.e. maintenance 
and calibration and protective clothing); and iii) record the use of chemicals (i.e. time and 
amount of application, type of chemicals used). The ultimate aims of this BMP are to 
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gradually educate farmers on the danger of excessive/ improper use of chemicals, and raise 
awareness of responsibility in chemical application. The effectiveness of this BMP is site 
dependent (SEPA 2010).   
 
Soil analysis 
Namruengsri’s study (2005) reveals that more than 20% of farm expenses are for chemical 
fertiliser and hormone, and approximately 50% of these expenses are unnecessary. The study 
shows that Thai farmers apply chemicals at the unnecessarily high rates only to maintain 
fruit appearance. The Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services (2004) 
recommends a basic nutrient management with a consideration on soil, water, organic matter 
sample analysis and expected crop yields. Thus, this BMP mainly aims to manage the 
amount, source and timing of nutrient application, and then apply organic fertilisers to match 
with crops’ needs. According to SEPA (2010), the effectiveness of this BMP is site 
dependent but it is remarkably effective in the management of dissolved N and P.  
 
Vegetative cover 
Both a row crop with drip irrigation and a row crop with mini-sprinkler system are widely 
seen in the upstream of the Ping river basin. The drip irrigation is done through drip tape or 
tube buried below the soil surface, and a pump is needed to provide the right pressure for 
water delivery into the pipe system. Similarly, with mini-sprinklers water is applied 
throughout the field by mini-sprinklers connected to a pressurised pipe system. Furrows 
between tree rows serve as both farm road and drainage during flash flood. The width of the 
furrows is approximately 6m.  
 
This BMP requires a consistent bottom slope on furrows in order that a uniform vegetative 
cover can slow the overland flow, thus minimising the velocity of runoff and level of 
devastation of flash flood in hilly area especially during heavy rainfall. The primary aim of 
this BMP is to manage water discharge during rainfall events, but it also benefits in erosion 
control (Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 2004). Moreover, when 
the vegetative cover is densely planted this practice can control the growth of noxious weeds 
(USDA and Mississippi State University 1999). According to Schuster (1996), the amount of 
cover and the rate of infiltration are greatest under trees and shrubs. This is followed by, in 





This BMP requires materials such as straw and grass to cover soil surface. The main 
objective of this BMP is to stabilise soil and control erosion by slowing the runoff and 
trapping sediment. Other benefits are to retain nutrients and moisture, slowly release 
nutrition, and assist germination (Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 
2004). Sediment reduction by straw mulch without vegetation is 90-95% for a few months, 
and this gradually drops to 70% in six months. Nutrient reductions are estimated to be 60-
80% for a very first month and reduce to 50% in six months (IDEQ 2005). 
 
Vegetative buffer strip 
Vegetative buffer strip is a sloping area of vegetative cover that filters pollutants before they 
reach the water body. In Thailand, a tropical plant known as Vetiver grass is extensively 
used to serve this purpose. Krutz et al. (2004) state that this practice potentially reduce 
herbicide transport from agricultural fields by increasing mass infiltration and adsorption, 
compared with bare soil. Other benefits from this BMP are to intercept sediments and reduce 
runoff velocity (Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 2004).  
 
To function a water quality protection, the general recommended widths of buffer zone are 5 
to 30 metres (Hawes and Smith 2005). The grass filter strip works best for sediment removal. 
According to Krumrine (2004), an estimated reduction of sediment from the adoption of 
vegetative filter strip is approximately 53-97%, while the reductions of N and P are also 
estimated at 4-70% and 24-85%, respectively.  
 
Grassed waterway 
This practice is either natural or constructed channels for transporting of concentrated 
runoffs. Green and Haney (2005) explain that the vegetation improves water quality as it 
removes nutrients through plant uptake and soil absorption. Florida Department of 
Agriculture and Consumer Services (2004) suggests that the treatment areas are more 
effective in removing phosphorous attached to soil particles rather than dissolved N. Other 
advantages from this BMP are to decrease flow velocity thereby minimising soil erosion, and 
to provide habitats for widelife. The effectivenss of this BMP depends on soil characteristics, 
land slope, vegetation, construction area, and the width of the grassed waterway (Green and 
Haney 2005).  
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On-site retention storage 
This BMP provides additional water storage; thereby assisting a long-term plan regarding 
water management and minimising off-site discharge during heavy rainfall (Florida 
Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 2005). Moreover, this BMP also benefits 
in sediment reduction in that it allows settlement of particles and biological treatment of 
dissolved pollutants (SEPA 2010). In terms of water management, a sufficient size of pond 
to retain water for up to 120 days requires an area of 10% of cultivated land (DOAE 2002). 
The effectiveness of this BMP to reduce N and P particles are remarkably high, while its 
effectiveness to reduce dissolved N and P is considered medium to low (SEPA 2010).  
 
Terracing 
This BMP recommends a construction of wide steps on a gentle gradient for cultivated land 
with more than 30 degree slope. Wheaton and Monke (2001) argue that the major benefit 
from terracing is to reduce soil erosion. This is because terraces breake up one long slope 
and intercept rainfall runoff as it starts down a slope. Therefore, runoff is temporarily stored 
and the amount and velocity of the spilling water is minimised. Moreover, terraces keep 
eroded soil particles behind the terrace ridge; thereby reducing the potential of soil loss. 
Carman (2005) states that the potential reduction of soil erosion by this BMP ranges from 
10-50%. This BMP is most effective when used in combination with other BMPs, such as 
conservation tillage and field borders.  
 
Mix-load and wash-down site 
Chemical spills results in expensively hazardous waste-cleanup and environmental 
contamination. This BMP aims to reduce the impacts from the spills. The construction of 
permanent mix-load and wash-down site provides a place where spills can be collected and 
cleaned (Florida Department of Agriculture and Consumer Services 2005). Furthermore, 
most farmers can receive the delivery of pestcides at sites where mixing and loading occurs. 
Stover et al. (2002) suggest that pesticide storage should be built within a permanent mix-
load and wash-down site to avoid exposure to rain and wind. The suitable site for this BMP 
should have no direct linkages to yard drains or ditches. The site should be 10 m away from 
watercourses or 50 m from groundwater sources. The effectiveness of this BMP is site 






This practice requires an established distances between natural watercourse and cultivated 
land where soil disturbing activities are prohibited. In the context of citrus plantation, 
setbacks could contribute to manage the offsite nutrient impacts. The setbacks also protect 
and preserve native riparian and wildlife habitat (Florida Department of Agriculture and 
Consumer Services 2005). The effectiveness of this BMP at removing sediments is site 
dependent and related to many factors. The study of Chagrin River Watershed Partners 
(2006) showed that the effectiveness of riparian buffer is directly related to its width and 
land slope. For example, a 46 m riparian setback is needed on a 3% slope to reduce sediment 
transport by 90%. Mayer et al. (2006)’s study revealed that the effectiveness of this BMP 
depends on types of vegetative cover and buffer width. For example, N removal is predicted 
at 50% with the 16 m width grass cover, and increases to 75% with the 47 m width grass 
cover. With a combination of grass and forest cover, N removal is predicted to be 50% with 
only the 5 m width, and increases to 75% with the 20 m width of buffer strip.   
 
3.3 Cost Statement of BMPs for Citrus Production in the Ping River 
Basin 
In terms of BMP adoption there are at least two components of cost facing farmers. These 
are the installation and annual maintenance of BMPs, and the opportunity cost due to the lost 
production of the land used for BMP installation (Field et al. 2006; Wossink and Osmond 
2002). The installation costs will occur in the first year when the BMP is installed, whist 
other costs such as maintenance, and opportunity costs may occur yearly through the life of 
BMP implementation.  
 The bottom-up engineering approach is used to estimate BMP cost. In doing so, all elements 
of work are listed, and the costs associated with each work item are assigned and summed to 
obtain the total cost (Afari-Sefa et al. 2008). Cost components are derived from US EPA 
(2008; 2000). Based on the worksheet calculated by engineer and agronomist (Khamkanya 
2009; Namruengsri 2008), cost figures are estimated item-by-item (see Annex 2). Costs of 
materials employed in BMP construction and establishment is estimated using 2007 prices 
obtained from local retailers, and machinery and equipment is assumed to be rented at 2007 
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retail rates. The cost components of each BMP are illustrated in Table 3-2. The unit 
measurement is illustrated in terms of THB/ rai9
 
.  
Table 3-2: Cost components of BMPs (Year 2007) 
unit: THB1/ rai 






Good Husbandry    
1 Scheduling water structure 2,250 300 - 
2 Apply herbicide within tree 
canopy 
- 882 - 
3 Basic restrictions for 
pesticide application 
1,360 30 - 
4 Soil analysis 3,300 1,650 - 
Vegetative Practices    
5 Vegetative cover 1,200 400 - 
6 Mulching 882 294 - 
7 Vegetative buffer strip 1,125 90 Approx. 3,842– 6,4026 
8 Grassed waterway 1,365 120 Approx. 6,402 – 8,9637 
Structural Practices    
9 On-site retention storage 15,155 765 Approx. 10,244–12,8058 
10 Terracing 1,847 935  - 
11 Mix-load and wash-down 
site9 
5,181 259 Approx. 3,841 
12 Riparian setbacks 163 20 Approx. 2,561 – 3,84210 
Notes: 
(1) An average exchange rate Year 2007; GBP1 = THB69.53 (Bank of Thailand 2010b) 
(2) Instalment costs occur in the first year when BMP is installed 
(3) Annual maintenance cost such as machinery and labour cost is to ensure the effectiveness of 
BMPs 
(4) Annual opportunity cost of land recognises the forgone opportunity of continuity the production 
of crops on the land used for BMPs. It is calculated as gross margins of the crops, which is a 
value of output minus variable costs. 
(5) The calculation is based on the assumption that each tree yields THB1280.4 per annum as 
shown in Table 3-1. This calculation also acknowledged that one rai accommodates 65 trees. 
(6) This BMP requires at least 6m x 15m for critical zone in the field, thus it could cause a loss of 
3-5 trees 
(7) This BMP requires an area of 2.5m x 40m, thus it could cause a loss of 5-7 trees 
(8) This BMP requires an area of 160m2/ rai, thus it could cause a loss of 8-10 tress 
(9) Cost estimate of this practice varies by farm size. The calculation is presented in Annex 3 
(10) This BMP requires an area of 40m2/ rai, thus it could cause a loss of 2-3 trees 
 
3.3.1 Installation and Annual Maintenance Costs 
 
Scheduling water structure 
The construction of water structures (i.e. irrigation ditches) requires earthwork such as 
excavation and planning of irrigation routes. There is further work removing unwanted tress 
from the ditch lines. This costs approximately THB2,250/ rai. In the following years to 
                                                          
9 A land measurement unit in Thailand; 1 rai = 0.16 ha 
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maintain the ditch cross-sectional area, costs include ditch maintenance such as weed control 
and sediment removal. This could cost THB300/ rai/ year. 
 
Herbicide application within tree canopy 
No installation cost is required for this practice. The cost of applying herbicide within the 
tree canopy depends on several factors such as weed species, number and size of weeds, 
weather condition, soil moisture and selective herbicide. To maintain the effectiveness of 
this practice, the use of herbicide should be structured to maintain desired vegetation. For 
example, applications should remove broadleaf vegetation while maintain grasses. The 
estimated maintenance costs should not exceed THB882/ rai/ year including labour and 
equipment.  
 
Basic restrictions on pesticide application 
The first year costs include spraying equipment and its accessories. This could cost 
approximately THB1,360/ rai. Yearly maintenance includes labour and equipment 
replacement, which are as low as THB30/ rai. 
 
Soil analysis 
The first year costs include soil collection equipment and soil collection training, analysis 
services, interpretation manual, and use of appropriate organic fertiliser to target area. This 
could cost THB3,300/ rai. Effective nutrient management in the following year requires 




The establishment costs of this BMP are based on seedling and types of grass matching with 
the climatic conditions in the Ping river basin. Types of grass and seeding method affect the 
cost of seeds and tillage. However, it is estimated that overall installation costs should not 
exceed THB1,200/ rai. Yearly maintenance costs are THB400/ rai including reseeding in 





The installation costs include materials such as straw or plastic sheeting. Labour costs are 
incurred during the processes of mulching. Overall costs should not exceed THB882/ rai. 
Proper maintenance includes re-mulching and re-layering and these can cost THB294/ rai/ 
year. 
 
Vegetative buffer strip 
If land is cleared and graded, installation of buffer strip could cost THB1,125/ rai. To 
maintain the effectiveness of this practice, any excessive sediment on the buffer strip should 
be removed periodically and the strip should be reseeded as necessary. Furthermore, the strip 
should be mowed regularly. This yearly maintenance could cost THB90/ rai. 
 
Grassed waterway 
The establishing costs of this BMP vary depending on the equipment and labour costs, 
grading, seed and fertiliser selected. Overall costs, however, should not exceed THB1,356/ 
rai. Once the vegetation is established its maintenance costs are minimal. These costs include 
repairing rills and gullies and removing accumulation of deposited sediment, which can be 
low as THB120/ rai.  
 
On-site retention pond 
Site selection is important in terms of topography, water supply and soil type. Installation 
costs are varied and largely cover earthworks. The pond size of 10% of total planted area can 
store water for up to 120 days. Therefore, the construction costs are expected to be 
approximately THB15,155/ rai (for a pond sized 12.65m x 12.65m  x 3m). Maintenance 
costs are low but care may be needed for removal of excessive sediments. Trimming and 
replanting vetiver grass is sometimes needed, if plant around the edges of a pond to prevent 








Construction costs of terracing include earthwork to build terraces and outlet facilities. 
Additional costs cover the vegetation establishment. Construction costs vary greatly 
depending on the size of terrace and outlet. Typically, construction costs should not exceed 
THB1,847/ rai. Periodic and post-run-off inspections are required with prompt repair of 
damaged components. Moreover, maintenance of ridge height and outlet elevations, removal 
of excessive sediment, and maintenance of the vegetated area that may require replanting are 
also needed. These yearly maintenance costs are approximately THB935/ rai. 
 
Mix-load and wash-down site 
This practice requires an installation of chemical storage, and mix-load and wash-down 
areas. Literature suggests that the size of functional areas of an operation depends on the 
amount of pesticides stored at the facility (US Army Center for Public Works 1997; Kammel 
and O’Neil 1990), and storage area should able to hold at least 10% more than chemicals 
applied in latest season (Sumner and Bader 2009; Dean 2004). Accordingly, cost estimates 
for this practice are based on the concept of mixed costs. That is, costs contain both fixed 
and variable costs, and are partly affected by change in the level of activity (i.e. farm size 
and chemicals application). Assumptions for cost estimates are presented in Annex 3. 
Average installation cost is as high as THB 5,181/rai, while the annual maintenance cost is 
estimated at THB259/rai.  
 
Riparian setback 
The setback distances are established from the edge of stream where riparian areas are left as 
natural as possible. Typically, setback widths of 9.15m can serve an area of approximately 
80.95rai (Geauga Soil and Water Conservation District 2006). With the assumption that a 
farm has a square shape, an area of around 40.65m2/ rai is thus required for setback areas. 
Though existing natural vegetation is usually preferred, planted stock may be used. The 
overall installation costs are estimated at THB163/ rai. Annual maintenance costs include 
subsequent cutting/ trimming, selective herbicide application, and replanting or reseeding 




Figure 3-3 illustrates the proportion of installation and annual maintenance costs. The results 
show that the construction costs occurred in the first year is very important for every BMP 
adoption, excluding practice 2 (applying herbicide within tree canopy) from Good 
Husbandry category.  
 
 
Figure 3-3: Proportion of installation cost and annual maintenance cost (%) 
Notes: The horizontal axis represents twelve BMPs. From left to right, Good Husbandry 
category includes practice number 1-4: 1) scheduling water structure; 2) apply herbicide 
within tree canopy; 3) basic restrictions for pesticide application; and 4) soil analysis. 
Vegetative Practice category includes practice number 5-8: 5) vegetative cover; 6) mulching; 
7) vegetative buffer strip; and 8) grassed waterway. Structural Practice category includes 
practice number 9-12: 9) on-site retention storage; 10) terracing; 11) mix-load and wash-
down site; and 12) riparian setbacks. 
 
3.3.2 Land Opportunity Costs 
 
Land opportunity cost occurs from taking land out of production. In this study, it is based on 
related square meter of land necessary to build the appropriately sized BMP as recommended 
by US EPA (2008). Annual opportunity cost of land is calculated as gross margins of the 
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crops (Wossink and Osmond 2002). The calculation is based on the assumption that each rai 
can accommodate 65 trees, and each tree yields THB1280.4/ year (i.e. this is a return over 
variable costs).  
 
In this study, five BMPs incur land opportunity costs. These are vegetative buffer strips, 
grassed waterways, an on-site retention pond, a mix-load and wash-down site, and riparian 
setbacks. The opportunity costs of the remaining practices are considered zero (Table 3-2). 
The installation of vegetative buffer strip is recommended only in critical zone in the field, 
and the land opportunity cost is approximately estimated as THB3,842 – THB6,402/ rai. 
Land opportunity cost for grassed waterway can be estimated to range from THB6,402 – 
THB8,963/ rai. The construction of on-site retention pond causes a land opportunity cost of 
as high as THB10,244 – THB 12,805/ rai. The opportunity cost for installation of permanent 
station for mix-load and wash-down is estimated at THB3,841/rai. Finally, the opportunity 




3.4 Annualised Costs 
 
The expected lifetime of each BMP varies. For cost comparison, installation costs are 
























ABMP Annualised cost for BMP (THB) 
Z Capital cost of a BMP (THB) 
r Time value of money or the private discount rate (%) 




It is assumed that Good Husbandry will have a one year lifespan, while Vegetative and 
Structural Practices are expected to have a longer lifespan. Based on agronomy and 
engineering aspects, the expected lifespan of Vegetative and Structural BMPs are presented in 
Table 3-3. To capture all economic costs, opportunity costs were included in the cost analysis. 
Table 3-3: Expected lifespan for Vegetative and Structural Practices 
BMPs Lifespan (years) 
Vegetative Practices 
Vegetative cover 5 
Mulching 3 
Vegetative buffer strip 10 
Grassed waterway 10 
Structural Practices 
On-site retention pond 10 
Terracing 10 
mix-load and wash-down site 10 
Riparian setbacks 10 
  
Gregersen and Contreras (1992) argued that, from a private investor’s point of view, 
estimated average bank lending rate should be used as a discount rate. They further 
suggested that private discount rate varies from situation to situation. As such, in this study, 
three discount rates are offered for a comparative purpose. The first discount rate refers to 
the Bangkok Interbank Offered Rate (BIBOR), which is the rate of interest at which 
commercial banks borrow fund from other banks in the Bangkok interbank market. In year 
2007, the average BIBOR was approximately 4% (Bank of Thailand 2010a). The second 
discount rate is that normally applied in academic work for any project carried out in 
Thailand. This rate is set as 10% (Sajjakulnukit and Verapong 2003; Niskanen 1998). The 
third discount rate represents the rate at which farmers borrow money from the bank and pay 
a real annual interest rate. The rate from the Bank of Agriculture and Agricultural 
Cooperatives (BAAC) is used as a proxy and it is as high as 13% (BAAC 2010). Table 3-4 




Table 3-4: Annualised cost estimates for twelve BMPs 
     unit: THB/ rai 







Annualised installation cost Total annualised costs 
4% 10% 13% 4% 10% 13% 
Good Husbandry          
1. Scheduling water 
structure 




- 882 - - - - 882 882 882 
3. Basic restrictions 
for pesticide 
application 
1,360 30 - 1,414 1,496 1,537 1,444 1,526 1,567 
4. Soil analysis 3,300 1,650 - 3,432 3,630 3,729 5,082 5,280 5,379 
Vegetative Practice          
5. Vegetative cover 1,200 400 - 270 317 341 670 717 741 
6. Mulching 882 294 - 318 355 374 612 649 668 
7. Vegetative buffer 
strip 
1,125 90 5,122 139 183 207 5,351 5,395 5,419 
8. Grassed waterway 1,365 120 7,683 169 222 252 7,971 8,025 8,054 
Structural Practice          
9. On-site retention 
storage 
15,155 765 11,525 1,869 2,466 2,793 14,158 14,756 15,082 
10. Terracing 1,847 935 - 228 301 340 1,163 1,236 1,275 
11. Mix-load and wash-
down site 
5,181 259 3,841 639 843 955 4,739 4,943 5,055 
12. Riparian setbacks 163 20 3,202 20 27 30 3,242 3,248 3,252 




By comparison, at any discount rate, practice 9 (on-site retention pond) has the highest total 
annualised cost. At 13% discount rate, for example, the total annualised cost of practice 9 is 
as high as THB 15,082/ rai (Table 3-4; Figure 3-4). This high annualised cost is due to the 
land opportunity cost as a proportion of total cost.  Further, amongst all BMPs the top three 
practices having the highest total annualised cost are also those having the highest 
opportunity cost (practice 7, 8, and 9) (Figure 3-4). The finding indicates that opportunity 
cost (i.e. land requirement) is the critical determinant of conservation practice.   
 
 
Figure 3-4: Economic cost of BMPs (at 13% discount rate) 
Notes: The horizontal axis represents twelve BMPs. From left to right, Good Husbandry 
category includes practice number 1-4: 1) scheduling water structure; 2) apply herbicide 
within tree canopy; 3) basic restrictions for pesticide application; and 4) soil analysis. 
Vegetative Practice category includes practice number 5-8: 5) vegetative cover; 6) mulching; 
7) vegetative buffer strip; and 8) grassed waterway. Structural Practice category includes 
practice number 9-12: 9) on-site retention storage; 10) terracing; 11) mix-load and wash-





3.5 Discussion  
 
Cost analysis in this chapter offers a better understanding of the key financial factors that 
might influence farmers’ adoption intention. The value transfer of these estimated costs to 
other studies must be done with care because the cost estimates related to the implementation 
of BMPs in citrus farms are site-specific. For example, the installation cost of practice 10 
(terracing) was calculated for the terrace system that is suitable for citrus farms. The 
opportunity cost was calculated based on yield reduction. The use of these cost figures for 
other crops or other areas in the country may not appropriate. However, the lists of cost 
elements represent diverse conditions over the entire country, and policymakers can adopt 
these cost elements as guidelines for a cost estimate of BMPs in other studies.  
 
Overall, this study provides basic information about the total amount of money required for 
establishing a particular BMP at farm level. It also offers a comparison of annualised costs 
between various BMPs. This information is critical to guide policymakers about how to 
allocate public resources in order to encourage BMP adoption (Afari-Sefa et al. 2008; 
Wossink and Osmond 2002). Though cost estimates cannot provide conclusive evidence for 
predicting any desired water quality level, cost information can provide some insights about 
whether farmers make decisions based on costs. This can be further investigated in 
comparison with frequency of adoption intention (i.e. stated intention which will be derived 
from the application of TPB in chapter 4). In sum, economic cost estimates can offer insights 
into economic clarity around implementation costs of BMPs, allow a comparison of various 




The analysis in this chapter stems from the notion that cost is one barrier in the adoption of 
new technologies. The objectives of this chapter are to i) illustrate the farm budget in citrus 
production; ii) present BMP functions and its potential benefits and effectiveness; and iii)  
estimate the cost of BMP adoption and understand cost structure of BMPs recommended for 
citrus farms in the Ping river basin. BMP costs are separated into installation cost, annual 
maintenance cost, and land opportunity cost. BMP costs were based on the bottom-up 
approach. By doing so, labour-hours and materials of each element of work are estimated, 
priced and accumulated into a total cost. For comparison, annualised cost was calculated for 
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capital cost of BMPs which have different lifespans. The analysis revealed that installation 
cost is very important in BMP adoption, but for some BMPs, particularly those in Vegetative 
Practice and Structural Practice categories, land opportunity cost outweighs the installation 
and annual maintenance costs. The cost information is useful in the design of PES 
programme. Provided that costs influence farmers’ adoption, these costs could indicate the 
level of incentive payments to induce farmers’ participation. The main conclusion derived 
from this analysis is that in terms of actual cost, land opportunity cost is a large proportion of 




4 A MODIFICATION OF THE THEORY OF PLANNED 
BEHAVIOUR 
 
The literature review in chapter 2 shows that there are differences in underlying assumptions 
between economics and psychology. To a degree, adoption models provide little attention to 
psychological variables influencing behaviours and adoption intentions (Shogren and Taylor 
2008). Hence, an alternative approach is needed to understand human behaviour better. This 
chapter introduces a psychological theory, the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB), to 
supplement the economic model of BMP adoption. The scope of analysis is based on the 
integration of the TPB and statistical analysis (Figure 4-1).  
 
 




Section 4.1 reviews the application of TPB in the domain of environmental policy, followed 
by a transitivity concept in relation to farmers’ preferences towards BMPs. Then, it presents 
how to obtain psychological variables through an elicitation study and content analysis, and 
further discusses external variables to be considered in this adoption intention study. These 
variables will be included in a questionnaire, and treated as independent variables. Next, the 
processes of questionnaire development and fieldwork administration are then outlined. 
Section 4.2 presents descriptive statistics of farmers. This chapter closes with a summary of 
the main findings (section 4.3).   
 
4.1 Theory of Planned Behaviour  
 
4.1.1 Basic TPB constructs and the concept of behavioural intention 
TPB attempts to explain human behaviour. It postulates that a particular behaviour can be 
predicted from the behavioural intention to perform such behaviour. This intention can be 
predicted from three psychological constructs: attitude towards the behaviour; subjective 
norm about the behaviour; and perceived behavioural control of the behaviour (Ajzen 2006; 
Ajzen 1991) (Figure 4-2). The common method to measure these three variables is a survey 
using a TPB-constructed questionnaire. In this section are the three basic constructs of the 
TPB and evaluation of behaviour.  
 
 
Figure 4-2: Basic TPB model  
Sources: adapted from Ajzen (2006), and Ajzen (1991) 
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4.1.1.1 Attitude  
Attitude is the overall positive and negative evaluation of performing the behaviour. It is a 
product of personal evaluation of the outcome associated with the behaviour (or outcome 
evaluation) indexed by personal perception about the consequence of the behaviour (or 
behavioural belief). It is hypothesised that the more favourable the attitude, the more likely 
the adoption.  
 
4.1.1.2 Subjective norm 
Subjective norm is the perceived social pressure whether to perform. It is the product of 
belief about how referent group would like an individual to behave (or normative belief) 
indexed by likelihood of compliance (or motivation to comply). It is hypothesised that the 
more favourable the subjective norm, the stronger an individual’s intention to have that 
behaviour. 
 
4.1.1.3 Perceived behavioural control 
This is the degree in which an individual feels able to perform. It is assumed to reflect past 
experiences and anticipated impediments. Perceived behavioural control is a product of 
belief about both situational and internal factors controlling the behaviour (or control belief 
strength) indexed by perceived power of these factors (or control belief power). It is 
hypothesised that the greater the perceived behavioural control, the more likely the adoption.  
 
4.1.1.4 Behavioural intention 
According to the TPB, intention is assumed to be an approximate measure of actual 
behaviour. Behaviour is determined based on an individual’s intention to perform or not 
perform an action (Ajzen 1991). Most TPB studies apply a multipoint scale (i.e. 7-point 
scale) to measure a common dimension of intention (e.g. from scale of 1 to 7, how likely do 
you think you will perform n activity?). Intention is conceptualised as a probability 
continuum, and further transformed into a dichotomous behaviour representing a YES/NO 
response. Intention and actual behaviour are assumed to have a linear relationship (i.e. the 
greater the intention, the greater the probability of actual behaviour performing) (Sutton 
1998). This could cause a lack of correspondence because there are seven points on the 
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intention scale but only two for behaviour (Luzzi and Spencer 2008). Further, this could 
raise the argument of how well intention can predict the actual behaviour with considerable 
accuracy. According to Sutton (1998), intention can be treated as a dichotomous outcome 
variable which could allow the possibility of a better prediction for behaviour. A few TPB 
studies attempt to assess the link between intention and actual behaviour by defining 
intention in terms of a dichotomous dependent variable (Wauters et al. 2010; Mayet and 
Niess 2008; Fagan et al. 2008; Gabler and Jones 2000). 
 
On a related point, actual behaviour is the result of competition amongst options (Laroche 
and Sadokierski 1994), and behavioural intention can be better predicted when people are 
asked to consider relative distinctiveness amongst options (Axelrod 1968). As such, a 
construction of more specific questions, such as those giving choices and asking for 
selection, and situation-based questions are superior and can increase the probability of 
getting accurate responses (Ovans 1998). Similarly, a set of intention simulations imitating 
real situations could be a more valid proxy measure for actual behaviour, because it more 
closely approximates the condition that requires complex decisions (Francis et al. 2004). 
 
Taking into account the debate over the nature of behavioural intention and previous works 
relating to BMP adoption, 12 specific BMPs (see Table 1-5, Chapter 1) became the basis of 
both the belief and behavioural sections of the questionnaire to study farmers’ adoption 
decision as a dichotomous choice. Each measure was encouraged by agronomists for reasons 
of practicality and suitability to the study area. The next section describes a ranking process 
relating to adoption intention.  
 
4.1.2 Rank-ordering of the options 
According to Greiner et al. (2009), farmers will adopt an innovation if they expect that the 
practice helps them achieve social, economic, environmental and other goals. In other words, 
farmers decide which BMP according to its anticipated consequences. Throughout, this study 
assumes that each BMP possesses an inherent desirability and farmers determine how likely 
a particular BMP is to be preferred to another. This implication is based on the concept of 
transitivity of an individual’s preferences (Wu and Annis 2007), and this type of response is 
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classified as sentiment where there is no veridical comparison10
 
 (Nunnally 1978). The 
transitivity concept could be defined as: if A is preferred to B; and B is preferred to C; then 
A is preferred to C. 
In this study, twelve intention simulations representing corresponding BMPs were presented 
to participants. The BMPs were presented as a proxy service in a PES programme. The main 
messages sent to farmers were that the adoption will lead to an improvement in water quality 
and those who adopt BMPs will be compensated by the beneficiaries downstream. Each 
simulation comprised basic information, including implementation methods, relevant 
environmental benefits from adoption, and cost components of each BMP. Both benefit and 
cost figures were not presented to farmers. This is because in terms of benefits there is a 
limited reliable estimation related to science-based water quality improvement (Stanley 
2000), while costs of BMP adoption tend to vary substantially by farm and even across farm 
fields within a single farm depending on many factors such as geography, climate, and 
farming practices. Further, for some BMPs the costs are difficult to quantify because of their 
indirect and highly variable implementation level (US EPA 2004). Another issue why an 
objective cost is not presented to participants is that this thesis considers BMPs in the context 
of PES. Under the PES programme, costs incurred by farmers will be covered by transfer 
payments from beneficiaries. Hence, objective costs are not pertinent to the subject under 
consideration.   
 
Further question may arise as to what extent farmers consider the effectiveness of BMPs in 
their decision makings. At the individual farm scale farmers know best the most vulnerable 
location of their farms, and thus they tend to choose BMPs that could potentially solve a 
relevant environmental problem (Ellen et al. 1991; Cary and Wilkinson 1997). However, the 
actual BMP effectiveness and the effectiveness perceived by farmers are different. Farmers’ 
perceptions about BMP effectiveness are formed by familiarity with the practices (Matthew 
et al. 1993), environmental awareness, adaptability with new practices and acquired 
knowledge (Sattler and Nagel 2010). On the contrary, the actual effectiveness of BMPs is 
monitored in an experiment site (Otto et al. 2008; Borin et al. 2005). Factors affecting the 
                                                          
10  Two types of response are judgment and sentiment. Judgment is used to cover all responses where 
there is some veridical comparison for the subject’s response, and it is possible to determine 
whether each response is correct (i.e. which of two is heavier?). On the other hand, sentiment is 
used to cover all responses concerning personal reaction, preferences, interests, attitudes, values, 
likes and dislikes, and there is no physical scale for sentiment.  
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actual effectiveness of BMPs are, for example, climatic conditions, sources of pollution, and 
runoff volume.  
 
Overall, farmers’ perceived effectiveness covers a range of aspects related to production 
goals. Their understanding focuses on ‘know how’ or practical knowledge at the farm level 
in the interactions between the factors influencing crop production other than ‘know why’ in 
the ecological function (Ingram et al. 2010). Pannell et al. (2006) argued that, for an 
individual farmer, adoption is based on subjective perceptions rather than on scientific 
information because environmental advantage is not always clearly observable. This 
argument is reinforced in particular when positive perception in benefits and effectiveness of 
BMPs is important for an ex-ante decision in the evaluation of voluntary adoption (Husak et 
al. 2004). Accordingly, throughout the thesis farmers were asked to self-evaluate between 
‘perceived benefits’ (refer to environmental benefits of BMP, section 3.2) from, and 
‘perceived costs’ (refer to cost structure of BMP, section 3.3) of, BMP adoption. This 
process is in line with the discussion made by Lutz et al. (1994) that farmers’ decisions to 
invest in new technology are often based on estimated net benefits and personal interest. 
 
At this point adoption intention was designed as a dichotomous choice, adopt or not, leading 
to discretionary behaviour. Empirical studies have shown that more choices and more 
information could be overwhelming and led to a feeling of helplessness or reduced self-
efficiency (Dawnay and Shah 2005). Thus, after being presented with twelve scenarios 
participants were asked to select only three BMPs that they wanted to adopt at their farm. 
The selection criteria were based on personal preferences, personal need, the possibility of 
that practice being implemented on their farms (i.e. practicality, adaptability, and labour 
requirement), necessity, and achievement or goal of farm management. These criteria were 
set to reflect constraints relating to the adoption process. That is, farmers were asked to take 
account of possible outcomes, to compare the new alternative with the old technology, and to 
evaluate whether to adopt a new alternative (Guerin 1999).  
 
The participants were then asked to interpret their three selected BMPs according to their 
individual preference ranking (i.e. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd orders). Though the preference ranking 
amongst several discrete BMPs may not be the absolute test for behavioural intention, it 
could be an initial predictor of some level of commitment. On a related point, arguments 
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could arise when a multi-attribute measure granting a comparative judgment is applied. 
Participants were confronted with n possible solutions, but they were asked to choose only 
some BMPs. This could be a case if participants were forced to respond. However, in this 
study participants had the right to refuse selection if they were not sure. Farmers were 
allowed to select ‘no adoption’ if they desired as long as it was reasonable and followed the 
selection criteria. This is in line with the foundation of TPB in that choices are voluntary and 
individual is conscious of the consequences of adoption (East 1993).  
 
In order that all participants in the TPB study consider the studied behaviour, i.e. BMP 
adoption, under the same situational condition, the behavioural intention must be defined in 
terms of its Target, Action, Context, and Time (TACT) (Ajzen 2006; Francis et al. 2004). 
The TACT was stated directly at the beginning of the interview and it was defined as:  
If the government asks for voluntary adoption, consider the case of 
adopting activities that could reduce amount of pollutants discharged 
into watercourses in the next three years. (Carefully think about what 
you have just chosen as your preferred choices) 
 
4.1.3 Construction of psychological variables 
 
4.1.3.1 Elicitation study 
To establish a cognitive foundation for farmers’ salient beliefs, an elicitation study is 
required. Face-to-face interviews were conducted in June 2007 with 17 citrus farmers in the 
Ping river basin. These farmers were randomly selected from the list of registered farmers 
with the Department of Agricultural Extension. Participants were presented with pictures 
illustrating impacts from citrus production on water quality, and then introduced to BMPs. 
They were interviewed with thirteen open-ended questions (Annex 4). Interviews were 
conducted in the local native language, and answers were written down verbatim. 
 
4.1.3.2 Content analysis 
Content analysis was conducted to determine ideas and themes from the responses (Fink 
2003; Gillham 2000). Words and phrases were first defined and categorised into themes and 
sub-themes. Then, to be more specific, words and phases in each sub-theme were counted for 
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frequency of occurrence. Those with high frequency and containing meaningful information 
were retained and assigned as items in the questionnaire. The content analysis yielded 13 
psychological variables, which were four attitude variables, four subjective norm variables, 
and five perceived behavioural control variables (Table 4-1). A hypothesis relationship 
between these psychological variables and behavioural intention is also presented. 
 
Table 4-1: Psychological variables 
Variables Study Hypotheses 
Attitude variables  
 Reduced production cost + 
 Environmental protection + 
 Benefits gained from watershed services + 
 Greater commitment to farm management -1 
Subjective norm variables  
 Consumers + 
 Government + 
 Agricultural input retailer + 
 Neighbours + 
Perceived behavioural control variables  
 Affordable + 
 Return  + 
 Knowledge + 
 Farmer’s association + 
 Potential market + 
Note: 1) The study hypothesises negative association with adoption intention. However, for 
ease of score computation and interpretation, scores of the negative item were reversed.  
 
4.1.3.3 Psychological statements 
Thirteen variables were used to create a set of indirect measures to reflect both personal 
beliefs and personal evaluations of farmers. Further, a set of direct measures was added to 
the questionnaire. An indirect measure is a belief-based measure asking participants about 
specific beliefs and outcome evaluation, while a direct measure is an evaluative measure 
asking participants about their overall attitudes towards behaviour (Francis et al. 2004). A 
seven point bipolar adjective scale was used to elicit farmer’s adoption intentions regarding 
attitude, subjective norm and perceived behavioural control. For indirect measures, personal 
belief was scaled from 1 to 7, while personal evaluation was scaled from -3 to +3. For the 
direct measure, it was scaled from 1 to 7. Table 4-2 presents types of measure and numbers 




Table 4-2: Types of statement and corresponding question numbers 
 
Types of statement Question number1 
Statements presenting direct measure  
Attitude 1 
Subjective norm 3-5, 25 
Perceived behavioural control 2, 6-8 
Statements presenting indirect measure  
Attitude  
 Personal belief: behavioural belief 9-12 
 Personal evaluation: outcome evaluation  18-21 
Subjective norm  
 Personal belief: motivation to comply 22-26 
 Personal evaluation: normative belief 27-30 
Perceived behavioural control  
 Personal belief: control belief strength 13-17 
 Personal evaluation: control belief power 31-35 
Note: 1) as appeared in section 2, Annex 5 
 
4.1.4 Additional variables 
The TPB originally postulates three elements (attitude, subjective norm and perceived 
behavioural control) explaining behavioural intention. However, the model allows for the 
inclusion of other variables (Ajzen 1991: 199). Inclusion of additional variables in the model 
could increase the predictive power of actual behaviour (Fielding et al. 2008), and provide a 
theoretical coherence to results (Conner and Armitage 1998). Some research has shown that 
intention is better predicted when other factors are included alongside the traditional three 
variables (de Bruijn et al. 2005; Karppinen 2005; Cook et al. 2002). In the context of 
farmers’ decision-making towards adoption of new agricultural technologies and policies, 
Edwards-Jones (2006) suggested that farmers’ decisions are influenced by a range of factors 
which are integrally formed of psychological and other socio-economic variables.  
Accordingly, the TPB model is extended inclusion of four additional variable sets (Figure 4-
3). These four variable sets are socio-demographics of farmer, characteristics of the farm 
household, structure of the farm business and social milieu. Their hypothesised relationship 





Figure 4-3: The TPB model 
Source: adapted from Ajzen (1991), and Edwards-Jones (2006)  
 
4.1.4.1 Cost determination 
Basically, adoption intentions can be explained by both the classical microeconomic concept 
and the social psychology concept. The behaviour of economic agents described by 
economic theory is based on normative concepts, in that the individual is assumed to have 
bounded rationality and to maximise his utility. On the other hand, behaviour explained by 
social psychology follows a positive approach, and relies on behavioural determinants as 
antecedents to individual’s intention (Dierks 2005). The introduction of the social 
psychology concept into economic study has been done to explain the adoption process of 
intended behaviour (Spash et al. 2009). In order to assess willingness to adopt according to 
implementation costs of BMPs, a questionnaire must be designed based on a stated 
preference approach. However, studies reveal that a TPB structured questionnaire could only 
include perceived costs as variables in the analyses (Rehman et al. 2007; Fielding et al. 
2005). This reflects a methodological incompatibility between social psychology and 
economics. As the introduction of cost into the TPB framework is uncertain, cost is excluded 







Table 4-3: Additional variables 
 
Variables References Modes of Technology Adoption Findings Study Hypotheses 
Socio-demographic of the farmers 
 Age Rodriguez et al. (2009) 
Sriwichailamphan et al. (2008)  
Sheikh et al. (2003)  
Zubair and Garforth (2006)  
Sustainable agricultural practices 








 Education level 
 
Rodriguez et al. (2009) 
Zubair and Garforth (2006) 
Sheikh et al. (2003)  
Doss and Morris (2001) 
Fulgie (1999) 
Traore et al. (1998) 
Feather and Cooper (1995) 
Kerns and Kramer (1985)  
Ervin and Ervin (1982)  
Sustainable agricultural practices 
Agroforestry 
No-tillage practices 
Modern varieties and fertiliser 
Conservation tillage and pesticide 
BMPs 
Nonpoint source pollution control 
Nonpoint source pollution control 













Gillespie et al. (2007)  
Tenge et al. (2004)  
Adesina and Chianu (2002)  
BMPs 
Soil and water conservation 





Characteristics of the farm household 
 Dependence on other crops Gillespie et al. (2007)  
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1994)  
BMPs 




 Past experiences in farming Nyaupane and Gillespie (2009)  
Ribaudo et al. (1999)  
Traore et al. (1998) 
BMPs 






 Health condition Traore et al. (1998) 















Variables References Modes of Technology Adoption Findings Study Hypotheses 
Structures of the farm business 
 Farm size Nyaupane and Gillespie (2009)  
Larson et al. (2007). 
Zubair and Garforth (2006) 
Beedell and Rehman (2000)  
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1994) 
Earle et al. (1979)  



















 Location Ribaudo et al. (1999) Nonpoint source pollution control Depend on type 
of technology 
n/a 
 Any stream run through Rahelizatovo (2002)  






 Soil type (i.e. natural fertility, drainage 
efficiency, erosion susceptibility) 
Zhou et al. (2008)  
Rahm and Huffman (1984)  





 Contribution of family labour in farm activity Gillespie et al. (2007)  
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1994)  
BMPs 




 Land ownership 
 
Nyaupane and Gillespie (2009)  
Oates (2006) 
Zubair and Garforth (2006) 
Sheikh et al. (2003) 
Herath and Takeya (2003) 
Soule and Tegene (2000) 
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1994)  
BMPs 















 Household income Rodriguez et al. (2009) 
Gillespie et al. (2007)  
Sheikh et al. (2003) 
Ribaudo et al. (1999) 
Sustainable agricultural practices 
BMPs 
No-tillage practices 






 Household debt Oates (2006)  Good Agricultural Practices - - 
Social milieu 
 Membership of farmers’ agricultural 
association 
Herath and Takeya (2003)  






 Access into government advisory services 
 
Herath and Takeya (2003)  






 Access into other sources of advisory 
services 
Gillespie et al. (2007)  
Traore et al. (1998) 
Feather and Cooper (1995)  
BMPs 
Conservation practices 







4.1.4.2 Socio-demographics of the farmers 
Age 
According to Rodriguez et al. (2009), older farmers are less likely to consider new 
production practices because they may be ‘ready to retire’ and ‘do not have the years to see 
more benefits’. Previous research has also shown that younger farmers were more likely to 
adopt conservative practices on their farms (Sriwichailanphan et al. 2008; Zubair and 
Garforth 2006; Sheikh et al. 2003). Thus, a negative impact of age on an adoption of BMPs 
is expected.  
 
Education level 
It is hypothesised that more educated farmers are able to understand and obtain information 
about environmental problems, such as water quality degradation, which not only affects 
their own farms but also the watershed system. Kerns and Kramer (1985)  explained that 
highly educated farmers may have better access to information, and better managerial skills. 
These could potentially increase the effort to adopt conservation practices. Lack of 
knowledge deters farmers from adopting new technology as this increases the uncertainty in 
changing to something unknown (Rodriguez et al. 2009). Plenty of empirical studies show 
that education level is positively related to the adoption rate of more eco-friendly practices 
(Zubair and Garforth 2006; Sheikh et al. 2003; Doss and Morris 2001; Fulgie 1999; Traore et 
al. 1998; Feather and Cooper 1995; Ervin and Ervin 1982). Hence, a positive impact of 
education level on a BMPs uptake is expected.  
 
Gender 
Gender relates to the issue of adoption because male and female farmers may hold different 
preferences when considering new practices. Other things being equal, they may face 
different constraints when it comes to new technology uptake (Doss and Morris 2001). The 
role of gender on the uptake of more eco-friendly practices is not very clear (Gillespie et al. 
2007; Tenge et al. 2004). Gender bias could occur in land allocation, inheritance systems, or 
even in testing and demonstration process of new practices (Adesina and Chianu 2002). 




4.1.4.3 Characteristics of the farm household 
Dependence on other crops 
Dependence on other crops indicates the number of activities other than citrus cultivation on 
the farm, and simply indicates farm diversification. Gillespie et al. (2007) and Fernandez-
Cornejo et al. (1994) found that more diversified producers are likely to adopt BMPs as the 
adoption could potentially offer benefits to other farm business sections. This study thus 
hypothesises that dependence on other crops is positively associated with BMP uptake.  
 
Level of farming experience 
The association between experience and BMP adoption is not clear. Nyaupane and Gillespie 
(2009)  found that farming experience is positively associated with adoption rate. Greater 
experience could simply mean a better knowledge in farm management, and more accurate 
assessment of benefits from BMP uptake (Herath and Takeya 2003). On the other hand, 
more experienced farmers, also older farmers, have shorter planning horizons, and thus are 
less likely to adopt new conservation practices (Ribaudo et al. 1999; Traore et al. 1998). 
Further, a belief in traditional farming practices could possibly outweigh new technology as 
experience increases (Herath and Takeya 2003). Accordingly, the expected sign for this 
variable is uncertain a priori. 
 
Health state 
Provided economic factors are not a driving force in BMP adoption, human capital variables 
such as health increase the adoption likelihood of conservation practices (Traore et al. 1998). 
Poor health could shorten planning horizons and deter normal decision-making (Rahm and 
Huffman 1984). Thus, it is hypothesised that a healthy farmer is more likely to adopt BMPs. 
 
4.1.4.4 Farm business structure 
Farm size 
Farm size is positively associated with the adoption of new conservation practices. Smaller 
farmers face large fixed costs, transaction costs, and information costs, and thus these reduce 
the tendency to adopt new practices (Larson et al. 2007; Zubair and Garforth 2006; Beedell 
and Rehman 2000; Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 1994; Earle et al. 1979). On the other hand, 
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smaller farmers may be able to adapt faster to new practices (Feder et al. 1985; Greene 
1973). According to Nyaupane and Gillespie (2009), farm size has different effects on the 




BMP that is developed for one particular setting may not suitable or may cause damage if 
applied in another setting. Farmers will be unwilling to adopt a practice that is inappropriate 
for their land (Ribaudo et al. 1999). As they are twelve BMPs proposed in this study, a priori 
may not be suitable.  
 
Proximity to a water course 
As BMPs are initially introduced to capture the problem of water quality degradation caused 
by traditional farming practices, farms having a stream or drainage running through are more 
likely to adopt BMPs (Gillespie et al. 2007; Rahelizatovo 2002).  
 
Soil type 
Soil characteristics, such as natural fertility, drainage efficiency, and erosion susceptibility 
potentially influence BMP adoption. Farms with good soil quality would achieve better 
effects through an adoption of new conservation practices (Zhou et al. 2008; Rahm and 




Family members provide unpaid farm labour to the enterprise. Gillespie et al. (2007) and 
Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1994) found that family labour supply is positively associated with 





Land ownership reflects planning horizons and risk aversion. It increases incentives to adopt 
more eco-friendly practices by lengthening time horizons and the share of benefits accruing 
to the adopter (Herath and Takeya 2003). An association between land tenure and adoption 
varies by types of landholding and the nature of the innovation. The land owner is likely to 
adopt new practices if the innovations require investment tied to the land (Zubair and 
Garforth 2006; Sheikh et al. 2003; Soule and Tegene 2000). Conversely, given the same 
condition, the tenant is less likely to adopt new practices because the perceived benefits from 
adoption may not accrue to them (Nyaupane and Gillespie 2009; Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 
1994). Oates (2006) found that short term rental contracts in Thailand discouraged farmers 




Information about new technology is not costless. Further, adoption costs such as initial 
investment cost, and conversion costs may be high. As such, households with greater income 
are more likely to adopt new conservation practices (Rodriguez et al. 2009; Gillespie et al. 
2007; Sheikh et al. 2003; Ribaudo et al. 1999). Thus, it is expected that household income is 
positively associated with BMP adoption. 
  
Household debt 
Previous investment, such as initial investment and supporting materials is directly linked to 
household debt. Normally, farmers are able to repay their loans after the first harvest. This 
kind of commitment limits farmers’ choice (Oates 2006). Thus, it is hypothesised that 
household debt is negatively associated with BMP adoption.  
 
Two other variables further included in this study are the contribution of full-time workers 
and the contribution of part-time workers in farm activity.  
 
                                                          
11 Land title is needed to guarantee bank credit  
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Full time workers 
It is hypothesised that the number of full time workers could influence the adoption of a 
particular practice. With high rates of full time working in the field, it is expected that the 
adoption of time- and management- intensive technology increases. 
 
Part time workers 
It is hypothesised that farms which rely on a high rate of part time workers are unlikely to 
adopt high-commitment practices, such as BMPs in Good Husbandry category.  
 
4.1.4.5 Social milieu 
Membership of farmers’ conservative group 
Being a member of a farmer association can ensure access to timely and accurate 
information (Herath and Takeya 2003). Member of a conservative group is also likely to take 
conservation advice and tends to think of the long-term productivity of their farm (Beedell 
and Rehman 2000). Accordingly, it is expected that membership status is positively 
associated with BMP adoption. 
 
Access into government advisory services 
State agencies are responsible for transferring agricultural knowledge and information to 
farmers. A local extension service office is located in each district. A mobile unit providing 
prompt technical service to farmers is also available. Literature shows that the number of 
times producers meet with state extension service personnel enhances the rate of BMP 
adoption (Herath and Takeya 2003; Henning and Cardona 2000). Thus, it is hypothesised 
that the accessibility level, from easy to difficult, is negatively associated with BMP 
adoption. 
 
Access into other sources of advisory services 
Besides information from the state agency, farmers also rely on information from a network 
of providers such as chemical dealers, and input supply retailers. Provided technical 
assistance is easily received from this network, farmers are likely to adopt new conservation 
practices (Feather and Cooper 1995). Empirical studies present a positive relationship 
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between the availability of information and the uptake of conservation practices (Gillespie et 
al. 2007; Traore et al. 1998). Thus, it is hypothesised that the accessibility level, from easy to 
difficult, is negatively associated with BMP adoption.  
 
4.1.5 Questionnaire development 
 
4.1.5.1 First draft questionnaire  
The first draft questionnaire was constructed and included: 1) an open space for filling the 
most three preferable BMPs in priority order; 2) a set of multipoint-scale questions including 
direct measures and indirect measures reflecting thirteen psychological variables; and 3) a 
set of additional variables. 
 
4.1.5.2 Feedback from experts 
The first draft questionnaire was presented at international conferences12
 
. Feedback from 
conference participants was taken into account. The questionnaire was redrafted to make its 
layout clearer, and question items were rephrased to make it more concise.  
4.1.5.3 Piloting the questionnaire 
Five participants were asked to complete the questionnaire and comment on the difficulty and 
clarity of the questions. A second draft was also written in consultation with a research team 
experienced in interviews with local people. Responses led to minor changes in wording and 
formatting (i.e. sequence and layout), and thus a final questionnaire was constructed (Annex 
5).  
 
4.1.6 Fieldwork administration 
 
4.1.6.1 Sampling method and sample size calculation 
A simple random sampling scheme was applied for small- to medium- scale farm households 
in the Ping river basin. This procedure gives each member of the population an equal chance 
of being chosen. The procedure is a sampling without replacement (Newbold 1995). The 
                                                          
12  Two international conferences are 1) ‘Integrating Conservation in the Upland Agriculture in 
Southeast Asia’, International Agroforestry Education Conference, 24-26 October 2007, Chiang 
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question is how many sample observations are needed. According to Bartlett et al. (2001), 
the determination of sample size depends on which type of variables play a primary role in 
data analysis. The construction of TPB questionnaire requires a multipoint scale 
measurement, which is classed as continuous data. Therefore, the continuous sample size 
formula (equation 2) was used as follows: 
 




stn ×=  
(Equation 2) 
where; 
t  = value for selected alpha level of .025 in each tail = 1.96 (the alpha level of .05 
indicates the level of risk the researcher is willing to take that true margin of 
error may exceed the acceptable margin of error) 
s = estimate of standard deviation in the population = 1.167 (estimate of variance 
deviation for seven point scale calculated by using 7 [inclusive range of scale] 
divided by 6 [number of standard deviations that include almost all 
(approximately 98%) of the possible values in the range]) 
d = acceptable margin of error for mean being estimated = .21 (number of points on 
primary scale times acceptable margin of error; seven-point scale times 
acceptable margin of error of .03)   
 
There is a population of 439 households in upstream area and that of 1,163 households in 
downstream area (Table 4-4).  
 
                                                                                                                                                                    
Mai, Thailand; and 2) ‘The 28th Biannual Workshop’, held by the Economy and Environment 
Program for Southeast Asia, 13-16 November 2007, Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 
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Table 4-4: Sampling frame  
Provinces1 Reported of 
cultivated district2 
No. of Households2 Cultivation area 
(rai)2 
Upstream 
Chiang Mai 17 345 4,340 
Mae Hong Son 4 45 229 
Tak - - - 
Lam Pang 4 45 104 
Lam Phun 1 4 24 
Sub-total 26 439 4,697 
Downstream 
Kampangpeth 7 795 13,813 
Nakorn Sawan 3 368 5,122 
Sub-total 10 1,163 18,935 
Total 36 1,602 23,632 
Sources: 
(1) derived from GIS data, Office of Project Management, Royal Irrigation Department (RID 2007) 
(2) DOAE Information Centre, Department of Agricultural Extension (DOAE 2007a) 
 
The required sample size for each area is: 











However, since this sample size exceeds 5% of the population (439 × .05 = 21.95, and 1,163 
x .05 = 58.15), Cochran (1977)’s correction formula (equation 3) is used to calculate the 










Population size = 439 for upstream area and 1,163 for downstream area 
0n = required return sample size according to Cochran’s formula = 118 
1n = required return sample size because sample > 5% of population 
Un1 = the minimum returned sample size for the upstream area = 93 
Dn1 = the minimum returned sample size for the downstream area = 107  
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4.1.6.2 Data collection 
Sample size 
The survey administration was split into two periods. The first survey was conducted from 
December 2007 to January 2008. The second survey was from June to August 2008. The 
total sample size was 218 (13.61% of population). Of those, 126 are from the upstream area 
and 92 are from the downstream area. The numbers of interviews are shown in Table 4-5, 
and the distribution of sample is illustrated in Figure 4-4.  



















Chiang Mai 70 87 1 1 2 83 
Mae Hong Son 10 12 - - 1 11 
Lam Pang 20 34 - 1 1 32 
Sub-total 100 133 1 2 4 126 
Downstream 
Kampangpeth 95 84 1 5 1 77 
Nakorn Sawan 20 17 2 - - 15 
Sub-total 115 101 3 5 1 92 
Total 215 234 4 7 5 218 
Note: * consistency in psychology tests refers to reliability whether a researcher gets the 
same result across a range of measurement. To assess the responses, the TPB-
based questionnaire was designed to have two different questions that tested the 
same construct. For example, two questions (questions 10 and 19: see Annex 5) 
were used to measure an attitude towards the notion that BMP adoption could 
protect environment. A response containing inconsistent results was rejected as this 
showed that a participant may not carefully answer, thus leading to bias and 
inaccuracy of data interpretation.   
 
The target for the upstream area was 100 households. The appointments with farmers were 
made through the Tambon (sub-district) Administrative Organisations (TAOs) and 
agricultural extension agencies at district level. A total of 133 participants came for 
interview but one refused to participate in the interview. Two participants gave incomplete 
answers about household income, and four participants gave inconsistent answers in the 




Figure 4-4: Distribution of sample by area 
 
The target for the downstream area was 115 households. The appointments with citrus 
farmers were also made through the TAOs and agricultural extension agencies at district 
level. Only 101 participants came for interview, and this number was less than targeted. 
Further, three participants refused to complete the interviews. Five participants gave 
incomplete answers and one participant gave inconsistent answers in the psychological 
section. In total, there were 92 interviews with downstream households. 
 
Flow of information and tasks for participants 
A team leader started the interviews by describing the role of the watershed and its natural 
services. This was followed by a description of the impacts from nonpoint source pollution, 
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possibly generated by citrus production. The scientific information regarding water quality in 
the Ping river basin, compared to other river basins nationwide, was also demonstrated to 
participants through a water quality map. Then, twelve BMPs were demonstrated to 
participants (see illustrations in Annex 6).  Participants were informed that they were free to 
ask the research team any questions before, during and after the survey.  
 
Task 1: Adoption intention and rank-ordering 
Participants were presented with pictures of twelve BMPs together with implementation 
details, expected environmental benefits from adoption, and cost components of each BMP. 
Then, they were asked to make a decision on whether to adopt that technique on their farm. 
Provided behaviour is voluntary and conscious, BMP is selected based on the anticipated 
consequences (i.e. need satisfaction, goal achievement) that provide positive consequences, 
and avoid negative outcomes (Olson and Reynolds 2001). It is at this stage that participants 
were asked to select only three BMPs that they wanted to use at their farms. Next, 
participants were asked to rank these three BMPs in priority order.   
 
Task 2: Personal interview 
Participants who had already selected their three practices were interviewed personally by an 
enumerator. First, they were asked about their background, such as demographic data. Then, 
they were asked to complete a set of multipoint-scale questions reflecting psychological 
variables. Participants with literacy were asked to complete this section by themselves. 
However, an enumerator was provided to respond promptly if difficulties arose. Participants 
who were unable to read were assisted by an enumerator.  
 
Communication management 
Misunderstanding could happen during the flow of information. On one hand, a message 
from the research team could confuse and mislead participants, and may cause them to act in 
unintended ways (Whittington 2004). Moreover, a warm-glow effect (Andreoni 1990)13
                                                          
13  When people make donations to privately provided public goods, there may be other factors (i.e. to 
win prestige, respect, friendship, to avoid scorn, to receive social acclaim) influencing their 
decision other than altruism.   
 




attempt to reduce the bias in hypothetical commitment is a cheap talk script (Carlsson et al. 
2005; Cummings and Taylor 1999). Participants were informed that the study will be used 
solely for the purpose of research, that it is important that participants should carefully 
consider when answering, and that their answers will be confidentially treated. A serious 
response is likely when participants are reminded of the consequences of their actions (Bulte 
et al. 2005).   
 
On the other hand, information from the participants to the research team was filtered 
through the enumerators. Thus, prior to the fieldwork, enumerators were trained to ensure 
that they understood the object of the survey and basic technical aspects contained in the 
twelve intention simulations. As suggested by Whittington (2002), pairs of enumerators role-
played an entire questionnaire in front of the group of the survey team. They then discussed 
the mock interview and any problems that arose. The team leader stepped in to assist and 
guide on how to handle particular problems. It is expected that during the survey all 
enumerators are able to respond in a knowledgeable and informed manner. 
 
Ethical considerations 
During the fieldwork, participants were notified of aims, methods, anticipated benefits and 
potential hazards of the research. They were informed of the voluntary nature of the 
interview and their right to refuse to be interviewed or to terminate interviews in progress.  
 
4.2 Descriptive Results 
 
This section provides summarised information and comprises two sub-sections. First, 
descriptive data are presented based on characteristics of farmers in terms of both socio-
economic and psychological constructs. This sub-section also presents the frequency of BMP 
selected as 1st, 2nd, and 3rd option according to farm location. The following sub-section 
offers insights into the differences in the sample means of upstream and downstream 
farmers. A Mann-Whitney test is also employed to compare differences in farm and farmer 
characteristics. Prior to the analysis, it should be noted here that farm location is considered 
as an importantly distinctive difference amongst Thai citrus farmers. Particularly, a spatial 
difference contributes to a different style of farm management and land use, and thus could 
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possibly lead to a difference in farmers’ attitudes and preferences towards BMP adoption. 
Accordingly, the further analysis will be done on the basis of farm location.  
 
4.2.1 Descriptive statistics 
 
4.2.1.1 Characteristics of citrus farmers 
The statistical analysis includes 218 farmers of which 126 (58%) are from the upstream area 
and 92 (42%) are from the downstream area. The characteristics of the sample are presented 
in Table 4-6. 
Table 4-6: Characteristics of citrus farmers 
Variables Upstream Downstream Overall 
(n=126) (%) (n=92) (%) (n=218) (%) 
Socio-demographics of farmer 
 Age (years)       
  Less than 30  19 15.1 3 3.3 22 10.1 
  30.1 - 40 23 18.3 25 27.2 48 22.0 
  40.1 - 50 32 25.4 28 30.4 60 27.5 
  50.1 - 60 30 23.8 26 28.3 56 25.7 
  More than 60 22 17.5 10 10.9 32 14.7 
  Mean (S.D.) 47.1(13.9) 47.2 (10.6) 41.2(12.6) 
 Education level       
  Less than high school 77 61.1 55 59.8 132 60.6 
  High school and over 49 38.9 37 40.2 86 39.5 
 Gender       
  Male 90 71.4 68 73.9 158 72.5 
    Female 36 28.6 24 26.1 60 27.5 
Characteristics of the farm household 
 Farm experiences (years)       
  Less than 15 91 72.2 83 90.2 174 79.8 
  15 or over 35 27.8 9 9.8 44 20.2 
  Mean (S.D.) 12.0(10.2) 8.4(8.9) 10.5(9.8) 
 Dependency of other crops       
  Yes 103 81.8 60 65.2 163 74.8 
  No 23 18.3 32 34.8 55 25.2 
 Health problem retarding farming activities     
  Yes 21 16.7 30 32.6 51 23.4 




Variables Upstream Downstream Overall 
(n=126) (%) (n=92) (%) (n=218) (%) 
Structures of the farm business 
 Land ownership       
  Own land 103 81.8 79 85.9 182 83.5 
  Under others 23 18.3 13 14.1 36 16.5 
 Farm size (rais)       
  Less than or equal 5 42 33.3 4 4.4 46 21.1 
  5.01 - 10 39 31.0 28 30.4 67 30.7 
  10.01 - 20 24 19.1 27 29.4 51 23.4 
  20.01 - 50 13 10.3 18 19.6 31 14.2 
  More than 50 8 6.4 15 16.3 23 10.6 
  Mean (S.D.) 17.0(29.0) 39.4(97.5) 26.4(67.8) 
 Location of farm       
  Upstream 126 100.0 - - 126 57.8 
  Downstream - - 92 100.0 92 42.2 
 Farm resource endowments       
 - Stream       
  Yes 75 59.5 80 87.0 155 71.1 
  No 51 40.5 12 13.0 63 28.9 
 - Soil type       
  Clay 22 17.5 42 45.7 64 29.4 
  Loam 30 23.8 6 6.5 36 16.5 
  Sandy and others 74 58.7 44 47.8 118 54.1 
 Labour management in farm workload     
 - Contribution of family labour (%)      
  Less than or equal 50 83 65.9 79 85.9 162 74.3 
  More than 50 43 34.1 13 14.1 56 25.7 
 - Contribution of part time worker (%)      
  Less than or equal 50 58 46.0 29 31.5 87 39.9 
  More than 50 68 54.0 63 68.5 131 60.1 
 - Contribution of full time worker (%)      
  Less than or equal 50 126 100.0 91 98.9 217 99.5 
  More than 50 - - 1 1.1 1 0.5 
 Household income (THB/rai)       
  Less than median value 47 37.3 62 67.4 109 50.0 
  
Equal or more than 
median value 79 62.7 30 32.6 109 50.0 
  Mean (S.D.) 33,046.7 (51,936.2) 16,614.5 (22,780.7) 26,112.0 (42,867.0) 
  Median value   13,166.7 
 Household debt (THB/rai)       
  Less than median value 82 65.1 26 28.3 108 49.5 
  
Equal or more than 
median value 44 34.9 66 71.7 110 50.5 
  Mean (S.D.) 21,073.9 (41,555.0) 42,652.7 (79,785.9) 30,180.6 (61,468.2) 




Variables Upstream Downstream Overall 
(n=126) (%) (n=92) (%) (n=218) (%) 
Social milieu 
 Membership of farmer association      
  Yes 66 52.4 70 76.1 136 62.4 
  No 60 47.6 22 23.9 82 37.6 
 Access to government advisory services      
  No need for services 40 31.8 45 48.9 85 39.0 
  Easy or not so difficult 50 39.7 34 37.0 84 38.5 
  Difficult or not so easy 36 28.6 13 14.1 49 22.5 
 Access to other advisory services      
  No need for services 26 20.6 1 1.1 27 12.4 
  Easy or not so difficult 97 77.0 86 93.5 183 83.9 
    Difficult or not so easy 3 2.4 5 5.4 8 3.7 
 
Farmer socio-demographics 
The average age of upstream farmers is 47.1 years and that of downstream farmers is 47.2 years. 
Both have an education level less than high school and one-third are male. 
 
Farm household characteristics 
On average, farmers in the upstream area have longer experience in farming than those in the 
downstream area. Most farmers depend on other cash crops, and indicate no health problems in 
citrus farming.  
 
Structure of the farm business 
Most of farmers are land owners. The average farm size of upstream farms is 17.0 rais, and that 
of downstream farms is 39.4 rais. It should be noted that the samples contain only small- to 
medium-scale farmers. Therefore, a caution should be taken when interpreting this data and 
making any further analysis. In this study, the survey could not carry out with large-scale 
farmers because of a time limitation and a difficulty to arrange a meeting with either owners or 
farm managers.    
 
Most farms are situated by streams or have a stream running through. Soil type in upstream 
areas is typically sandy, while in downstream areas soil is proportionately clay and sandy. 
Overall, the farm workload mainly relies on part-time workers. The average income of upstream 





Overall, most farmers are members of farmer associations. There is little complaint about 
difficulty accessing either government advisory services or other sources of information.  
 
Descriptive statistics of farmers’ psychological characteristics are illustrated in Table 4-7. A 
direct measure was scaled from 1 to 7, while an indirect measure was a summated scale and was 
derived from the personal belief score (ranged from 1 to 7) weighted by the personal evaluation 
score (ranged from -3 to +3). Thus, for the indirect measure the lowest summated score is -21 
(i.e. 7 times -3), and the highest summated score is +21 (i.e. 7 times +3). For both measures the 
higher the score, the more likely the adoption intention.  








(n = 218) 
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
Direct measures       
Attitudes       
Overall adopting BMPs is BAD(1a) vs. 
GOOD (7) 4.1 (2.6) 2.6 (2.2) 3.5 (2.5) 
Overall adopting BMPs is WORTHLESS(1) 
vs. USEFUL(7) 6.1 (1.6) 6.3 (1.2) 6.2 (1.5) 
Overall, adopting BMPs is the WRONG 
thing to do(1) vs. RIGHT thing to do(7) 4.2 (2.5) 2.7 (2.2) 3.6 (2.5) 
Overall, adopting BMPs is 
UNPLEASANT(1) vs. PLEASANT(7) for me 4.2 (2.5) 2.8 (2.1) 3.6 (2.4) 
Subjective norms       
Important people think that I should  
NOT(1) vs. SHOULD(7) adopt BMPs 3.8 (2.5) 5.0 (2.3) 4.3 (2.4) 
It is expected for me that I should adopt 
BMPs, DISAGREE(1) vs. AGREE(7) 5.5 (1.7) 5.7 (1.8) 5.6 (1.7) 
I feel under social pressure to adopt BMPs, 
DISAGREE(1) vs. AGREE(7) 5.0 (2.1) 4.7 (2.2) 4.8 (2.1) 
Important people want me to adopt BMPs, 
DISAGREE(1) vs. AGREE(7) 5.5 (1.8) 5.5 (1.8) 5.5 (1.8) 
Perceived behavioural control       
I am confident that I could adopt BMPs if I 
want to, DISAGREE(1) vs. AGREE(7) 5.8 (1.6) 6.0 (1.5) 5.9 (1.5) 
For me, to adopt BMPs is DIFFICULT(1) vs. 
EASY(7) 4.4 (2.1) 3.9 (1.7) 4.2 (2.0) 
The decision to adopt BMPs is beyond my 
controlb,  AGREE(1) vs. DISAGREE(7) 4.5 (2.3) 4.2 (2.3) 4.3 (2.3) 
Adopt BMPs or not is entirely up to me, 
DISAGREE(1) vs. AGREE(7) 4.4 (2.4) 5 (1.9) 4.8 (2.3) 
Notes: 
(1) aNumber represents score 
(2) bThe negative item was reversed score 





Upstream   




(n = 218) 
Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) Mean (S.D.) 
Indirect measuresc       
Attitudes       
Reduced production cost 12.6 (7.9) 13.1 (8.4) 12.8 (8.1) 
Environmental protection 17.2 (6.0) 17.7 (5.8) 17.4 (5.9) 
Watershed services gained 15.4 (7.3) 16.3 (6.5) 15.7 (7.0) 
Greater commitmentb 4.4 (8.7) 0.9 (8.9) 2.9 (8.9) 
Subjective norms       
Consumers 13.2 (8.8) 13.3 (9.5) 13.3 (9.1) 
Government 12.0 (8.3) 11.5 (9.7) 11.8 (8.9) 
Agricultural supply retailer 4.4 (9.8) 4.7 (9.6) 4.5 (9.7) 
Neighbours 5.8 (10.2) 4.6 (10.0) 5.3 (10.1) 
Perceived behavioural control       
Affordable 11.0 (7.9) 9.0 (10.2) 10.1 (9.0) 
Return 7.2 (7.0) 5.4 (8.4) 6.4 (7.6) 
Knowledge 10.2 (8.4) 9.0 (8.6) 9.7 (8.5) 
Farmer association 9.5 (10.6) 7.5 (10.9) 8.6 (10.7) 
Potential market 11.1 (9.8) 9.9 (9.7) 10.6 (9.7) 
Note: 
(1) aNumber represents score 
(2) bThe negative item was reversed score 
(3) cIndirect measure score is ranged from -21.0 to +21.0 
 
In general, upstream farmers hold more positive attitudes toward BMP uptake than downstream 
farmers. Upstream farmers view the adoption as more ‘good’, ‘right’, and ‘pleasant’ than 
downstream farmers (Figure 4-5). Upstream farmers appear to be less influenced by their social 
pressures. They present relatively low agreement with the statement ‘important people think that 
I should adopt BMPs’ (Figure 4-6). Downstream farmers are not confident in their abilities to 










Figure 4-5: Mean of attitude direct measures by location; scores are ranged from 1 to 7 
 
 




Figure 4-7: Mean of perceived behavioural control direct measures by location; scores are 




Means of indirect measures are illustrated in Figure 4-8. Overall, results suggest an attitude that 
BMP adoption could enhance environmental protection. Farmers also perceive that BMP 
adoption will result in improved watershed services, and reduced production costs.  Further, 
farmers perceive that BMP adoption will impose a greater commitment to farm management.  
 
 
Figure 4-8: Mean of indirect measures 
Notes: 
(1) The negative item (i.e. greater commitment) was reversed score 
(2) Scores are ranged from -21.0 to +21.0 
 
Of all the social referents, consumers are the most important influences when farmers make 
adoption decisions. This is followed by the state government, neighbours and agricultural 
supply retailers. The strongest perceived facilitator to adopt BMPs is the existing of market for 





4.2.1.2 BMP selection 
Overall, Good Husbandry is the functional category most preferred by both upstream and 
downstream farmers (72.0%). This is followed by Structural Practice (17.0%) and Vegetative 
Practice (11.0%). Details are presented in Table 4-8. Of all the practices, the most selected 
adoption choice is soil analysis for which more than one-third of farmers voted (35.3%). 
Additionally, it is the adoption choice most highly voted by both farmer groups (35.7% for 
upstream farmers and 34.8 8% for downstream farmers). Discussion with farmers after the 
interviews revealed a few reasons for the preference. First, farmers are faced with an increase in 
input prices especially fertiliser and chemicals. The adoption of this BMP results in a reduction 
of fertiliser application and simply means a decreased production cost. Second, some farmers 
perceived on-farm soil deterioration due to a continuous high rate of fertiliser application. They 
are afraid that this may lead to a reduction in farm profit, and seek alternatives. Third, soil 
analysis is the BMP that can be adopted in any farm terrain. That is, it is not a site-specific 





Table 4-8: Selection of BMPs 
 
Practices 
Upstream Downstream Overall 
Frequency 
(n=126) % Order 
Frequency 
 (n=92) % Order 
Frequency 
 (n=218) % Order 
Good Husbandry          
 Scheduling water structure 10 7.9 4 25 27.2 2 35 16.1 2 
 Apply herbicide within tree canopy 20 15.9 2 6 6.5 6 26 11.9 3 
 Basic restrictions for pesticide application 16 12.7 3 3 3.3 8 19 8.7 5 
 Soil analysis 45 35.7 1 32 34.8 1 77 35.3 1 
  Total 91 72.2  66 71.7  157 72.0  
Vegetative Practices          
 Vegetative cover 6 4.8 7 6 6.5 6 12 5.5 7 
 Mulching 4 3.2 8 7 7.6 4 11 5.1 8 
 Vegetative buffer strip - - 12 - - 12 - - 12 
 Grassed waterway 1 0.8 10 - - 12 1 0.5 10 
  Total 11 8.7  13 14.1  24 11.0  
Structural Practices          
 On-site retention storage 11 8.7 6 3 3.3 8 14 6.4 6 
 Terracing 2 1.6 9 - - 12 2 0.9 9 
 Mix-load and wash-down site 11 8.7 6 10 10.9 3 21 9.6 4 
 Riparian setbacks - - 12 - - 12 - - 12 




4.2.2 Comparative differences  
A further analysis of Mann-Whitney test (M-W test) is performed to understand the 
differences between upstream and downstream farmers. The following comparisons employ 
128 upstream farmers and 92 downstream farmers in the Ping river basin. Comparative 
perspectives are presented as follows. 
 
4.2.2.1 Comparisons of farm and farmer characteristics 
Differences in farm and farmer characteristics in upstream and downstream areas are as 
follows (Table 4-9): 
1) More upstream farmers farm on their own land than downstream farmers who 
generally farm on rented land 
2) Upstream farm size is significantly smaller than downstream 
3) The number of upstream farms that has stream running through or next to it is 
less than that in downstream farm 
4) Upstream farmers have more experience in citrus cultivation than downstream 
farmers 
5) Upstream farmers  have fewer health problems than downstream farmers 
6) Upstream farmers are more dependent on other cash crops rather than citrus  
7) Membership of farmers’ associations in upstream area is significantly lower 
than downstream 
8) Upstream farmers face more difficulty in accessing sources of information other 
than government advisory services than downstream farmers 
9) Upstream farmers have lower debt than downstream farmers  
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Table 4-9: Mann-Whitney test of external variables 
External Variables Farm location Mean Rank (Order) Mean 
Std.  
Deviation 
Gender Upstream 110.6 0.3 0.5 
Downstream 107.9 0.3 0.4 
Age  Upstream 109.3 47.1 13.9 
Downstream 109.8 47.2 10.6 
Education level Upstream 105.9 1.8 1.4 
Downstream 114.4 1.9 1.3 
Land ownership*** Upstream 97.2 0.9 0.4 
Downstream 126.4 1.1 0.4 
Farm size (rai) *** Upstream 88.9 16.9 28.8 
Downstream 137.7 39.4 97.5 
Any stream run through farm*** Upstream 96.9 0.6 0.5 
Downstream 126.8 0.9 0.3 
Soil type Upstream 104.0 3.1 1.3 
Downstream 117.1 3.4 1.7 
Past experience (years) *** Upstream 122.2 12.0 10.2 
Downstream 92.2 8.4 8.9 
Health condition** Upstream 102.2 0.2 0.4 
Downstream 119.5 0.3 0.4 
Number of family members  Upstream 102.9 2.3 1.5 
Downstream 118.5 2.6 1.4 
Number of full-time workers Upstream 109.5 1.8 7.2 
Downstream 109.5 2.5 9.6 
Number of part-time workers Upstream 103.5 8.3 14.7 
Downstream 117.7 11.8 32.1 
Crop dependency** Upstream 117.1 0.8 0.4 
Downstream 99.1 0.7 0.5 
Membership of farmers’ association*** Upstream 98.6 0.5 0.5 
Downstream 124.4 0.8 0.4 
Access to governmental advisory 
services 
Upstream 103.5 3.1 1.6 
Downstream 117.7 3.5 1.8 
Access to other sources of 
information*** 
Upstream 119.7 2.1 1.6 
Downstream 95.6 1.3 0.7 
Annual Household Income (THB) Upstream 110.5 492,621.4 1,116,399.1 
Downstream 108.1 748,783.8 2,358,996.1 
Amount of Household's Debt (THB) *** Upstream 83.8 241,384.1 651,109.9 
Downstream 144.7 2,713,630.4 9,068,169.9 
 Notes:  ** significant at .01 level, *** significant at .001 level 
 
Further points to add from Table 4-9 are as follows. A steeper slope and relatively hilly 
terrain in the upstream area influences farm size and management style. The upstream area 
consists of dispersed farms, which are relatively small and regularly on the valley floor, 
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whereas a number of large scale farms are apparent in the downstream area. The geography 
of the upstream area and distant farm location cause difficulty for service delivery by 
government agents, and thus advisory support from government is less frequent amongst 
upstream farmers than downstream farmers. Further, as farms in the upstream area are 
scattered on the valley floor, farmers do not have an incentive to rent more land. Rather, 
upstream farmers rely more on semi-subsistence farming14
 
 with crop diversification to 
reduce risks in income. With this management style, farm household debt in upstream areas 
is lower than downstream areas, and there is less incentive for farmer collaboration.  
4.2.2.2 Comparisons of psychological variables 
Differences in psychological characteristics of farmers in upstream and downstream areas 
are described as follows (Table 4-10): 
Direct measures 
1) Upstream farmers significantly perceive BMP adoption as better, right and 
pleasant thing to do than downstream farmers 
2) Upstream farmers are less likely to be influenced by social pressures 
3) Upstream farmers perceive BMP implementation is easier than downstream 
farmers 
4) Upstream farmers perceive less control over the consequences of BMP adoption 
than downstream farmers 
Indirect measures: Though both upstream and downstream farmers perceive that BMP 
adoption will impose a greater commitment to farm management, by comparison, upstream 
farmers see that more work is not a crucial barrier.  
 
The significant statements from psychological measures can be jointly implied with the 
interpretation of the external factors mentioned above. Semi-subsistence farming in the 
upstream area represents more traditional farming practices, while farms in the downstream 
area are business-oriented farming systems, which are currently dependent on chemical 
application to maintain output. As such, it is clear that downstream farmers view BMP 
                                                          
14 Here, semi-subsistence farming refers to the cultivation that takes place on small farms and uses 




adoption as less good, not right, and unpleasant. Furthermore, as downstream farmers have 
experienced greater debt than upstream farmers they are likely to refuse adoption of BMPs 
that could reduce profit. On the other hand, upstream farmers perceive adopting BMPs as 
easier because they hold smaller farm size. Commitment to implement BMPs in a small 
piece of land is unlikely to deter adoption decision-making. 
 
Differences in the importance of other people upon farmers’ adoption intentions can be 
explained by farm location, farm goals and farmer attitudes. Evidence shows that upstream 
farms, which are more subsistence-oriented and located further away from market and 
information, are less influenced by others whereas business-oriented farms in a downstream 
area are likely to be influenced by others, particularly consumers. Moreover, that upstream 
farmers report less ability to control the consequences of BMP adoption is supported by the 
fact that they farm in a distant area, and thus receive less assistance and up-to-date 
information from government agencies. 
Table 4-10: Mann-Whitney test of psychological variables 
 
Direct Measurement Farm location Mean Rank (Order) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Overall, adopting BMPs is Bad vs. Good*** Upstream 124.7 4.1 2.6 
Downstream 88.7 2.6 2.2 
Overall, adopting BMPs is Worthless vs. 
Useful 
Upstream 108.3 6.1 1.6 
Downstream 111.1 6.3 1.2 
Overall, adopting BMPs is The Wrong thing to 
do vs. The Right thing to do*** 
Upstream 124.6 4.2 2.5 
Downstream 88.8 2.7 2.2 
Overall, adopting BMPs is Unpleasant for me 
vs. Pleasant for me*** 
Upstream 125.2 4.2 2.5 
Downstream 88.1 2.8 2.1 
Important people think that I Should not vs. I 
Should adopt BMPs*** 
Upstream 96.2 3.8 2.5 
Downstream 127.7 5.0 2.3 
It is expected for me that I should adopt 
BMPs .. Disagree vs. Agree 
Upstream 105.6 5.5 1.7 
Downstream 114.9 5.7 1.8 
I feel under social pressure to adopt BMPs .. 
Disagree vs. Agree 
Upstream 112.6 4.9 2.1 
Downstream 105.3 4.7 2.2 
Important people want me to adopt BMPs ... 
Disagree vs. Agree 
Upstream 110.6 5.5 1.8 
Downstream 108.1 5.5 1.8 
I'm confident that I could adopt if I wanted to 
... Disagree vs. Agree 
Upstream 107.0 5.8 1.6 
Downstream 113.0 6.0 1.5 
For me, to adopt BMPs is Difficult vs. Easy* Upstream 117.6 4.4 2.1 
Downstream 98.4 3.9 1.7 
The decision to adopt BMPs is beyond my 
control .. Disagree vs. Agree 
Upstream 113.3 4.5 2.3 
Downstream 104.3 4.2 2.3 
Adopt BMPs or not is entirely up to me ... 
Disagree vs. Agree** 
Upstream 98.1 4.4 2.4 




Indirect Measurement Farm location Mean Rank (Order) Mean 
Std. 
Deviation 
Reduced production cost Upstream 106.9 12.6 7.9 
Downstream 113.0 13.1 8.4 
Environmental protection Upstream 107.4 17.2 6.0 
Downstream 112.3 17.7 5.8 
Gain from watershed service Upstream 106.4 15.4 7.3 
Downstream 113.7 16.3 6.5 
Greater commitment** Upstream 120.4 4.4 8.7 
Downstream 94.5 0.9 8.9 
Consumers Upstream 108.2 13.2 8.8 
Downstream 111.3 13.3 9.5 
Government Upstream 109.5 12.0 8.3 
Downstream 109.6 11.5 9.7 
Agricultural supply shop Upstream 108.7 4.4 9.8 
Downstream 110.6 4.7 9.6 
Neighbours Upstream 111.6 5.8 10.2 
Downstream 106.7 4.6 10.0 
Affordability Upstream 114.2 10.9 7.9 
Downstream 103.0 9.0 10.2 
Return Upstream 115.8 7.2 7.0 
Downstream 100.9 5.4 8.4 
Knowledge Upstream 113.3 10.2 8.4 
Downstream 104.4 9.0 8.6 
Farmer association Upstream 114.5 9.5 10.6 
Downstream 102.6 7.5 10.9 
Potential market Upstream 113.4 11.1 9.8 
Downstream 104.2 9.9 9.7 
Note: * significant at .05 level, ** significant at .01 level, *** significant at .001 level 
 
 
According to Guagnano et al. (1995), psychological factors such as attitude and external 
conditions act jointly to influence behaviour. The M-W test could only highlight how 
attitudes and characteristics of upstream and downstream farmers differ, but it could not 
define what constitutes such differences. There might be a possibility that psychological and 
external factors work together to induce adoption, or external factors may contribute to the 
strength (or weakness) of attitude-induced behaviour. Nevertheless, this is not the main focus 
of this thesis, and there is room for future study in the context of the relationship between 
psychological and external factors influencing adoption decision. The next section presents 






Farmers’ decision-making regarding adoption of new innovations and agri-environmental 
policies has received considerable attentions over many years. Adoption of new innovation is 
influenced by a variety of factors, and for this reason the study of significant variables 
explaining the decision is of interest to government. Traditional agricultural economics 
assumes that farmers make decisions to maximise their utility. However, behaviour is the 
consequence of a complex integration between socio-economic and psychological factors. 
As such, a utility approach to understand decision-making has been supplemented by an 
increasing input from psychology.  
 
This study is developed based on a theoretical framework rooted in social psychology 
complemented with variables derived from economic theory. From a theoretical perspective, 
these empirical findings emphasise the relevance of combining theoretical insights from 
different disciplines in adoption studies. The TPB is employed to investigate factors that 
influence farmers’ decisions to adopt twelve BMPs in citrus farms. TPB is an expectancy-
value model, which has an ability to predict and to explain human behaviour by postulating 
that behaviour is predicted by intention to perform that behaviour. Through the use of 
statistical methods, the TPB provides a distinct process to show the relative importance of 
the proposed determinants of intention, and to investigate which attitudes influence 
behaviour. Furthermore, external variables are allowed to be included in the model so as to 
increase predictive power. Thus, the TPB can increase our understanding of farmers’ beliefs 
for policy making.  
 
This chapter mainly focuses on the presentation of descriptive data. Descriptive data is easily 
understood and it is not too technical, compared to inferential statistics. With a validity and 
reliability of information collected from the surveys, the results provide supporting data for 
policymakers by describing patterns and general trends in a data set. For example, the 
descriptive data illustrates the characteristics of farmers and their farm environment. Further, 
the TPB application shows that farmers in upstream and downstream areas differ in their 
evaluative measures of BMP adoption. Both are significantly different in their belief-based 
measures relating to attitudes towards BMP adoption. Other than differences in their latent 
psychological variables, both farmer groups also differ in their past experience, dependency 
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on other crops, health state, farm size, stream condition, land ownership, household debt, 
membership of farmers’ associations and access to information sources. Furthermore, an 
investigation of farmers’ preference towards BMP showed that the most preferred BMP is 
soil analysis, which is a test of organic matters and application of organic fertiliser to match 
with crops’ need.  
 
Overall, the results in this chapter provide an understanding of the nature of citrus farmers in 
the Ping river basin, and suggest which BMPs are in the farmers’ interests. This descriptive 
data is useful in presenting quantitative data in a manageable form. However, its main 
limitations are that the results could not be extrapolated to a general population, and the fact 
that the results could not identify a cause-effect relationship in farmers’ behaviours. Rather, 
this descriptive data will provide basic information for further investigations of variables 












5 OBSERVATION OF STATED ADOPTION INTENTIONS 
 
This chapter aims to investigate factors explaining farmers’ intentions to adopt BMPs 
(Figure 5-1). The first section (section 5.1) discusses how perceived costs may influence 
farmers’ stated adoption intention. The cost data, derived from the economic cost study in 
chapter 3, were plotted against the frequency of farmers’ stated intentions for each BMP. To 
explore how farmers’ perceived costs may influence their adoption decisions, the 
interpretation is expressed based on graph illustration and the facts recorded during the 
farmers’ interviews.  
 




Building on the previous analysis and drawing information from the descriptive statistics 
presented in chapter 4, the second section (section 5.2) proposes a multivariate logistic 
regression analysis to examine factors influencing farmers’ decisions to adopt different 
BMPs. To perform the logistic regression, twelve BMPs are collapsed into three functional 
categories, which are: Good Husbandry; Vegetative Practice; and Structural Practice. 
Statistical diagnostic to determine independent variables and variable selection techniques 
are discussed. This is followed by the results from the best fit model. Section 5.3 is a 
discussion. This chapter is closed by a summary of main findings in section 5.4.  
 
5.1 Perceived Costs vs. Stated Intention 
 
In general, adoption of any environmental measure results in a number of costs to farmers 
and this could hinder adoption. Nonetheless, cost variables could not be included in the TPB 
questionnaire. Rather, during the interviews farmers were asked to self-evaluate between 
perceived benefits from, and perceived costs of, BMP adoption. The aim of this section is to 
explore how perceived cost may influence farmers’ stated intentions. This section uses the 
economic costs data (in chapter 3) to compare with the frequency of stated intentions on 
adoption of each BMP (in chapter 4). It is expected that this may offer some insights into the 
relationships between farmers’ perceived costs and their stated adoption intentions.  
 
5.1.1 Graphical interpretation 
In this thesis, farmer decision-making is assumed to be based on the perceived cost of 
adoption. This decision-making process is in line with Reed’s (1999) argument, in that the 
perceived cost, rather than the absolute level of cost, is an important determinant in 
investment judgment. Accordingly, the costs to be discussed in this section are the farmers’ 
perceived costs at the time the decision is made. These perceived costs include the one-time 
payment of the installation cost, annual maintenance cost and annual opportunity cost. In 
Figure 5-2 and Figure 5-3, the scatter plots present numbers of farmers selecting a particular 
BMP as their first option (refer to Table 4-8, chapter 4), while the bar graphs present total 
costs of each BMP (refer to Table 3-4, chapter 3). In general, the results show that the most 
popular options lie in the Good Husbandry, followed by Structural Practice and Vegetative 
Practice.   
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In Figure 5-2, the actual total costs excluding (land) opportunity costs show that Structural 
Practices especially practice 9 (on-site retention storage) and practice 11 (mix-load and 
wash-down site) are not financially attractive, but some farmers still prefer to adopt. 
Similarly, practice 4 (soil analysis) in the Good Husbandry is the most preferred BMP 
amongst farmers though it has the highest investment costs compared with other BMPs in 
the same category (i.e. practice 1-4).  
 
 
Figure 5-2: Actual installation and annual maintenance costs vs. Stated intention 
Notes: The horizontal axis represents twelve BMPs. From left to right, Good Husbandry 
category includes practice number 1-4: 1) scheduling water structure; 2) apply herbicide 
within tree canopy; 3) basic restrictions for pesticide application; and 4) soil analysis. 
Vegetative Practice category includes practice number 5-8: 5) vegetative cover; 6) mulching; 
7) vegetative buffer strip; and 8) grassed waterway. Structural Practice category includes 
practice number 9-12: 9) on-site retention storage; 10) terracing; 11) mix-load and wash-
down site; and 12) riparian setbacks. 
 
 
In Figure 5-3, the bar graph is plotted against the scatter plot to present the land opportunity 
cost and farmers’ stated intention. Practice 7 (vegetative buffer strip) and practice 8 (grassed 
waterway) from Vegetative Practice, and practice 9 (on-site retention storage), practice 11 
(mix-load and wash-down site) and practice 12 (riparian setbacks) from Structural Practice 
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have relatively high actual land opportunity costs. The number of farmers who prefer to 
adopt these measures is relatively low, especially compared to BMPs from Good Husbandry 
where opportunity cost is nearer zero. 
 
 
Figure 5-3: Actual land opportunity costs vs. Stated intention 
Notes: The horizontal axis represents twelve BMPs. From left to right, Good Husbandry 
category includes practice number 1-4: 1) scheduling water structure; 2) apply herbicide 
within tree canopy; 3) basic restrictions for pesticide application; and 4) soil analysis. 
Vegetative Practice category includes practice number 5-8: 5) vegetative cover; 6) mulching; 
7) vegetative buffer strip; and 8) grassed waterway. Structural Practice category includes 
practice number 9-12: 9) on-site retention storage; 10) terracing; 11) mix-load and wash-
down site; and 12) riparian setbacks. 
 
 
5.1.2 How perceived costs may affect stated intentions 
 
In Figure 5-4 the bar graph presents the actual total costs, which include installation cost, 
annual maintenance cost and land opportunity cost, while the line graphs show the number of 
stated intentions form farmers in different locations. This graph illustrates some preliminary 
information important to understand the influence of perceived costs on farmers’ stated 
intentions. The interpretation is referred back to the assumption of preference ranking 
mentioned in chapter 4, where farmers were assumed to make decision based on perceived 
costs (and perceived benefits). It was assumed that farmers consider adoption at the prices 
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they actually face and with a consideration on characteristics of the environment in which 




Figure 5-4: Actual total costs VS. Stated intention 
Notes: The horizontal axis represents twelve BMPs. From left to right, Good Husbandry 
category includes practice number 1-4: 1) scheduling water structure; 2) apply herbicide 
within tree canopy; 3) basic restrictions for pesticide application; and 4) soil analysis. 
Vegetative Practice category includes practice number 5-8: 5) vegetative cover; 6) mulching; 
7) vegetative buffer strip; and 8) grassed waterway. Structural Practice category includes 
practice number 9-12: 9) on-site retention storage; 10) terracing; 11) mix-load and wash-
down site; and 12) riparian setbacks. 
 
In general, the number of farmers preferring to adopt BMPs in Good Husbandry category 
(i.e. practice 1-4) is obviously higher than those preferring BMPs in Vegetative Practice and 
Structural Practice categories (i.e. practice 5-8, and practice 9-12, respectively). Basically, all 
other factors being equal, willingness to adopt BMPs decreases with a rise in cost and vice 
versa. This is obvious in farmers’ preferences towards the adoption of Good Husbandry 
BMPs, which have lower investment costs in terms of both actual and perceived costs. 
Indeed discussions during farm interviews revealed that farmers wanted to adopt BMPs in 
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Vegetative Practice and Structural Practice categories, but they withdrew because they 
perceived a large amount of initial investment costs. 
 
However, personal perceptions are subject to error, and the actual cost and perceived cost 
may differ (Ross and Stiles 1973). As illustrated in Figure 5-4, it is evident that some 
farmers prefer to adopt practices 9 despite the fact that the actual cost is relatively high. 
Further, there is no stated intention for practices 7 and 12 though the actual total cost is less 
than practices 8 and 9. Moreover, considered by itself the Good Husbandry category (i.e. 
practice 1-4), the graph illustrates that a number of farmers preferring practice 4 is the 
highest in spite of its highest actual cost.  
 
At this point, the preliminary findings suggest some key points in the relationship between 
the stated intention and perceived costs of adoption. First, if the amount of perceived costs is 
obviously different and farmers can easily note this difference, farmers are likely to select 
the one with lower perceived cost. This is evident in farmers’ preferences towards Good 
Husbandry category. Lui et al. (2002) explain that in the circumstance where neither net 
profit from BMP nor effectiveness of the practice is known, comparative cost is used to 
measure competitiveness among several options. The practice with the most competitive cost 
is likely to be adopted.  
 
Second, when the difference in perceived costs is not definite, farmers tend to select 
technology that meets their own objectives, production possibilities and farm constraints. In 
other words, farmers weigh the advantages and disadvantages between options, and consider 
which BMP is the most acceptable (Franzel 1999). As BMP is a site specific practice (i.e. 
practicality) and its effectiveness varies across locations (Sharpley et al. 2009), farm location 
is taken into account in order to understand the influence of perceived costs towards the 
selected BMP. 
 
Considering Figure 5-4, the graph illustrates some differences in stated intentions between 
farmers in upstream and downstream of the Ping river basin. For example, practice 1 
(scheduling water structure) is more preferred by downstream farmers, while practice 2 
(applying herbicide with tree canopy), practice 3 (basic restriction for pesticide application), 
practice 9 (on-site retention storage) and practice 10 (terracing) are more preferred by 
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upstream farmers. As any BMP is site-specific, it is applicable to citrus farms if it can be 
installed as a retrofit of existing farm condition. Development and implementation of 
practice 1 is not suitable in the upstream area, where most farms are on hilly areas. Similarly, 
an installation of practices 9 and 10 is not applicable to farms in the downstream areas 
because farmers are farming in ditch irrigation systems.  
 
On the related point, the explanation of preferences towards practice 2 and 3 is not 
conclusive. However, during the farm interviews, a few farmers commented on the 
complexity of implementation. Downstream farmers perceived that the adoption of practice 
2 could impede current working conditions, and it is difficult to maintain a safe distance 
between the herbicide boom and the tree because of a narrow ditch. On the other hand, 
practice 3 was recognised as needed and worthwhile for investment as it reduces chemicals 
and cost. However, farmers also stated that it is time-consuming, complicated, and thus 
frustrating. This may in part explain why downstream farmers, holding larger average farm 
size, have stated lower interests in the adoption of practice 3.  
 
In this thesis, farmers were asked to consider perceived costs and benefits from the BMP 
adoption. Cost perception varies across farmers, and this can influence their intentions to 
adopt a certain practice (Huijps et al. 2009). Farmers may value costs and benefits at the 
price they have experienced with, and make decision to meet their own objectives and farm 
constraints (Lutz et al. 1994). Even if the perceived costs of conservation practice exceed the 
benefits in the short run this may not discourage the adoption by some farmer groups. The 
findings simply indicate that although cost is regarded as an important determinant in 
adoption decisions, it may not be the most important factor. The findings are similar to the 
work of Sattler and Nagel (2010) in that factors other than cost are equally or even more 
important for adoption a new technology.  
 
5.2 Multinomial Logistic Regression Analysis 
 
The main finding from the preceding section is that cost may not be the most important 
factor influencing BMP adoption. This section looks beyond traditional economic theory to 
include aspects of social psychology. The descriptive statistics from chapter 4 provide the 
basis for the following analysis. This section specifically deals with the question of what are 
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the factors influencing farmers to adopt a different type of BMP. It begins with a basic 
principle of logistic regression analysis for adoption models. This is followed by data 
screening and statistical diagnostics leading to a creation of group-specific DUMMY 
independent variables, and the techniques to select independent variables (i.e. added or 
deleted or forced-entry) in logistic regression analysis. Next, it proceeds with the use of 
multinomial logistic model to model the relationships between nominal-scale dependent 
variables and a set of independent variables. This present section is closed with the results 
from a multinomial regression analysis.  
 
5.2.1 Logistic regression analysis for adoption intentions 
The binary decision (i.e. adopt vs. not adopt) of citrus farmers generates a non-linear 
response, and thus violates the assumptions of the linear regression model (Sheikh et al. 
2003). A logistic regression is more suitable to model a relationship between a dichotomous 
outcome variable and a set of covariates (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). Logistic regression 
analysis does not require either multivariate normality or equal variance-covariance matrices 
across groups. It also has the ability to incorporate nonlinear effects, and defines an S-shape 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables (Hair et al. 2009).  
Consider a collection of k independent variables which are denoted by the vector  
),...,,(' 21 kxxxx =  (Equation 4) 
The probability being modelled is denoted by the conditional probability statement 
)(),...,1( 21 xPxxxDP k ==  (Equation 5) 







where;    
α  =  intercept parameter 
β  =  regression coefficient 
An alternative way to write the logistic model is called the logit form. The logit is the natural 
logarithm of the odds of the outcome. The odds of the outcome is the probability of having 
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the outcome divided by the probability of not having the outcome (Katz 1999). Let the logit 















where  )(xP  = equation 6 
 
Thus,  
logit )(xP = ]ln[ )( ∑+ ii xe βα    (Equation 8) 
logit )(xP = )( ii xβα ∑+  (Equation 9) 
 
5.2.1.1 Independent variables 
As from the elicitation study and literature reviews, there were thirty two independent 
variables included in the study. These were thirteen psychological variables and nineteen 
additional variables. These independent variables were subjected to see if they fit with the 
assumptions of multivariate model, and the statistical software used for analysing data was 
SPSS 16.0.  
 
The data were first screened for normality and homogeneity of variance. The missing data 
were then replaced with a conditional mean substitution15
                                                          
15  For cross-sectional data, a conditional mean gives more accurate estimates of missing values. It is 
a mean derived from other participants in the sample who have very similar background, not a 
sample mean. 
. Statistical diagnostics revealed 
that: 1) only indirect measures created by a summated scale of psychological variables were 
reliably constructed; 2) variables with multicollinearity problems were deleted; 3) outliers 
and influential cases were not relevant; 4) DUMMY variables were required to solve the 
problem of linearity; and 5) one variable (contribution of full-time workers) contained 
incomplete information cells, and was excluded from the model. Thus, only thirty one 
independent variables were eligible for inclusion in the model. Descriptions of DUMMY 
variables are illustrated in Table 5-1. 
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Table 5-1: Descriptions of DUMMY variables 
Variables Coding and Descriptions 
Socio-demographics of the farmers    










≤ 30 year old* 
30.1 – 40 year old 
40.1 – 50 year old 
50.1 – 60 year old 
> 60 year old 




< high school* 
≥ high school 






Characteristics of the farm household    




Dependence on other crops* 
Otherwise 




< 15 years* 
≥ 15 years 






Health problem retarding farm work* 
Otherwise 
Structures of the farm business    










≤ 5 rais* 
5.01 – 10 rais 
10.01 – 20 rais 
20.01 – 50 rais 











Stream run pass/ through farm* 
Otherwise 








Sand and others 




Contribution of family labour ≤ 50%* 
Contribution of family labour > 50% 




Contribution of part-time worker ≤ 
50%* 
Contribution of part-time worker > 50% 




Contribution of full-time worker ≤ 50%* 
Contribution of full-time worker > 50% 










< median value* 
≥ median value 




< median value* 
≥ median value 
Social milieu    




Member of agricultural association* 
Otherwise  






No need for services* 
Easy or Not so difficult 
Difficult or Not that easy 








No need for services* 
Easy or Not so difficult 
Difficult or Not that easy 
    
                                                          
16  Farmers’ experiences could be backed up by a national policy. The 6th National Economic and Social 
Development Plan (1987-1991) focused on: 1) the concern over natural resource degradation; and 2) the 
promotion of fruit crop cultivation. The 7th National Economics and Social Development Plan (1992 – 
1996) focused on the sustainable development considering a common outlook and common principles to 





Variables Coding and Descriptions 
Psychological factors    






















































































































(1)  * reference group 
 
 
5.2.1.2 Variable selection technique  
In this study, external variables such as socio-demographic variables were collected from the 
literature, whereas psychology variables were derived from the elicitation survey. There is 
often a lack of theoretical literature on BMP adoption relating to psychology variables 
(Prokopy et al. 2008), and thus stepwise logistic regression is useful in situations where 
‘important’ independent variables are poorly understood in terms of their influence on 
intentions (Hosmer and Lemeshow 1989). Further, the forward stepwise selection is superior 
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to the backward method when sample size is small for the number of independent variables 
in the analysis (Katz 1999). Accordingly, a forward stepwise selection method was used to 
determine the number of independent variables to be included in the equation. After the 
significant psychological variables were defined, the subsequent step is to forced entry 
external variables into the model simultaneously. 
 
5.2.1.3 Dependent variables 
 
As the descriptive statistic in chapter 4 presented data based on farm locations (i.e. upstream 
vs. downstream areas), in this logistic regression analysis there was an attempt to assess the 
effects of the determinants on the outcomes by splitting cases between upstream and 
downstream location. However, using the statistical analysis programme (SPSS16.0), the 
preliminary analysis of downstream samples yielded a floating point overflow error. This 
error can happen when: i) the sample size is not big enough, thereby causing scattering data; 
or ii) the computing system does not support the specific operation on floating point 
numbers. As such, an alternative to analyse data is required. 
 
Alternatively, it is worth to understand the nature of adoption based on the types of 
management practice, in particular when one practice may require more efforts (i.e. time, 
money) to implement than another (i.e. Good Husbandry vs. Structural Practices). Here, a 
criterion to select dependent variables is a majority rule strategy. The majority rule applies a 
transitivity principle implying that participants compare all possible pairs of alternatives, and 
decide which alternative is preferred to another (Kinoshita 1991). Suppose a farmer of size n 
is asked to choose the best among m potential options, there are many ways to determine a 
preference order for the group. With the nature of discrete rank-orderings of BMP techniques 
and when a complete rank-ordering is more difficult to obtain than a top choice, a majority 
rule can perform effectively. In other words, a potential choice is better revealed when many 
participants state their top choices rather than a few participants give complete rank-
orderings (Wu and Annis 2007). For example, during the interviews, it is more practical to 
ask all participants to select and rank only the first three options, rather than ask them to rank 
all twelve options. 
 
Based on the majority rule strategy, only the first ranked BMP (or the most preferred BMP) 
is used as a dependent variable. As there are twelve BMPs, a multinomial logistic regression 
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is suitable for examining a relationship between nominal-scale dependent variables and 
multiple independent variables. To do this, twelve BMPs were collapsed into three 
functional categories (refer to Table 1-5) in order to create three dependent variables: Good 
Husbandry; Vegetative Practice; and Structural Practice. These three categories are not 
mutually exclusive, but the probability of farmers experiencing any single outcome is 
between zero to one.  
 
5.2.1.4 Multinomial logistic regression  
Multinomial logistic regression enables a calculation of the proportion that farmers fall into 
one outcome category relative to the other two (Unrau 1998). It is applied to determine the 
combination of independent variables that most influence the probability of a farmer 
selecting one of the three functional categories. Multinomial logistic regression requires a 
reference group to generate a regression model for nominal dependent variables. Reference 
group is the category omitted in the analysis and the odds ratio is to be compared with this 
reference group (Katz 1999).  
 
In this study, there are two reasons why Good Husbandry is selected as a reference group. 
First, Good Husbandry is the largest group. Katz (1999) explained that if the logistic model 
has the largest group as the reference group, the standard errors are smaller and the 
confidence intervals are narrower; thereby increasing more precise estimates. Second, Good 
Husbandry provides baseline information that may be useful to compare with Vegetative and 
Structural Practices in terms of financial and technical requirements to facilitate the BMP 
implementations. For example, the interpretation could demonstrate the variables influencing 
intention to adopt practices with higher up-front investment (i.e. those within Structural 
Practice).  
 
The analysis is expressed as an (log) odds ratio. Odds is the ratio of the probability that event 
occurs to the probability that it does not, and the odds ratio is used to compare the odds of 
those two groups by dividing the odds in group one by the odds in group two (Westergren et 
al. 2001). An interpretation of the odds ratio is superior to other indicators in that it provides 
an estimate with confidence level for the relationship between two binary variables, and the 
ratio remains the same no matter how data arrangement in a table is switched (Bland and 
Altman 2000).  
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The odds ratio given in SPSS 16.0 is labelled ‘Exp (B)’. The odds ratio greater than 1 means 
that an independent variable increases the logit and increases odds of event occurs. The odds 
ratio less than 1 means that an independent variable decreases the logit and decreases odds of 
event occurs. The odds ratio equal to 1 means that an independent variable has no effect. An 
interpretation of odds ratio for any particular independent variables is explained when all 
other independent variables in the model are held constant.  
 
To do the analysis, the forward stepwise method was first used to select psychological 
variables. Results of the step summary are presented in Table 5-2 (for more details, see 
Annex 7).  
Table 5-2: Summary of forward stepwise procedure 
Step Action Effect(s) 
Model fitting criteria Effect selection tests 
AIC BIC -2LL Chi-square df Sig. 
0 Entered Intercept 340.065 346.834 336.065    
1 Entered PBC1g3 335.615 349.153 327.615 8.451 2 .015 
2 Entered PBC2g2 330.383 350.690 318.383 9.232 2 .010 
3 Entered SN1g2 327.587 354.662 311.587 6.769 2 .033 
4 Entered SN1g3 321.767 355.612 301.767 9.820 2 .007 
5 Removed PBC1g3 322.111 349.187 306.111 4.344 2 .114 
 
For this model, PBC1g3 (perception that affordability highly influences BMP adoption) 
entered first in the stepwise procedure, followed by PBC2g2 (perception that the return is 
neither important nor unimportant in BMP adoption), SN1g2 (perception that the consumer 
is neither important nor unimportant in my decision to adopt BMPs), and SN1g3 (perception 
that the consumer is very important in my decision to adopt BMPs). However, PBC1g3 was 
removed from the model in the final step. It is likely that PBC1g3 may relate to other 
independent variables, and thus the Variance Inflation Factor test (VIF) was used to scan for 
any multicollinearity. The analysis revealed that no VIF value was greater than 10, thus 
indicating no serious multicollinearity effect (Field 2005).  
 
Table 5-3 presents the psychology variables selected by the forward stepwise method. Three 
psychology variables remaining for the analysis are SN1g2, SN1g3, and PBC2g2.  
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Table 5-3: Final model selected by forward stepwise method 
Category of the adoption choicea B Std. error Exp(B) 
95% CI for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
Vegetative Practice Intercept .252 1.163    
 SN1g2 -2.106 1.091 .122 .014 1.033 
 SN1g3 -2.700* 1.052 .067 .009 .528 
 PBC2g2 .899 .488 2.457 .945 .6388 
Structural Practice Intercept -3.435* .719    
 SN1g2 1.394* .592 4.031 1.263 12.862 
 SN1g3 .372 .408 1.451 .652 3.230 
 PBC2g2 .975* .422 2.652 1.161 6.060 
Notes: (1) aThe reference category is: Good Husbandry 
  (2) R2 = 0.13 (Cox & Snell), 0.16 (Nagelkerke), 0.09 (McFadden) 
  (3) *significant at the 0.05 level 
  (4) n = 218 observations (nGood Husbandry = 157, nVegetative Practice = 24, nStructural Practice = 37) 
 
The next step is to enter these three psychology and external variables into the equation. The 
combined model, of only the final regression results, is presented in Table 5-4 (for more 
details, see Annex 8). This combined model is significant at .05 level and the R2 of Cox & 
Snell, Nagelkerke, and McFadden is 0.43, 0.55, and 0.36, respectively.  
Table 5-4: Combined model with psychological variables and external variables 
Category of the adoption choicea B Std. error Exp(B) 
95% CI for Exp(B) 
Lower Upper 
Vegetative Practice Intercept -23.172* 7.831    
 SN1g2 -2.774* 1.271 .062 .005 .753 
 SN1g3 -3.625* 1.239 .027 .002 .302 
 PBC2g2 1.651* .731 5.214 1.246 21.827 
 SIZEg2 1.998* .995 7.373 1.048 51.874 
 FW1 2.854* 1.421 17.363 1.071 281.476 
 nPRIg2 2.301* 1.005 9.980 1.391 71.605 
Structural Practice Intercept -1.666 5.548    
 SN1g2 2.277* .782 9.752 2.104 45.190 
 PBC2g2 1.318* .584 3.736 1.190 11.724 
 CROPg2 2.308* .789 10.056 2.142 47.223 
 SIZEg4 -2.451* .942 .086 .014 .546 
 SIZEg5 -4.108* 1.164 .016 .002 .161 
Notes: (1) aThe reference category is: Good Husbandry 
 (2) R2 = 0.43 (Cox & Snell), 0.55 (Nagelkerke), 0.36(McFadden) 
 (3) *significant at the 0.05 level 
 (4) n = 218 observations (nGood Husbandry = 157, nVegetative Practice = 24, nStructural Practice = 37) 
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The logistic regression models can be written as follows: 
 
Logit (VP) = -23.17 + (-2.77) SN1g2 + (-3.63) SN1g3 + (1.65) PBC2g2 + 
(1.99) SIZEg2 +(2.85) FW1 + (2.30) nPRIg2 
(Equation 10) 
  
Logit (SP) = -1.67  + (2.28) SN1g2 + (1.32) PBC2g2 + (2.31) CROPg2 +        
(-2.45) SIZEg4 + (-4.11) SIZEg5 
(Equation 11) 
 
Equation 10 represents the log of probability to adopt Vegetative Practice over Good 
Husbandry. When all variables were entered into the equation the three psychology variables 
remained significant. Holding all other variables constant, results show that farmers who are 
indifferent to (SN1g2) or those who highly care about consumers (SN1g3 ) have 0.06 (= e-2.774, 
Table 5-4) and 0.03 times lesser odds of adopting Vegetative Practice than those who are 
less concerned about consumers. Furthermore, farmers who hold indifferent preference 
towards perceived farm returns (PBC2g2) have 5.21 times greater odds of adopting 
Vegetative Practice than those who hold negative or positive preference towards perceived 
farm returns. Further, farmers with the farm size of 5.01-10 rais (SIZEg2) have 7.373 times 
greater odds of adopting Vegetative Practices than other farmer groups. Citrus farms 
depending on more than 50% of family labour (FW1) have 17.36 times greater odds of 
adopting Vegetative Practices than farms with less than 50% contribution of family labour. 
Lastly, farmers who have easy/ not so difficult access to information sources other than 
government agents (nPRIg2) have 9.98 times greater odds of experiencing Vegetative 
Practices than those who are faced with difficult/ not so easy access. 
 
Equation 11 represents the probability of adopting Structural Practice over Good Husbandry. 
When all variables were entered into the equation, only two psychology variables remained 
significant. Holding all other variables constant, results show that farmers who hold 
indifferent preference towards consumers (SN1g2) have 9.75 times greater odds of adopting 
Structural Practice than those who hold a negative or a positive preference.  Further, farmers 
who hold an indifferent preference towards perceived farm returns (PBC2g2) have 3.74 
times greater odds of adopting Structural Practice than farmers who hold a negative or a 
positive preference towards perceived farm returns. Moreover, a few more external variables 
are significant. Farmers who depend solely on citrus cultivation (CROPg2) have 10.06 times 
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greater odds of adopting Structural Practice than farmers with farm diversification. Farmers 
who occupy farm land of 20.01-50 rais (SIZEg4) decrease the odds of adopting structural 
practice in their farm by 0.09 times, and those who occupy farm land more than 50 rais 




There has been much discussion about which factors determine the intention to adopt new 
conservation practices. This study draws a conclusion that both psychological and external 
variables contribute to BMP adoption. The summaries of the causal relationship between 
stated adoption intention and significant determinants are described as follows.   
 
5.3.1 Influence of perceived cost on stated adoption intentions 
The analysis in the first section attempted to investigate the relationship between perceived 
costs and farmers’ stated intentions. Because of the difference in the underlying assumptions 
between traditional economics and psychology, objective cost could not been included in the 
TPB model. Rather, an investigation was done on the assumption that farmers made 
decisions upon perceived costs, rather than actual costs. The graph presenting the actual total 
costs of BMP against the numbers of farmers selecting such BMP as their first option. The 
interpretation based on the graph layout and results from farmers’ interviews has led to the 
conclusion that there is no definite trend in the relationship between perceived costs and 
stated intentions.  
 
The importace of perceived costs on adoption decision could be explained by the stepwise 
method to select psychological variables. The TPB works by allowing participants to 
evaluate the belief-statements and indicate whether they agree or disagree with such 
statements. Attention should be paid to the two perceived behavioural control variables, 
affordability for BMP implementation (PBC1) and perceived returns from the BMP adoption 
(PBC2). Based on the TPB, these two factors were derived from the elicitation study, thereby 
indicating that both vairables are important. However, the statistical analysis showed that the 
PBC1 did not provide a significant contribution to the model. Overall, the investigations into 
perceived costs and stated intentions show that perceived cost varies across farmers and 
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could affect adoption intentions for a certain BMP. Farmers do not always select an option 
with the lowest cost because they also consider other factors when making decisions.   
 
5.3.2 Influences of psychological determinants on stated adoption intentions 
 
5.3.2.1 Subjective norm: consumer referents 
The empirical analyses reveal that farmers who are indifferent towards consumer referents or 
those who are highly influenced by consumers are unlikely to adopt Vegetative Practice, 
while those who are indifferent towards consumers tend to adopt Structural Practice. The 
direction of relationship between attitudes towards consumer referents and BMP adoption is 
not definite; rather it depends on the consumer’s preference and the specific characteristics 
of BMPs.  
 
The farmer’s perception of consumer preference could play a role in the adoption decision 
(Guehlstorf 2008; Kaine and Bewsell 2008). In response to market signals sometimes 
farmers have to adopt new technologies even if they have not been able to skill on them 
(Stone 2007). On the other hand, farmers who want to adopt an eco-friendly production 
process are faced with consumers’ existing demand for conventionally produced food. This 
is because the adoption of safer production is critical for a drop in the external appearance of 
fruit such as colour, size and shape, and it is these attributes that are most used to evaluate 
the quality of fruit when a consumer makes the buying decision (Sule Alonso et al. 2002). In 
Thailand, consumers typically buy fresh fruit with a good physical appearance (Oates 2006). 
Considering only the effect of consumer preference on their decisions, farmers will always 
supply what the consumers want (Poole and Baron 1996; East 1993). Because BMP adoption 
could reduce the external quality of fruit, it is possible that farmers who are influenced by 
consumers are unlikely to adopt the practices.  
 
Although consumers’ preferences are important for investment decisions, another concern 
emerged during farmers’ interviews. Farmers stated that while making decisions, they also 
considered the potential benefits from technology adoption. Tangible benefits from adopting 
Structural Practice are more prevalent and observable than Vegetative Practice. For example, 
a retention pond can store water during a dry season, or a loading station can provide 
equipment storage and reduce health risk. At this point, the results suggest that the adoption 
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decision of a certain BMP is associated with farmers’ attitudes to consumers’ values weighed 
by expected gains from the adoption of such practice. Farmers who are indifferent towards 
consumers are likely to adopt Structural Practice rather than Vegetative Practice, and farmers 
who are highly influenced by consumers are unlikely to adopt Vegetative Practice.  
 
5.3.2.2 Perceived behavioural control: perceived farm return 
Farmers differ in the degree to which they accept risk. Farmers’ attitudes can be divided into 
three categories that are risk taker, risk neutral and risk averse (FAO 2007a). Risk-related 
attitudes are an important factor in investment planning and can result in different responses 
to adoption of new technology (Setia and Johnson 1988). The empirical analyses show that 
farmers who are indifferent towards a perceived farm return are likely to adopt Vegetative 
and Structural Practices.  
 
Many studies found that a primary reason for adoption of conservation practices was a 
farmer’s perception about perceived benefits (Rolfe et al. 2008; Gillespie et al. 2007; 
Valentin et al. 2004; Cary et al. 2001; Cary and Wilkinson 1997). There is a possibility that 
farmers who hold more positive perceptions about the outcomes of conservation practices 
are more likely to adopt new innovations (Bosch and Pease 2000). Furthermore, risk neutral 
farmers are less sensitive to changes in net farm return than risk averse farmers (Fafchamps 
2003; Setia and Johnson 1988). As the potential outcomes of adopting a new practice are 
hardly predictable (Pannell et al. 2000), it is likely that farmers holding indifferent 
preferences towards farm returns may adopt BMPs. 
 
5.3.3 Influences of external determinants on adoption intentions 
 
5.3.3.1 Contribution of family labour to farm workload  
It is hypothesised in this study that the contribution of family labour to farm activity is 
positively associated with BMP adoption. The findings reveal that farms relying on more 
than 50% of family labour in farm workload are likely to adopt Vegetative Practice. The 
Vegetative Practice demands much management time and labour, and family members could 
provide unpaid farm labour to the enterprise. Thus, a farm that relies mainly on family 
members is likely to adopt labour-intensive practices. The empirical findings are generally 
consistent with Gillespie et al. (2007) and Fernandez-Cornejo et al. (1994) in that family 




5.3.3.2 Farm size 
This study assumed that farm size has a significant effect on technology adoption behaviour 
in the agricultural sector, but it did not assign the direction of relationship. Literature showed 
that farm size had different effects on the adoption rate depending on the characteristics of 
BMPs. Many studies found that larger sized farms have generally been associated with an 
increased likelihood to adopt technology. This is because smaller farmers tend to be faced 
with large fixed costs, transaction costs and information costs; thereby reducing the tendency 
to adopt new innovation (Larson et al. 2007; Zubair and Garforth 2006; Beedell and Rehman 
2000; Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 1994; Earle et al. 1979). However, a few studies revealed 
that smaller farmers adapted faster to new technology and perceived less problems than 
large-scale farmers (Feder et al. 1985; Greene 1973).  
 
The empirical analyses reveal that small-scale farmers holding farm land of 5.01-10 rais are 
likely to adopt Vegetative Practice. There are at least three factors explaining adoption of 
Vegetative Practice by small farms. These factors are trialability, compatibility and 
complexity, and they are termed as programme factors17
 
 by Rolfe et al. (2008). First, 
Vegetative Practice offered in this study can be applied on a small scale (i.e. the most 
selected practices are vegetative cover and mulching). Thus, farmers are able to trial prior to 
full implementation. Second, the selected Vegetative Practice might be compatible with 
existing farming methods and cropping system. Third, the innovation is not complex and 
materials such as straw, grass, and vetiver can be found locally with relatively cheap cost.  
On the contrary, the empirical analyses reveal that farmers who hold farm land of either 
20.01-50 rais or more than 50 rais are unlikely to adopt Structural Practice. The negative sign 
between Structural Practice adoption and farm size can be described by the characteristics of 
BMPs. In Thailand, for small- to medium- scale farmers land area of more than 20 rais is 
considerably large. Structural Practice typically requires high initial investment and the 
following maintenance costs. Moreover, farmers incur land opportunity cost because the 
BMP instalment reduces the production area for farming and causes net production cost 
                                                          
17  Programme factors are characteristics of a programme that could influence participation rate. 
There are complexity, congruence, risk and uncertainty, capital implementation cost, intellectual 




(Rolfe et al. 2008; Thurston 2006; Hoppe and Wiebe 2002; Stanley 2000; Woznick 1987). 
Farmers are likely to adopt a new innovation, if such innovation can provide a reasonable 
financial viability for the business (Pannell et al. 2006). However, farmers often tend to 
overestimate privately short-run loss and overlook important medium- and long-term 
benefits especially those associated to society (Stanley 2000) since it is difficult to quantify 
and value social benefits. Because the current perceived economic costs outweigh economic 
benefits, farmers therefore do not prefer the adoption of Structural Practice.  
 
5.3.3.3 Access to information sources other than government  
Besides information from government agents, farmers also rely on information from a 
network of providers such as chemical dealers, input supply retailers and community leaders. 
Farmers are likely to adopt new innovation, if technical assistance can be easily received 
from this network (Gillespie et al. 2007; Feather and Cooper 1995; Traore et al. 1998). This 
study hypothesised that easy accessibility to information sources is positively associated with 
BMP adoption. The results show that farmers who have easy or not so difficult access to 
non-government extension services are likely to adopt Vegetative Practice.  
 
These findings are consistent with arguments by Pannell et al. (2006). They describe 
farmers’ tendency to adopt conservation practices, if they can seek technical assistances from 
people who are seen to be experts. During the survey, farmers stated that a non-government 
extension service is credible and the support of innovation is clearly suitable to local 
circumstances. Further, a great number of private extension agents are available at local 
level. This could enhance adoption rate because farmers receive high exposure to the 
information (Pannell et al. 2006). Another reason why access to private extension service is 
positively associated with adoption intention is the history of relationship between farmers 
and agents. In the past few years the major role of government extension agents in Thailand 
is to promote farming practices to provide public goods such as environmentally friendly 
production, rather than to support farmers to achieve their personal goal such as financial 
viability. This has created a complex social interaction that may be less comfortable for 




5.3.3.4 Crop dependency 
Dependence on other crops indicates the number of activities other than citrus cultivation run 
in the farm, and simply signifies farm diversification. It is hypothesised that more diversified 
farms are more likely to adopt conservation practices because such adoption can potentially 
benefit other farm business sections (Gillespie et al. 2007; Fernandez-Cornejo et al. 1994). 
Moreover, a variety of practices can be trialled in a diversified farm, thereby making it more 
likely to adopt new innovations (Rahelizatovo and Gillespie 2004).  
 
Contrary to the hypothesis, farmers who depend only on citrus cultivation are likely to adopt 
Structural Practice. Zentner et al. (2002) stated that managers of diversified farms demand 
more time on management, such as monitoring and obtaining marketing. Further, with more 
crop varieties farmers go through a learning process which could increase risks. For 
example, production costs might increase because of misjudgement or until new experiences 
is mastered. Moreover, Prokopy et al. (2008) describe that farm diversity may have a 
negative sign with conservation practice adoption because farmers face with too many 




Cost estimates in chapter 3 and descriptive statisics in chapter 4 provide ground information 
for the analysis in this chapter. The analysis in the first section aims to explore how farmers’ 
perceived costs can affect their adoption intentions. To do this, actual cost data were plotted 
against the frequency of stated intentions. The graph showed no definite trend in the 
relationship between actual costs and stated intention. However, the further discussion based 
on the graphical illustration and farmer interviews has led to the conclusion that cost is 
crucial in farmers’ decision-making, but it may not be the most important determinant. This 
is because farmers may make decisions based on other farm’s goals, such as environmental 
stewardship. 
 
This chapter then proceeds to examine factors affecting the decision to adopt different BMP 
types. The twelve BMPs were collapsed into three functional categories: Good Husbandry; 
Vegetative Practice; and Structural Practice. Farmers’ decisions to adopt a specific 
functional BMP category were investigated through a two step multinomial logistic analysis. 
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First, statistical assumptions underpinning logistic regression analysis were validated, and 
thirty one independent variables were retained. Then, the forward selection method was 
conducted to select psychological variables. During the stepwise analysis, four psychology 
variables were entered into the equation, but one variable (i.e. affordability) was removed in 
the final step. Therefore, only three psychology variables were kept for the next step. Next, a 
combined model comprising of those three psychology variables and external variables were 
entered into the equation at .05 level of significance.  
 
Results from the multinomial logistic analysis show that farmers who are indifferent to or 
highly influenced by consumers are unlikely to adopt Vegetative Practice. Further, farmers 
who hold indifferent preferences towards perceived returns are likely to adopt Vegetative 
Practice. Farmers who occupy the farm land of 5.01-10 rais, or a farm having a high 
contribution of family labour to farm workload, or farmers who easily receive information 
apart from government advisory services are likely to adopt Vegetative Practices. In terms of 
the determinants of Structural Practice adoption, at the .05 level, farmers who are indifferent 
towards consumer referent are likely to adopt Structural Practices. Further, farmers who hold 
indifferent preferences towards perceived returns are likely to adopt Structural Practice. 
Farmers who depend only on citrus production are likely to adopt Structural Practice. 
However, farmers with large farm size are unlikely to adopt Structural Practice.  
 
Overall, this study begins to examine in which way perceived cost can affect farmers’ stated 
intention. It then draws on the TPB and econometric estimation model as a framework for 
understanding decisions to engage in BMP uptake at a landscape level. The TPB combines 
both qualitative and quantitative methods. It requires qualitative research in the elicitation 
study of attitudes, subjective norms, and perceived behavioural controls; while the statistical 
analysis developed to use with the TPB is quantitative in nature. Moreover, in the context of 
agri-environmental policy where other factors may be more important than beliefs and 
attitudes in determining behaviours, external variables can be added into the model. The 
results suggest that participation varies across different types of BMP. Further, the 
significant factors derived from the statistical analysis are useful for policymaking. These 
factors could provide a frame for minimum eligibility requirements for farmers and technical 
standards for farms to participate in a BMP programme. To design a more targeted policy 
approach accommodating differences between farmers, the next chapter introduces Q-




6 SUBJECTIVE POSITION 
 
This chapter is an extension of the previous chapter, which observes farmers’ adoption 
intentions (Figure 6-1). Though behaviour can be predicted by personal intention, intentions 
do not always lead to the final behaviour because people may not behave in line with their 
intentions. Furthermore, salient beliefs may differ from individual to individual and from 
population to population, and this proposition has not been addressed within the TPB 
framework (Cook et al. 2005). Provided there is another procedure for assessing the 
subjective importance of beliefs, this could improve an understanding underlying a decision 
process of specific subgroups and could offer tailored policy interventions.  
 




This chapter begins with a discussion about current statistical techniques to segment people 
based on their attitudes (section 6.1). Section 6.2 presents a development of concourse and a 
strategy to select statements within the Q-Methodology. This section also provides the 
criteria to select small-scale participants from a pool of TPB samples. In section 6.3, a field 
survey and fieldwork tools are detailed. The justification of data analysis is further presented 
in section 6.4, and followed by results based on citrus farmer’s subjectivity in section 6.5. 
The discussion in section 6.6 points to cautions in the application of Q-Methodology. This 
chapter closes with the summary in section 6.7.  
 
6.1 Attitudinal segmentation 
Practically, cluster analysis and Q-Methodology are widely applied to investigate attitudinal 
similarities and differences between groups (Morf et al. 1976). Cluster analysis is a statistical 
technique used to identify groups with heterogeneous inter-group and homogeneous intra-
group characteristics (Aldrich et al. 2007). In other words, it is a technique to segment 
individuals into categories so that the individuals in the same category are more statistically 
similar to each other than those who are in other categories. For example, attitudes were 
measured by a series of statements presenting in the forms of Likert-scales ranging from 
‘strongly agree’ to ‘strongly disagree’ (Gorton et al. 2008).  
 
Several studies employed cluster analysis to investigate farmers’ attitudes to agri-
environment policy. For example, Lobley and Butler (2010) performed a cluster analysis 
with 1,852 farmers in Southwest England to investigate their reaction to CAP reform. The 
analysis yielded five distinct groups, and suggested that different farming situations (i.e. 
farm structures) are associated with different types of reaction (i.e. slightly influenced by 
CAP reform). Vanhonacker et al. (2007) conducted a cluster analysis with 459 meat 
consumers to understand their attitudes towards farm animal welfare. The results revealed 
six groups and also suggested information regarding markting opportunities for high welfare 
products. 
 
Gorton et al. (2008) conducted a cluster analysis with 1,192 farmers from five EU countries 
in order to investigate differences in attitudes towards agricultural policy amongst the EU 
Member States. The five-cluster solution was obtained. Each group is first described based 
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on its attitudinal perspectives, and it is then refined based on its demographic and farm 
structure variables. Kuehne et al. (2008) performed a cluster analysis with 121 irrigators to 
investigate attitudes influencing willingness to participate in a water reform. Three-cluster 
solution was chosen as it has a strong conceptual support, and as such each cluster is 
meaningful. Garforth (2010) conducted a cluster analysis with 683 farmers to investigate 
whether farmers with different sets of attitudes respond differently to the introduction of the 
Single Payment scheme. The results showed that profit maximisation is not important for all 
farmers.  
 
Q-Methodology, on the other hand, is an agency- or person-centred approach, which 
provides insight into the structure of attitudes and indicates which aspect of behaviour is 
important. Barry and Proops (2000) classify Q-Methodology as attitudinal research along 
with as semi-structured interview and focus groups, but offers stronger qualitative methods 
providing a distinctive approach to empirical analysis. Recently, Q-Methodology is used to 
understand farming style in the context of a rapidly changing agri-environmental policy 
(Davies and Hodge 2007). The concept of farming style is that, in any farming community, 
there is a set of farming strategy of which farmers are aware and from which they choose to 
guide their own practice (Vanclay et al. 2006). Accordingly, understanding what are 
underlying these basic motivations and how farmer perceives a new practice can help to 
design policy that may receive positive responses. Examples of study employing Q-
Methodology to investigate farmers’ responses to new practices are given as follows. 
 
Hall (2008) studied farmers’ attitudes to GM crops in Scotland using Q-Methodology. She 
argued that previous studies usually focused on attitudes of consumers and agency bodies, 
such as industry and NGOs, and not much attention was paid to farmers. The study, thus, 
aimed to add farmers’ views to the overall GM debate. The findings suggested that farmer is 
a unique stakeholder group in the GM debate in that it is neither extremely pro- nor anti-GM. 
Rather, farmers prefer to wait and see the consequences of GM cultivation (i.e. benefits of 
the technology) from other stakeholders (i.e. biotechnology companies). 
 
Brodt et al. (2006) conducted the Q study and found three groups of farmer holding unique 
combinations of goals and values that result in different farm management strategies. This 
simply suggested that farmers may not adopt new practice if its values are not consistent 
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with their personal values. Moreover, diversities of farming style were then used to inform 
policy to promote alternative farming practices. Davies and Hodge (2007) used the Q-
Methodology to explore environmental perspectives of East Anglian farmers. Five groups 
were revealed and different policy orientations were suggested to correspond with different 
groups.  
 
Fairweather and Klonsky (2009) discussed the usefulness of Q-Methodology in terms of the 
extension to policy implications. They concluded that Q-Methodology is a suitable method 
for documenting farming styles and this knowledge allows an effective policy intervention 
targeting at salient motivations or attitudes. Stewardship positions revealed by the Q studies 
suggest that farmers’ core values and motivations are not only influenced by profit 
maximisation. To a degree, this is align with the hypothesis underlying in Ecological 
Economics that farmer is unbounded rational. 
 
Overall, cluster analysis offers two clear advantages. First, it can pinpoint the differences 
between each group based on attitudes and other variables such as demographic and 
geographic characteristics (ten Klooster et al. 2008), thus improving the profiling and 
validation of each cluster. Second, it is a preferred method when groups are identified based 
on a large number of variables (Aldrich et al. 2007). However, as criticised by Hair et al. 
(2009) cluster analylsis also has some limitations. First, the sample size must be large 
enough to provide sufficient representation of small groups within the population and to 
represent the underlying structure. Second, the cluster solution could not be generalised since 
it depends on the variables used as the basis for the similarity measure. Third, the variables 
used in the analysis must have a strong conceptual support because they will form the 
interpretation of a corresponding cluster. 
 
Several advantages of Q-Methodology are prior highlighted in chapter two (see 2.2.2). 
However, as a research methodology, Q study also has some limitations. First, the sorting 
process is time-consuming (McKeown and Thomas 1988). For example, method and 
instructions must be clearly explained to participants. Second, as paticipants in the Q study 
are purposively selected, the generalisation of the results could not be made (Danielson 
2009). Third, participants are segmented based on their attitudes toward studied subject. The 
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interpretation based on other variables, such as demographic variables, is not recommended 
because of the small sample size of participants (Danielson 2009).  
 
Cluster analysis and Q-Methodology have different strengths and weaknesses. Morf et al. 
(1976) argued that Q-Methodology is a more promising method to classify groups than is 
cluster anlaysis. In terms of mathematical basis factor analysis, an underlying method in the 
Q analysis, provides less susceptible to sampling fluctuations. This is because it takes into 
account the entire matrix of similarity indices between observations in forming groups. In 
other words, the broad dimensional Q factor analysis allows for the possibility that 
participants are moderately associated with a number of variables, while the categorical 
cluster analysis assumes that participants are maximally associated with one category and 
not with all others. 
 
Apart from the discussion above, the desired method for capturing attitudinal heterogeneity 
may depend on research goals and data availability. The Q-Methodology presents itself as an 
attitudinal study that could support the extension of the TPB and can be implied for the 
formulation and analysis of an agri-environmental policy (Barnes et al. 2007). Q-
Methodology aims to understand spectrum of views by using the process that is relatively 
independent of the researcher (Fairweather and Klonsky 2009). Accordingly, this chapter 
offers an application of Q-Methodology in order to understand how attitudes impact on the 
achievement of goal (i.e. BMP adoption).  
 
 
6.2 Concourse Development and Establishing the Q-sample 
The flow of information surrounding any topic in a Q application is termed a ‘concourse’. It 
is from this concourse that a sample of statements is subsequently drawn for administration 
in a sorting process (Brown 1991). In this study, the concourse relating to BMP adoption was 
collected from document review and personal interviews based on a set of thirteen open-
ended questions18
                                                          
18  This was the same questionnaire used during the TPB elicitation study (see Annex 5), and the 
interviewed farmers were the same. In other words, the interview records from the same sources 
(i.e. questions and interviewees) were used as inputs for both the TPB and Q study.  However, 
different approaches were used to derive variables/ statements for the analysis. In the TPB study, 
variables were derived by the content analysis (see 4.1.3.2) while in the Q study statements were 
categorised by relevant issues (Table 6-1). 
. Example questions are: ‘what do you believe are the advantages/ 
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disadvantages of BMP uptake?’, and ‘are there any conservation practices done on your farm 
and what are they?’. Seventeen citrus farmers were interviewed in June 2007. They were 
firstly informed about possible effects of citrus production on water quality and briefly 
introduced to twelve BMPs selected by Thai agronomists as being those most relevant to 
citrus farming in the study area (Table 1-5, Chapter 1). The concourse was subsequently 
broken down into 419 statements. These statements represented 91 statements from printed 
materials and 328 statements from the personal interviews. 
 
Next, a subset of statements must be drawn from the concourse. van Exel and de Graaf 
(2005) argued that these statements can be selected based on either existing theory or 
induction from a survey feedback. They further discussed that either selection approches 
could lead to a logical contruct of Q-sample as it is the participants who eventually give a 
meaning to these statements through a sorting process. In this study, to ensure that the Q-
samples represented the entire concourse, a strategic sampling was applied. A matrix was 
used to categorise 419 statements (Table 6-1).  
 
Table 6-1: A two-dimensional matrix for statement categorisation 
 
Statement topic Social Ecological Economic 
Water resource management (2) (2) (2) 
Soil conservation (2) (2) (2) 
Pest control (2) (2) (2) 
Fertiliser use (2) (2) (2) 
Overall views (4) (4) (4) 
Note:  The number in parentheses represents total statements chosen from each 
corresponding cell and thus yields a total set of 36 statements for the analysis. 
 
The thematic categories on the horizontal axis were based on the concept of sustainable 
agriculture, and were social, ecological and economic aspects, while those on the vertical 
axis were based on the technical aspects of BMPs, and were water resource management, 
soil conservation, pest control, fertiliser use and overall views towards BMP adoption. From 
419 statements, there are a few criteria to decide which statements will be selected as Q-
samples. First, the statements should be short, stand-alone sentences that are easy to 
understand. Second, the statements should accurately represent ‘what is said’ in the 
concourse (Webler et al. 2009). Third, the Q-sample should include statements that provide 
the fullest range of viewpoints in the concourse (Durning and Brown 2006). The matrix not 
only allows a categorisation of statement, but also offers a stratified random sampling for 
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statements selected from each cell. Using this matrix, a total of 36 statements for the Q-
sample was derived for the analysis (Annex 9). 
 
6.3 Administering the Q-sort 
 
The statement sorting (ranking) exercise was undertaken in December 2007 and August 
2008. Theoretically, the number of participants does not have to be large to ensure the 
comprehensiveness of factors and the reliability of the factor arrays (Brown 1980: 92). In 
this study, 72 out of 218 TPB participants were purposively selected for the Q analysis. The 
selection criteria are based on farm size, education level and age, to represent farmers from 
different areas in the Ping river basin (51% were upstream farmers and 49% were 
downstream farmers).  
 
During the survey, all participants were provided with: (1) 36 cards, each containing a 
statement and its number, (2) a guide bar with a quasi-normal distribution (Figure 6-2), and 
(3) an answer sheet to record the rank ordering. They were then instructed to read all 
statements, sort the cards according to the extent to which they disagreed or agreed with 
them (-4 to +4) and to place the cards on the guide bar. Participants were also interviewed 
about their own experience of citrus farming, current problems and opinions about BMPs.  
 
 
Figure 6-2: Survey tools 
Notes: 1) A guide bar for 36 statements, and examples of the sorted statements (i.e. white cards) 




6.4 Data Analysis 
 
Each participant’s Q-sort was entered into a database using PQMETHOD software 
(Schmolck 2002). Initially, a correlation matrix of Q-sorts was analysed using principal 
components analysis. The analysis provided eight unrotated factors with eigenvalues > 1.0. 
Next, a Varimax rotation was used to rotate the factors, thereby investigating a two, three, 
four, five, six, seven and eight factor solution. The four factor solution produced the most 
statistically defensible model providing a uniquely satisfactory account of the data. Thus, 
this study reveals four factor groups or discourses.  
 
In order to assign Q-sorts to the most appropriate factor, the factor loading of each Q-sort 
was considered. Loadings were considered statistically significant at the 0.01 level if they 
were approximately 2.58 times the standard error (SE) (Brown 1991). The standard error for 
a factor loading was derived from 1/√N, where N equals the number of statements (Brown 
1991). In this case, with 36 statements, the SE = 1/√36 = 0.17. Thus, Q -sorts with either a 
positive or negative loading on a single factor in excess of 2.58(SE) = 2.58(0.17) = 0.44 were 
considered to load significantly on that relevant factor. Seven sorts did not load onto any of 




6.5.1 Interpreting factor arrays 
The interpretation of the factors is based on statement scores. The statement score was first 
computed as a z-score, and then converted into the original Q-sort value format (score -4 to 
+4) for ease of interpretation (Watts and Stenner 2005) (see Annex 10, Distinguishing 
statements). Here, particular attention is given to statements that distinguish between factors 
and those statements that were ranked at the extremes of the scale (+4, +3, -3 and -4; Table 
6-2). Positive scores indicate that a farmer would agree with that particular statement, whilst 
negative scores indicate disagreement. Participants’ comments from the post-sorting 
interviews were also incorporated in the factor interpretation. The four factors are labelled as 
conservationist, traditionalist, disinterested and risk-averse.  
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Table 6-2: Factor Q-sort value (-4 to 4) for each statement 
 
No. Statements Factors A B C D 
1 Our water here is as safe to drink as anywhere in the country -4 -4** 0* -4 
2 I have never discharged waste into natural watercourses 1* 4 -1* 4 
3 Good water quality is a social benefit 4 3 3* 3 
4 I can no longer fish from river that used to be a food source for a 
decade 
0* -2* -1* -2* 
5 Natural watercourses are contaminated with chemicals 0* -3 -3 -1* 
6 If I adopt BMPs, the natural watercourse will be cleaner and water can 
be re-used for planting other crops 
3 3 3 3 
7 Government agencies should provide advisory services on soil 
management 
3 3 1 0 
8 To control weeds and grass, I prefer to use a power lawnmower than 
herbicides 
3 2 2 1* 
9 Vetiver (local plant) can stabilise farm ditches, but I cannot afford to buy 
the plants  
0** 2** 0* -2* 
10 I do not know which tree could reduce soil erosion effects -1 0* -1 -3* 
11 Soil on my farm is easily eroded -1* -3 -2 -3 
12 I do not have enough land to allocate to BMP activities -1 -1 0** -2* 
13 Chemically sprayed citrus from my farm is safe to eat  -2* 1 2 2 
14 We should use organic substances instead of chemical pesticides on 
citrus farms 
2 2 2 -1* 
15 If I do not apply pesticide as I have been accustomed to do, the fruit 
quality may drop 
-3* 2* 1 0 
16 Applying the dosage of chemicals suggested on the label will not harm 
human health 
-3* 1 0* 1 
17 Chemicals do not always imply toxicity -1 -2 -1 0* 
18 Chemical-free labels on food are important for consumer purchasing 
decisions 
2** 1 1 0 
19 I tend to use fertilisers that are widely used by my neighbours -2 1 1 -1 
20 An application of organic fertiliser rather than chemicals will reduce 
pollution 
2** 1 3** 1 
21 The application of organic fertiliser will give better fruit quality 0** -1* 2** 0** 
22 I am happy to use fertilisers introduced by agricultural input retailers -3 -1 -2 -3 
23 Farmers should apply the right amount of fertiliser to match the trees’ 
need because over-application will harm the environment 
1 -1* 1 2 
24 Without an application of chemical fertiliser, trees do not provide good 
yield  
-2* 0 0 1 
25 BMPs are needed to stop fighting between citrus farmers and residents 1 0 -1 1 
26 Man cause pollutant emission, therefore we should take some actions 
to lessen pollution.  
2* 0 0 0 
27 Farmers can comply with BMPs if they get enough monetary support 
from government 
1 1 4* 2* 
28 My neighbours will support me if I adopt BMPs 0** 0* 1 1 
29 We can gain more watershed benefits if we can restrict pollution from 
our farm production 
1** 0** 0* 3* 
30 In the long run, BMPs help enhance competitiveness in terms of 
chemical-free product 
1 -1* 0** 2 
31 The BMPs will lead to more red-tape, but I can adopt them despite this 0 -3* -1 0 
32 We should restrict citrus cultivation to designated areas  0 0 -3* -1 
33 Labour requirement for BMPs is a big problem -1** -2** -3* 0* 
34 We could not introduce BMPs correctly because we do not have 
enough understanding 
-2 -2 -2 -1** 
35 Most citrus farmers are not aware of water availability in the watershed -1** -1 -4* -2 
36 I cannot adopt BMPs because I do not have enough funds 0 0 -2* -1 
 
Note: Reading the table by column reveals the comparative ranking of statements which 
characterize a particular factor, and reading the table by row reveals the comparative 




Factor A: conservationist 
Fifteen participants, both upstream and downstream farmers, loaded on the conservationist 
factor. This discourse represents a position that is pragmatic, moderately progressive and 
environmentally favourable. The main aspect of this discourse is the belief that ‘good quality 
of environment brings better quality of life’.  
 
Those associated with the conservationist factor group explicitly expressed a preference for 
the production of safe and good quality products through environmentally friendly practices 
(statement 15, score -3; statement 24, -2). They also demonstrated an interest in minimizing 
adverse impacts on health and the environment (statement 13, -2; statement 16, -3; statement 
20, +2). Further, this discourse was the only group expressing a belief that chemical-free 
labels on food items potentially affect consumers’ buying decisions (statement 18, +2).  
 
In terms of water resource issues, this discourse represents a viewpoint that is indifferent in 
terms of perceptions about the current water quality (statement 4, 0; statement 5, 0; Table 2), 
but farmers in this group stated their awareness of water availability in the watershed 
(statement 35, -1). Further, this group of farmers was relatively confident that more 
watershed benefits will be gained from BMP adoption (statement 29, +1). Some of them also 
commented during the interviews that government should promote the concept of watershed 
services and benefits of BMP adoption to induce behavioural change amongst citrus farmers. 
This farmer group also believed that everyone was responsible for taking care of water 
resources (statement 26, +2). Moreover, farmers associated with this discourse not only 
expressed strong environmental concern, but also presented themselves as environmental 
protectors (statement 2, +1). 
 
Those farmers associated with this discourse did not perceive there to be a problem with soil 
erosion on their farms (statement 11, -1), neither were they concerned about labour 
requirements being a limitation for BMP adoption (statement 33, -1). However, these 
statements were ranked relatively less negatively than by other groups. Additionally, farmers 
represented by this discourse expressed neutral viewpoints towards BMP adoption in many 
aspects. For example, they did not have strong opinions about the consistency of the quality 
provided by organic fertiliser (statement 21, 0), or the readiness of their fellow citizens to 
participate in more eco-friendly practices (statement 28, 0). Further, farmers represented by 
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this factor group did not explicitly express whether they could afford to buy local plants to 
control soil stability (statement 9, 0). However, the interviews suggested that farmers needed 
advisory support from extension agents in order to achieve better outcomes in soil 
management. 
 
Conservationists favoured conservation-oriented farming methods because they perceived 
the necessity of improving human and environmental health. Indeed discussions during farm 
interviews revealed that farmers had learned through trial and error to use smaller amounts 
of chemicals but still maintained fruit quality. Overall, the extent of awareness of eco-
friendly production of this farmer group was relatively high.  
 
Factor B: traditionalist  
Sixteen participants loaded on the traditionalist factor; almost all were from downstream 
areas. This discourse featured farmers who felt comfortable in their current situation. The 
views represented by this discourse were characterized by a resistance to change that was 
underlined by a lack of open-mindedness to the wider world.  
 
Those farmers in this group perceived that water quality was being threatened (statement 1, -
4), but believed that this situation was bearable as water was classed as fishable (statement 4, 
-2). The resistance to change mainly came from a satisfaction with current agricultural 
practice which relied on chemicals in order to maintain fruit quality (statement 15, +2; 
statement 21, -1; statement 23, -1). Farmers commented during the interviews that size-
graded and good-looking fruit could command higher prices. In other words, chemical-
sprayed citrus simply meant guaranteed returns and secure family farming.  
 
The traditionalists also defined other limitations that deterred BMP adoption. These were a 
lack of faith in the market for eco-friendly products (statement 30, -1), and uncertainty over 
external uncontrollable factors such as governmental procedure (statement 31, -3). 
Interviews revealed that some of the farmers in this group did not feel comfortable with strict 
government regulations such as enrolment procedures, and paperwork. However, it was 
evident that finding workers for labour-intensive practices was not a problem for BMP 
adoption (statement 33, -2). 
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As recorded during the interviews, farmers in this discourse had been informed about the use 
of local plants to stop runoff and maintain soil stabilization (statement 9, +2). However, this 
contradicts the neutral opinion expressed about the received wisdom and prevailing 
perceptions of erosion control (statement 10, 0). Further, farmers in this group also expressed 
neutral viewpoints about uncertainty of environmental gains from BMP adoption (statement 
29, 0) and being socially excluded by non-adopters who were in mainstream agricultural 
practices (statement 28, 0). However, post-sort interviews with farmers revealed that some of 
them were afraid of being excluded from cultural and economic processes, and of losing 
informal support networks.  
 
Farmers in this group showed less interest in applying new techniques and preferred current 
farming practice. As long as current practices provided the main source of livelihood for 
their family and high uncertainty about adoption of BMPs still prevailed, new production 
techniques that deviated from the current practice of farming and ways of life would not 
easily be accepted.  
 
Factor C: disinterested  
Seventeen participants loaded on the disinterested factor; almost all participants were 
downstream farmers. This perspective is characterized by a recognition of resource 
degradation, self-regard and a distinctive demand for short-term returns. This group was 
facing lower yields and poorer quality of fruit as a result of pest and disease epidemics.  
 
The views of this group were strongly focused on water availability for crop production and 
food sources (statement 35, -4; statement 4, -1), undoubtedly because citrus production 
requires a huge amount of water. Though this group did not express strong opinions about 
water quality degradation (statement 1, 0), farmers perceived good water quality as a social 
benefit (statement 3, +3). However, statement 3 was statistically distinguished by having the 
lowest z-score when compared to the z-scores from the other discourses (Q-sort value 
format, z-score: +4, 1.98; +3, 1.90; +3, 1.26; +3, 1.77). In other words, those represented by 




Farmers in this group agreed that sustainability could be promoted through the use of organic 
substances (statement 20, +3; statement 21, 2), but were likely to prefer farming methods 
that contributed to nonpoint source pollution (statement 2, -1). The interviews revealed that 
chemical-sprayed fruit was produced in large quantities in order to keep up fruit appearances 
to meet with consumer demand. Another important viewpoint was found in opinions of 
citrus zoning, of which this group was not in favour (statement 32, -3). In Thailand, crop 
zoning aims to delineate a suitable area for each important crop in each watershed boundary. 
With zoning, appropriate technologies and management such as good agricultural practices 
can be applied to the particular growing area. Disagreement with the practice of crop zoning 
may imply an unwillingness to change current agricultural activities. 
 
One key viewpoint of this group of farmers was the perception that funds from government 
were essential for starting a BMP scheme (statement 27, +4). This was despite the fact that 
this group possessed fundamental resources such as labour (statement 33, -3), and funds 
(statement 36, -2). Additionally, there were a few statements with which this discourse had a 
neutral viewpoint. These were related to the use of local plants to stabilize soil (statement 9, 
0), the availability of land for allocation to BMPs (statement 12, 0), impacts of chemical 
applications on human health (statement 16, 0), likely environmental gains from adoption of 
BMPs (statement 29, 0) and the likelihood that BMPs will increase competitiveness by 
supplying a market for eco-friendly products (statement 30, 0).  
 
The farming of this farmer group was economically non-viable, presumably because of an 
extensive use of chemicals. Moreover, this group strongly expressed the view that financial 
support from the government was required to start BMPs. Interviews revealed that this 
money was viewed as a viable tool to promote opportunities in family farming and to secure 
farm income. In terms of government action, this requirement signals that this farmer group 
was likely to create better watershed services if reasonable incentives were offered.  
 
Factor D: risk-averse  
Seventeen participants loaded on the risk-averse factor. This group featured farmers with the 
largest average farm size and almost all participants were from upstream areas where the 
arguments over air pollution and excessive water consumption were always at the top of the 
agenda. The farmers in this group were market-sensitive, and well informed. However, they 
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had doubts about the net gains from adoption, and thus refrained from implementation due to 
costs and fear of economic losses.  
 
Those associated with this discourse acknowledged that there were social benefits from farm 
pollution restrictions (statement 29, +3), and preferred to apply more eco-friendly practices 
in farm management (statement 8, +1). The group was also equipped with environmental 
management knowledge (statement 10, -3; statement 34, -1) and displayed a capacity to 
allocate land to meet with BMPs criteria (statement 12, -2). However, during interviews, 
some citrus farmers expressed a refusal to divide their own land for vegetative and structural 
practices (i.e. buffer zones and onsite retention storage) because they felt that too much land 
was required and investment costs were high. 
Another viewpoint found within this discourse was related to the perception of the current 
condition of water resources. Those represented by this discourse did not consider that water 
quality was being threatened (statement 4, -2; statement 5, -1). Thus if they must comply 
with the policy on BMPs, an amount of monetary support was requested from the 
government (statement 27, +2). This was to secure income and to comply with the regulation 
if particular materials, such as local plants to control soil erosion, were required (statement 9, 
-2).  
 
Further, farmers in this discourse were reluctant to change their current practices. This 
resistance came from existing attitudes towards chemical use which were compounded by a 
disagreement that chemicals could be effectively substituted by organic substances 
(statement 14, -1). During the post-sort interviews some citrus farmers asserted that 
consumers bought fruit depending on its product attributes such as physical appearance, 
rather than production attributes. Thus, the farmers inevitably applied chemicals. They also 
stated that the government should promote and launch a campaign to raise consumer 
awareness of chemical-free fruit. Those farmers associated with this discourse displayed 
neutral viewpoints towards several statements. The group neither agreed nor disagreed about 
the role of organic fertiliser in boosting fruit quality (statement 21, 0), or about labour 
requirement being a limitation to BMP uptake (statement 33, 0). Additionally, farmers 
associated with this discourse expressed a neutral viewpoint about the toxicity of chemicals 




This farmer group held a positive attitude towards eco-friendly management, but refused to 
change. This is because farmers viewed BMP adoption as a risky activity, in that their wealth 
rested on the success of innovation. This fitted with a managerial profile which emphasizes 
the goal of reducing variation in income, and gives environmental protection a lower priority 
than the economics of the farm business. 
 
6.5.2 Consensus statement 
There are points of consensus amongst all four factors. One statement that received a 
statistically indistinguishable z-score and that all factors ranked in the same direction (score 
+3) is statement 6 (Table 6-2; see Annex 10, Consensus statement). All groups agreed that if 
they adopted BMPs, natural watercourses would be cleaner and could then be safely re-used 
for planting other crops. This consensus statement suggests that citrus farmers perceived 
natural water resources as economic goods, and essential assets in farming. This is 
unquestionably because citrus production demands huge amounts of water and the cost of 
water acquirement is relatively high in terms of effective irrigation systems such as 
sprinklers. Furthermore, citrus farmers had experienced conflict over excessive water 
consumption amongst various water users in the watershed, as well as arguments between 
farmers and local residents in the critical areas. Therefore, they tended to believe that BMPs 




The bottom-up results from Q-Methodology can provide policymakers with information for 
sustainable policy development. However, caution is needed when policymakers target 
different programmes to different farmer groups. For example, the traditionalist and 
disinterested groups are mainly downstream farmers, while almost all of the risk-averse 
farmers are upstream farmers with relatively large farms; however assuming that these 
particular characteristics are likely to be consistently defining variables may not be justified 
(Raje 2007). There were some downstream farmers who were represented by other 
discourses, thus being a downstream farmer was not the only reason for being defined as a 
traditionalist or disinterested. Similarly, there were some large-scale upstream farmers who 
did not load on the risk-averse discourse. In conclusion, farmers in the Ping river basin held 
a number of perspectives towards BMPs, but these were not consistently related to farm or 
153 
 
farmer characteristics. Q-Methodology is not an approach that aims to identify certain 
socioeconomic groups and their associated views. Rather, Q-Methodology can be used to 
identify what different perspectives exist and also what farmers share as common 
perspectives about BMP uptake.  
 
Further, as participants in the Q-study were not randomly selected, the reliable 
generalisations about farm or farmer characteristics cannot be made (Danielson 2009). 
However, Q-Methodology facilitates decision-making by highlighting relatively important 
attitudes about the topic being studied (Durning and Brown 2006). A few dominant concerns 
do emerge and provide some insights relating to the key factors affecting potential BMP 
adoption. Policy interventions may need to vary group by group. Different instruments will 
have varying success within different groups given the variation in the motivations and 





An application of Q-Methodology aims to understand farmers’ attitudes and to identify the 
ways environmental issues are perceived. Evidences from Q-Methodology are expected to 
enrich findings from the TPB and econometric estimation analysis by mapping the different 
perspectives of citrus farmers relating to BMP uptake. The first step in Q-Methodology was 
to develop a concourse and to establish the Q-Sample. In this study, concourse was gathered 
from personal interviews and published materials such as newspaper, public hearings and 
government reports. A concourse of 419 statements was derived. These statements were 
categorised by a data matrix and 36 statements were drawn from the concourse.  
 
Seventy two participants were purposively selected from the sample set from the TPB study. 
The participants included 51% of upstream farmers and 49% of downstream farmers. The Q-
sorting was conducted during winter 2007/2008 and summer 2008. Data were analysed using 
factor analysis and factor rotation provided by the PQMETHOD software. Findings revealed 
a diverse range of opinions and determined salient beliefs toward BMP uptake. The four-
factor solution gave the most coherent explanation with 48% of total variance. These four 
distinct groups were then labelled according to their main characteristics, and these were 
conservationist, traditionalist, disinterested and risk-averse.  
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In short, the conservationist is pragmatic, moderately progressive and environmentally 
favourable. The traditionalist tends to resist BMP adoption. This is signalled by a lack of 
self-confidence and narrow-minded views toward policy changes. The disinterested 
recognises a state of natural resource degradation, but shows a distinctive demand for short-
term returns to compensate for current losses from farming. The risk-averse is market-
sensitive and it refrains from BMP adoption because of fear of economic losses. Though four 
groups hold different subjectivities in their attitudes toward BMP uptake, there are parts of 
consensus. The consensus suggests that farmers perceive natural water resources as 
economic goods and essential assets in farming. Viewpoints of these four groups can then be 
used to deepen understanding about perceptions of BMP adoption and lead to policy design.  
 
In sum, Q-Methodology is an alternative method to assess human subjectivity in a systematic 
way. Furthermore, it would help modify the assumptions of objectivism underlying the R-
Method typically used by traditional economists. In this study the strengths of Q-
Methodology are that it allows farmers to model their own attitudes, and it preserves self-
referent factors during a statistical analysis. Evidences from this study reveal that important 
beliefs are different from group to group. This in turn implies that a well-designed policy to 







7 KEY FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This thesis offers three independent studies on BMP adoption. Each of which has its own 
stand-alone value, and provides meaningful information for policy implications. This chapter 
outlines the key findings from each study and presents policy implications by linking the 
study findings to the literature on PES (Figure 7-1). Section 7.1 summarises the key findings 
from each independent study and methodological findings. These findings provide 
information for a discussion regarding the development of water-related PES programmes in 
section 7.2. The policy implications are presented in section 7.3. The lessons learned from 
the findings in terms of nonpoint source pollution management are discussed in section 7.4, 
followed by the methodological limitations and recommendations for future research in 
section 7.5. Section 7.6 presents ‘a way forward’ focusing on future actions the government 
should consider in order to develop a PES programme in Thailand. 
 




7.1 Summary of Findings 
 
The analysis presented in the preceding chapters has highlighted the state of BMP adoption 
in citrus farms in the Ping river basin. In chapter 3, the study on costs incurred to farmers 
demonstrated cost components of twelve BMPs. In chapter 4, using the data collected 
between December 2007 and August 2008, an empirical model based on the TPB was 
applied to investigate farmers’ adoption intentions and descriptive statistics were presented. 
In chapter 5, the cost information from chapter 3 provided information for the study of how 
perceived costs could affect farmers’ stated intentions. Moreover, data from chapter 4 were 
modelled with a logistic regression analysis to explore the significant factors influencing 
adoption intentions. In chapter 6, Q-Methodology was employed to define salient attitudes 
towards the adoption decision. In this chapter, the results from the above mentioned studies 
are discussed in the context of available PES literature. This offers insights into policy 
implications for a water-related PES programme.  
 
 
7.1.1 Key findings from the independent studies 
 
7.1.1.1 Farm-Level Cost Analysis 
Influence of perceived costs on adoption intention 
The observation of the relationship between perceived costs and stated intention to adopt a 
particular BMP is partially relevant to the results from the TPB model and Q-Methodology, 
and it suggests three main findings. First, from the farmers’ viewpoint, land opportunity cost 
can be a critical determinant when selecting BMPs. This is because a perception of high 
opportunity cost potentially affects perceived profitability. Neill and Lee (2001) argue that 
an adoption of new technology is likely to take place if alternative land uses are more 
economically viable. Similarly, Pannell (2003) stated that since benefits of BMP adoption 
are not always apparent and provided the minimum scale of land needed to trial BMP is 
large, these could deter farmers’ adoption. The conclusion that land opportunity cost is a 
barrier for adoption of a certain BMP is not only derived from the farm-cost study, but it is 
also evident in the TPB model and Q-Methodology studies, in that BMPs with large land 




Second, perceived cost plays an essential part in decision-making, but it may not be the most 
important determinant in farmers’ adoption intentions. This conclusion is also supported by 
the TPB and its empirical analysis. In the TPB model, the elicitation study, which provided 
qualitative data, was conducted to determine psychological factors influencing BMP 
adoption. Affordability (PBC1), reflecting farmers’ perceived costs, was one of the most 
frequently stated factors, and it was incorporated in a logistic regression as an independent 
variable. In the stepwise analysis, affordability was firstly entered into the equation, but it 
was then removed from the equation in the final step. In this sense, from farmers’ 
viewpoints, affordability (or perceived cost) could be viewed as an important factor affecting 
their adoption decisions, but it is statistically nonsignificant when other predictors were 
taken into consideration. Furthermore, although the economic cost analysis at farm-level 
showed that BMPs with low investment cost were preferred to those with relatively high 
cost, there was no definite conclusion regarding the relationship between perceived costs and 
stated intentions. For example, though Structural Practices are not financially attractive and 
have a high opportunity cost, they were preferred by a number of farmers. 
 
The last observation is that farmers are likely to adopt the practice they perceive that the 
benefits outweigh the costs. This is supported by the finding that soil analysis is the most 
preferred BMP. This finding is consistent with the work of Rolfe et al. (2008) who found 
that nutrient management was favoured by farmers because the perceived benefits, such as 
input use reduction, exceeded perceived implementation costs. However, this could raise an 
argument regarding the influence of perceived cost, because it varies across farmers and 
whether farmers adopt a new technology partially depends on their personal attitudes 
towards conservation practices (Gelso et al. 2008). Thus, holding all other relevant factors 
constant, that farmers will adopt practices producing higher benefits relative to costs is true 
only if farmers easily distinguish costs between several BMPs.  
 
Indication for payment  
Cost components of BMP are divided into two main categories. These are installation and 
annual maintenance costs, and land opportunity cost. The investigation on the cost 
differences amongst twelve BMPs highlights the significance of land opportunity cost as it 
shares the largest proportion in BMP cost structure. This is followed by installation costs that 
occur in the first year and annual maintenance costs. The information regarding cost 
component is useful for designing a PES programme. In the context of PES programmes, 
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payments per ha are the same for all service providers adopting a given practice. Thus, the 
critical factors that differentially affect farmers’ ability to participate in BMP programme are 
on the cost side (Pagiola et al. 2005). The observation on costs can signal a fair 
compensation for land converted to conservation practices, and thus increase participation 
rates.   
 
7.1.1.2 An extension of the TPB model 
Preference towards Good Husbandry 
Due to the fact that BMPs are site-specific, in this thesis farmers were presented with twelve 
BMPs. Farmers were asked to select the top three BMPs that they wanted to adopt in their 
farms. The results in chapter 4 show that Good Husbandry is preferred to Vegetative and 
Structural Practices. There are a few reasons why Good Husbandry is more attractive than 
other BMP categories. These are detailed as follows: 
1. Good Husbandry offers a few advantages over other functional categories. For 
example, it can be trialled on a small-scale for learning process, and its effects are 
observable in a shorter time compared to other BMP categories.  
2. In Thailand there is legislation that prohibits certain actions in farm management. 
For example, farmers are not allowed to farm in a former forest reserve. They must 
hold an utilisation certificate, but they are restricted with some land use 
regulations, such as extensive earthworks. This could be a barrier to the adoption of 
Vegetative and Structural Practices. 
3. Vegetative and Structural Practices may not be compatible with existing farm 
layout or operations. Thus, farmers perceive an increase of overall complexity in 
land management system from their adoption.  
 
The most preferred BMP 
The results illustrated that soil analysis is the most preferred BMP amongst farmers. Soil 
analysis is defined in this thesis as a test of organic matters and fertiliser application, 
particularly organic fertiliser, to match the need of crops. It is found that one-third of farmers 
stated their intentions to adopt this BMP in their farms. This is because farmers perceive that 
adoption can lead to a reduction in production cost, and prevent future loss in farm profit. 




Contribution of psychological variables to economic behaviour 
Economic decision models offer an understanding of factors affecting adoption, whereas 
psychological constructs explain how such adoption is translated into decision-making 
(Montoya et al. 2000). Failure to incorporate these two disciplines into the behaviour study 
could result in a welfare distortion of agri-environmental policy. This is because parts of 
individuals’ behaviour is unbounded rationally, but policy is often made based on a bounded 
rationality assumption (Guagnano et al. 1995). In this thesis, BMPs lend themselves to the 
construction and application of TPB. The inclusion of TPB in this thesis is to induce 
behavioural, i.e. psychological, variables into the model. This can provide a better 
explanation and prediction of economic phenomena (BMP adoption). The importance of 
psychological variables in economic behaviour is supported by the findings from the 
empirical model. The M-W test helps in explaining the rationales behind farmers’ 
differences. It was used to find how farmers’ psychological variables (or thought processes) 
differ and to compare external conditions between upstream and downstream farmers. 
Moreover, results from the multinomial logistic regression analysis indicate that both 
psychological and economic perspectives are critical determinants for understanding why 
farmers adopt conservative practices. Thus, policymakers should take into account the value, 
belief and incentive of target population when implementing policies.  
 
Reference points to increase farmers’ participation 
The TPB model explicitly hypothesises behavioural intention to be an immediate 
determinant of behaviour, and further suggests that psychological determinants can serve as 
a point of attack to induce targeted behaviour (Ajzen 1991: 206). The logistic regression 
analysis in chapter 5 included a set of psychological variables and additional variables to 
increase the predictive power to the model. Results have shown that the likelihood of 
adopting BMPs was associated with farm size, contribution of family labours in farm, access 
to information sources apart from government agencies, and dependency on other crops. 
Moreover, two significant psychological determinants were farmers’ attitudes towards 
consumers and farmers’ perceived farm returns.  
 
In this thesis, there are two ways the TPB and its regression analysis could inform 
government intervention. First, the results suggest which specific psychological determinants 
should be addressed. Knowing the important beliefs that underlie farmers’ attitudes, a 
government can pay attention to these salient beliefs and design interventions to increase the 
160 
 
adoption rate. For example, the results show that perception about farm returns is a 
significant barrier to BMP adoption. As fixed investments and significant capital layout are 
required, incentive systems could be considered to keep farmers engaged (Fielding et al. 
2005).  Furthermore, consumers are the major referents influencing adoption intention, 
channelling of information through customers is likely to be an indirect motivation to 
increase farmers’ participation. Figure 7-2 illustrates supply chains delivering citrus to 
consumers. An understanding in a delivery path could elaborate how marketing campaign is 
used to raise awareness amongst consumers. 
 
 
Figure 7-2: Marketing channels 
 
Obviously, the most direct and simple sale is when the farmers sell their fruit directly to 
consumers. Farmers peddle their fruit from house to house, or consumers go to buy at the 
farms. Fruit is also delieverd through retailers, such as supermarket, fresh market, and a 
peddler. The upstream channels of retailer can be farmers themselves, wholesalers, or farmer 
groups/ cooperatives. A considerable amount of citrus also goes to citrus processing plant or 
is packed for export.  
 
Consumers’ food choice is influenced by taste and appearance, health, convenience, and 
process (Brunso et al. 2002). At the attribute level BMP-processed fruit shows a striking 
difference; for example, its contribution to environmental conservation when judging in 
comparison with commercial fruit. However, there is a knowledge gap between farmers and 
consumers because consumers become increasingly distanced in terms of time, space and 
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experience from the farm and production process (Jaffe and Gertler 2006). Bignebat et al. 
(2009) argued that intermediaries, such as retailers, may either help or hinder transmitting of 
imformation as they play an important role in making products available to consumers. As 
such, stimulating consumer demand by creating the images linked to the production value is 
a key to success, and marketing campaign needs to integrate this value in the purchasing 
behaviour (Horlings 2009).  
 
Second, the analysis indicates that the influence of additional determinants on adoption 
intentions is attributed to backgrounds of farmers. Farmers with different backgrounds prefer 
to adopt different BMP categories. Policymakers can consider these additional determinants 
as an entry point for policy intervention, such as the criteria to set minimum requirements for 
farmers and farms participating in a PES programme.  
 
7.1.1.3 Q-Methodology 
Farmer’s attitudes – differences and similarities 
 
The application of Q-Methodology in chapter 6 helps to understand why farmers behave the 
way they do, how opinions and attitudes are formed, how farmers were or will be affected by 
the policies, and the differences between farmer groups. Q results enrich findings from the 
TPB study by illustrating different farmers’ perspectives in relation to BMP uptake. During 
the analysis and the interpretation of salient statements, four farmer groups were revealed. 
These were conservationist, traditionalist, disinterested, and risk-averse (Figure 7-3). 
Empirical work suggests that an attitude study is important for implementing policy 
(Tjernstrom and Tietenberg 2008), in that psychological segmentation facilitates policies 





Figure 7-3: Main characteristics of each group and consensus area 
 
Though the four farmer groups suggest that there is a wide variety of farmers’ attitudes 
towards BMP adoption, there is an area of consensus where all farmers perceive a positive 
aspect of BMP (Figure 7-3). All groups agreed that if they adopted BMPs, natural 
watercourses would be cleaner and could then be safely re-used for planting other crops. 
This agreement points toward an opportunity to promote BMPs as farmers generally hold 
positive environmental values regarding water resources and perceive water as an economic 
goods. In sum, Q results highlight different perspectives and offer insights into how much 
differences are constructed. Furthermore, Q study provides the information of what different 
perspectives exist and what farmers share as a common perspective about BMP uptake.  
 
Q results and policy implications 
 
As suggested by Swedeen (2006), results from Q study could benefit policy implications in 
two ways. First, different management alternatives could be constructed for each discourse. 
Cools et al. (2009) find that segmentation can identify target groups according to a variety of 
meaningful variables and helps to develop practical guides that are appropriate for each 
group. Second, policy could target at shared perspectives or consensus. Consensus may be of 
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interest to the government as a set of values with which to promote a unifying management 
concept (Steelman and Maguire 1999). 
 
i) Policies targeting at each discourse 
Q-Methodology has revealed four farmer groups holding relatively different perspectives. 
The Q results point to the important constraints and concerns that are not always 
acknowledged, when making policy based on the assumption that farmers have the goal of 
profit maximisation. Having captured concerns of these farmers, barriers to BMP adoption 
can be defined (Table 7-1). A concern towards new policy adoption is known as a status-quo 
bias. It arises when an individual prefers the current position rather than changes in the 
provision of environmental commodities, and it can be reduced through removing 
uncertainties from adoption (Venkatachalam 2008). The concerns over BMP adoption could 
be useful for a policy design in this sense. In the following paragraphs, potential policy 
instruments to increase adoption for each discourse are discussed. 
 
Table 7-1: Summarisation of characteristics and concerns from BMP adoption for each 
farmer group 
 
Factor Characteristics Concerns about BMP adoption Policy instruments 





Consumer demand for 
chemical-free fruit 
Advisory support 




Factor B:  
traditionalist 
Shaped by traditional 
farming communities 
and farming culture 
Not so self confident 




Lack of flexibility  
Community exclusion  
 




Factor C:  
disinterested  
Recognition in natural 
resource degradation 
Self-regard 







Factor D:  
risk-averse 
Sensitive to market 
Concerns over gains from 
adoption 











Market-based incentive: the disinterested and risk-averse groups were concerned about the 
level of compensation to be paid for BMP uptake. To address this, adopting farmers should 
be compensated for producing the extra benefits that arise from BMPs, otherwise the 
externality will not be priced and market failure will follow (Sarker et al. 2008a). A market-
based incentive of both cash and in-kind compensation could be offered to induce desirable 
behaviour (Dowd et al. 2008). For example, farmers may be compensated for capital 
installation costs or increased risk in terms of decreased yields over the first few years of 
implementation (Ribaudo et al. 1999). 
 
Marketing campaign: while the conservationist realised there may be a potential market for 
eco-friendly products, the traditionalist, disinterested and risk-averse expressed doubts about 
there being a guaranteed market for chemical-free fruit and concerns about lower fruit 
quality if organic substances were applied. According to Oates (2006), Thai consumers find 
it difficult to distinguish between quality and safety labels, and many of them rely on certain 
retail chains rather than quality certification. Marketing campaigns to raise awareness about 
eco-friendly production processes could generate a price premium for sustainable citrus 
farming (Oates 2006). Such a campaign might help to assuage farmers’ concerns about there 
not being a market for chemical-free produce, and, in turn, increase the likelihood of 
voluntary adoption for all farmer groups. 
 
Bureaucracy: bureaucratic barriers and lack of flexibility, such as government regulations, 
paperwork requirements, participation and eligibility requirements, are some of the main 
concerns for the traditionalists. If BMPs are being promoted as a policy, the government 
should launch simple regulations and make procedures flexible in order to simplify 
communication between farmers and government (Kosoy et al. 2008). 
 
Education: previous studies suggest that a lack of information about profitability and 
environmental benefit has deterred farmers from the adoption of proper management 
practices (FAO 2007b). This is supported by the interviews with the conservationists, who 
agreed that education could open the door to opportunity for every farmer. For example, 
science-based information could lower the risk perceptions of the risk-averse and enable the 
traditionalist and disinterested to improve their understanding about positive outcomes from 
adoption. Information could help to revise farmers’ perceptions regarding the cost 
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effectiveness of new farming practices and environmental benefits (Feather and Amacher 
1994). Farmers should be informed that their farming depends on, and generates, a wide 
range of ecosystem services, including watershed services such as water flow and water 
quality. This can be done through training or extension workshops under the instruction of 
expert farmers (Brookfield and Gyasi 2009; Hashemi et al. 2008). Ramsey and Hungerford 
(2002) suggested that environmental education offered through the schooling system is 
critical for removing barriers to the adoption of more eco-friendly practices producing 
ecosystem services.  
 
Information dissemination: traditionally, farm supply shops serve as a meeting place and 
information centre for Thai farmers (Oates 2006). Those who step out of mainstream 
farming could face significant social pressures, including being excluded by neighbours (de 
Buck et al. 2001). This was one of the concerns exposed during the post-sort interviews with 
traditionalists. Because supply shop retailers play an important role in information transfer, 
they could potentially provide extension services, for example acting as a BMP innovation 
dissemination point for farmers (FAO 1999; Fuwa and Sajise 2006).  
 
ii) Policy targeting at a shared agreement 
A few Q-studies focused on policy intervention targeting at shared values amongst all 
discourses. For example, Ockwell (2008) suggested that discussion to policy intervention 
could start with an area of consensus. Webler and Tuler (2001) argued that it is a challenge 
for policymakers to meet with different views and to design a process that meets shared 
needs. Similarly, Swedeen (2006) agreed that area of consensus serves as a basis for future 
work in developing a sustainable policy that is consented by all stakeholders. 
 
In this study, the consensus statement represents the idea that water is economic goods and 
being a critical resource in citrus production (Table 7-1). This may suggest a point that 
relevant to the development and operation of a PES programme. Since PES programmes can 
be adopted as a business-type approach, offering a long-term environmental conservation 
(Bishop et al. 2006), this identifies an acceptable condition for a BMP adoption that would 
be compatible with farmers’ shared value. In other words, the area of consensus suggests that 
promoting PES programme as a fair and viable agreement to sustain water quality could 
open up a possibility for dialogue to satisfy solutions amongst all farmer groups. 
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Overall, the Q results highlight farmers’ constraints and interests. It also offers insights into 
social, political, economic, and technical perspectives that are fundamental elements of the 
farming. These perspectives are basic premises leading to a success of PES development 
(Perrot-Maître 2006). For example, the findings explicitly illustrate that cash alone is not 
sufficient to induce farmer’s participation. This is in line with the existing PES programme 
in France, the Vittel water company providing incentives to upstream farmers to voluntarily 
change their farming practices. The key issue for the success of Vittle company is an 
incentive which taking into account the livelihood strategies of farm families and their long-
term plans (Perrot-Maître 2006). 
 
 
7.1.2 Methodological findings  
Figure 7-4 illustrates the extent to which key findings can contribute to methodology and 
policy implications. In terms of methodological findings, there is a linkage between 
independent studies, in that the key findings from one independent study offer information 
for another independent study. First, the economic cost estimates provided cost figures for a 
graphical comparison to explore a relationship between perceived cost and farmers’ adoption 
intentions. Second, a sample in the Q study has been drawn from the TPB participants. 
Methodological links between these independent studies are presented as follows. 
 
First, previous studies (see for example: Rehman et al. 2007; Fielding et al. 2005) showed 
that a TPB-structured questionnaire could only contain perceived costs. As such, the TPB 
model could not explain how costs associate with behaviours. Alternatively, the influences 
of costs on adoption decision have been investigated through a graphical illustration. In this 
sense, the economic cost estimates were plotted against the frequency of stated intentions to 
adopt each BMP. Notably, the graph presentation might be criticised for the lack of details 
and accuracy regarding data interpretation. But, it is the second best method to present 








Figure 7-4: Key findings, contributions to methodology and policy implications 
 
 
Second, the mechanism by which attitudes influence human’s behaviour is described by the 
TPB model, while the Q-Methodology is an extended study to investigate how such attitudes 
have been formed. A sample in the Q study was selected by the researcher. The criterion is to 
select participants who are representatives of the population. This must ensure that a range 
from one extreme to the other is included. In this thesis, participants in the TPB study were 
used as sampling frame for the Q study. By doing so, the main advantage is that a TPB 




Another point why this thesis has proposed the Q-Methodology after the TPB study relates 
to policy implications. Barker and Swift (2009) argued that rather than explicitly indicating 
the effective intervention, TPB results can provide just general guidelines for government 
intervention. TPB findings only suggest the importance of promoting supportive campaigns 
through a psychological construct and inform an early intervention programme by targeting 
directly to external factors. Therefore, policy implications can be done at a generic level by 
highlighting the key issues the policymakers should focus on. However, given a 
comprehensive perspective of human behaviour, tailored interventions would be more 
efficient than interventions directed at changing behaviour in a general population (de Bruijn 
et al. 2005). The challenge is to consider different types of farmers grouped by their 
attitudes. In an attempt to use the Q-Methodology, the psychological segmentation 
contributes to a more responsive and specific policy designed to remove adoption barriers 
which vary across farmers (Pannell et al. 2006). Moreover, the revealed consensus suggests 
that there is a potential to advance a PES programme as a mean to preserve water quality. 
This information is useful for policy implications as the PES programme is induced not only 
by transferred payment from beneficiaries to service sellers, but it also requires the existence 
of a ‘pro-protection’ attitude amongst service sellers, such as farmers (Vatn 2009). 
 
 
7.2 Widening the PES Perspective and Contributions to Policy 
 
This section discusses conditions for a design and development of water-related PES 
programmes. The discussion is based on findings which can contribute to PES literature. To 
answer the question of how to achieve PES, three main components of PES programme are 
considered. These are: i) the commodity; ii) institutional arrangement, including interplay 
between sellers, buyers and intermediary, and a legal framework to support the PES 
programme; and iii) payment mechanisms, addressing the issue of how the payment should 
be made, how much to be paid and when to do the transaction.  
 
7.2.1 Commodity 
One of the key conditions for PES programmes is that there should have a well-defined 
ecosystem service. This is important because the ecosystem service must be transformed into 
a commodity, which then can be exchanged for a payment. The Millennium Ecosystem 
Assessment (2005) states that cultivated land can deliver a regulating service of water 
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purification by the process, such as removal of excess nutrients and pollutants.  In terms of 
impaired water quality as a consequence of farm pollution, an efficient approach is needed to 
tackle the problem at the source of origin. Amongst several management tools, a series of 
BMPs are recommended to reduce the risk of farm pollution by intercepting, or preventing, 
pollutant before it reaches water bodies. Typically, PES programmes tie payments to the 
delivery of a service proxy rather than the service itself (Wunder et al. 2008; Landell-Mills 
and Porras 2002). In chapter 1, twelve BMPs were defined as commodities in the sense that 
they have been long perceived as contracts negotiated between service providers and 
downstream beneficiaries. Buyers purchase conservation practices adopted by service 
providers but they do not directly buy watershed services.  
 
For example, the analysis in chapter 4 showed that soil analysis was the most preferred BMP 
amongst citrus farmers in the Ping river basin. From the supply side, this may imply that the 
soil analysis has a potential to be promoted as a commodity in the PES programme. 
However, the issue of which ecosystem service is defined as a commodity has importance 
beyond traditional commodity considerations, because it addresses the management of 
environmental resources and human well-being. This suggests that a biophysical model is 
needed to elucidate the link between ecosystem and its services (Daily et al. 2009). A 
simulation model is useful to investigate the scale effects of conservation practices, and the 
results can be fed into an economic model to measure the value services accruing to 
beneficiaries. This information is necessary in the design of PES programme, as it develops a 
baseline to assess PES additionality. The additionality is critical at the early development 
stage because PES is much more a demand-oriented programme requiring performance 
standard as the basis for programme decision-making (Smith 2006). In other words, the farm 
produces multi-services to buyers. To appoint appropriate commodity, policymakers must 
understand how well BMPs can be characterised with respect to their effects on ecosystem 
services. This is to ensure that positive impacts from the BMP adoption will occur, and that 
the water-related PES programme meets demand from service buyers.  
 
7.2.2 Institutional arrangements 
Wunder (2005) suggests that in the development of PES programme there needs to be 
institutions and laws that make provisions for and have capacity to effectively facilitate the 
transaction. This section aims to identify potential sellers and prospective buyers, to 
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determine whether an intermediary is needed to facilitate a PES programme, and to look 
beyond the prevailing legislations whether they are sufficient for supporting a PES 
programme. 
 
7.2.2.1 Prospective sellers, buyers, and intermediary 
 
Figure 7-5 presents how the key findings from the three independent studies can be used to 
specify the potential sellers, buyers, and an intermediary in the PES programme.  
 
Sellers 
Citrus cultivation is one source of pollution in the Ping river basin. Impaired water quality as 
a result of farm pollution suggests that alternative measures are needed to tackle the 
problems of nonpoint source pollution at farm level. This thesis proposes that citrus farmers 
in the Ping river basin are potential sellers who can adopt BMPs in exchange for payments. 
The characteristics of sellers were described by descriptive statistics in chapter 4. Moreover, 
in chapter 5, the use of TPB with a multivariate logistic regression helps to explain 
complexities of farmers’ behavioural intentions by identifying significant factors explaining 
the intention to adopt each BMP category, i.e. Good Husbandry, Vegetative Practice and 
Structural Practice. Further, Q study to understand differences and similarities in farmers’ 
attitudes toward BMPs was offered in chapter 6. The findings from TPB and Q studies 
enable the understanding of stated intentions within each BMP category. They are also 
useful to set up eligibility requirements for participants, and suggest policy instruments to 
induce farmers’ participation (Figure 7-5). 
  
Findings from the logistic model and Q-Methodology suggested that the farmers’ decisions 
were not only based on profit maximisation, but it was also influenced by internal factors, 
such as personal perceptions about ability, skills, and knowledge. This is in line with the 
conceptual framework proposed by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005). Based on 
the framework, indirect factors, such as cultural and socio-political forces indirectly drive 
changes in ecosystem services, and these factors may directly affect human well-being. The 
findings that internal factors are important to decision-making are necessary for the 
development of PES programme, because transfer payments can take on many forms from 
actual cash to technical assistance and in-kind compensation (Wunder et al. 2008). Knowing 
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what are significant factors affecting adoption intentions and how farmers perceive BMPs, 
policymakers are able to design more effective policy to motivate farmers and increase the 
rate of voluntary participation.  
 
 
Figure 7-5: Criteria to define prospective buyers, sellers and an intermediary 
 
Buyers 
In the context of PES, a buyer is any stakeholder who recognises a change of ecosystem 
service provisions, and who can be morally, legally or rationally motivated to pay for such 
service provision (Suyanto et al. 2005). Lipper et al. (2009) identified three broad categories 
of buyers: public sector, private sector, and NGOs. The key to determine the source of 
payments is the type and distribution of benefits generated. The conceptual framework 
illustrating relationships and interactions between ecosystems and human well-being 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005), and the spatial dimension of the external positive 
effects generated are useful to identify prospective buyers (Figure 7-5).  
 
Wunder (2005) states that the beneficiaries will pay as long as the ecosystem service is 
provided. This condition is based on the additionality of the PES. Buyers will participate if 
they are confident that additional services, such as when reduced fertiliser rates are applied, 
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are secured (UNESCAP 2009). To this point, in the long term, an individual buyer may not 
be willing to pay for a service. This gives room for a government to induce demand for 
ecosystem services. In some cases a government acts as a buyer (Steed 2007) by collecting 
taxes and grants, sometimes with earmarked contributions, and channelling through service 
providers (Wunder 2007). How long the government can act on behalf of users depends on a 
continuation of budget allocations.  
 
Intermediary 
Intermediary is defined as any actor who facilitates and maintains the exchange flows of 
services and payments between sellers and buyers (Figure 7-5). The roles of intermediary are 
as service and information providers, mediators, arbitrators, representatives, developers of 
standards and bridge builders (Thuy et al. 2010). Moreover, an intermediary is established in 
order to deal with transaction costs associated with PES programmes, especially when there 
are plenty of small landholders producing nonpoint source pollution (Jack et al. 2008). 
Transaction costs of PES typically include: 1) technical work to define links between the 
ecosystem and the services; 2) establishment of organisations to manage, monitor and 
support a programme; 3) establishment of property rights; and 4) monitoring the compliance 
(Kemkes et al. 2010). The distribution of small- and medium-scale farmers is scattered along 
the Ping river. This suggests that an intermediary is needed to generate collective action to 
link sellers and buyers.  
 
The meta-analysis in chapter 2 revealed that there are many forms of intermediary, such as 
government agencies, NGOs, trust funds, communities, and the private sector. Each 
intermediary has its own advantages and disadvantages in the development and management 
of PES programmes (Thuy et al. 2010; Corbera et al. 2009). For example, farmer 
organisation or community has the advantage in negotiating with service sellers who are 
mainly poor farmers. But, it has the least power amongst intermediaries because of inferior 
political status. Government, on the other hand, is seen as the most powerful intermediary 
because of its highly centralised institution. However, the major disadvantage emerges from 





The experience of PES programme in developing countries (i.e. Vietnam) suggested that 
some intermediaries may perform to support their interests, such as commercial and political 
missions (Thuy et al. 2010). As such, they are not neutral and may not work on the basis of 
benefits for either service sellers or buyers. Moss (2009) argued that the positive impacts of 
intermediaries depend on their international and local identities, relationships, capacity and 
adaptation to local situations. Further discussion focuses on the need to consider a 
combination of local organisations and government authorities to facilitate PES programmes 
(Thuy et al. 2010). This poses a challenge on an institutional interplay, which is a concept 
concerning the effectiveness of outcome regarding interactions between institutions (Young 
2002). Moss (2004) recommended that, at the river basin scale, a negotiation amongst 
stakeholders and a creation of new partnership are required to efficiently manage water 
resource.  
 
Practically, some water resource management programmes are based on considerations 
towards stakeholder interplay and participatory approach. These initiatives are characterisied 
by a catchment partnership and aim to promote collaborative resource management, to 
construct groups to do joint work and to build trust. Catchment partnership is needed because 
there always is a policy gap between water management planning (i.e. standards of water 
quality and quantity set by government authorities) and land-use management (i.e. 
conventional farming). Catchment partnership is seen in developed world; for example, the 
Dee catchment partnership (Dee Catchment Partnership 2009) and the Tay area management 
plan (SEPA 2008) in Scotland, and the Moreton Bay and Catchment in Australia (GWP 
Toolbox 2008). These partnerships normally involve a wide range of organisations, agencies 
and individuals, and work on a voluntary basis. Overall, they work as a network to establish 
a shared and long-term institution to support water resource management at the river basin 
scale, and to ensure that all stakeholders benefit from improvement in water quality.   
 
7.2.2.2 Legal framework 
 
A legal framework is needed to facilitate the establishment of PES programme. Here, a 
discussion regarding legal framework for the implementation of PES is relevant to well-






Well-defined property rights are a prerequisite to commitment to conservation practices 
(George et al. 2009). In the context of PES, property right is related to the characteristics of 
CPR and the spatial flow of ecosystem services. Fisher et al. (2009) pointed to a subtle 
difference between CPR and ecosystem services. They argued that CPRs are resources 
producing benefits to human, while ecosystem services are the processes of delivering such 
benefits. For example, water quality has a characteristic of CPR because it is rival and non-
excludable, whereas the regulating services of good water quality can be delivered through 
farm land which is typically a private property. In this sense, policy does not focus on ‘water 
regulation’ management, rather it highlights farm management practices, which provide 
water regulation services. 
 
Descriptive statistics in chapter 4 revealed that 83% of farmers were landowners, while the 
remaining were tenants. For a service flow of water quality where downstream beneficiaries 
pay upstream farmers for the adoption of certain practices, Vatn (2009) argued that a lack of 
secured land title increases uncertainty for service buyers. The tenants are challenged with 
which rights they must have to involve their lands in the PES programme. Huang and 
Upadhyaya (2007) studied the characteristics of PES programmes in Southeast Asia and 
found that user rights over the resources were sufficient to establish working PES 
programmes. Similarly, George et al. (2009) conducted a PES study in northern Thailand. 
They concluded that as long as user rights have been respected, and a strong trust has been 
developed between sellers and buyers, land title issued by the government is not necessary 
for the implementation of a PES programme.   
 
Existing laws and regulations 
Laws and regulations provide effective incentives for an investment in a PES programme. 
Examples of legal provisions to induce farmers to change their farm management practices, 
especially in input uses and production practices, are widely seen in the United States 
(Swinton et al. 2006). The literature review in chapter 1 showed that current legislation in 
Thailand, such as an effluent charge, subsidies, and a labelling scheme, is available to 
manage farm water pollution (Thomas 2006). Nonetheless, these laws do not mandate an 
engagement in PES. For the sustainability of PES programme, an appropriate legal 
framework must be established so as to set institutional arrangements, responsibilities, and 
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eligibility requirement (Takoukam and Morita 2008). Thus, policymakers must consider 
whether the need is to modify the existing laws and regulations to support PES, or to launch 
a new legislation (Huang and Upadhyaya 2007). 
 
7.2.3 Payment mechanism 
In the context of payment, in particular the question of ‘who should pay whom’, a 
fundamental question is whether farmers should be considered as polluters or service 
providers. Hatfield-Dodds (2006) argued that equity principles, PPP and BPP, provide a 
framework to consider who should bear the costs in achieving environmental goals. For the 
most part, demand for ecosystem services from beneficiaries creates market (Landell-Mill 
and Porras 2002), thereby implicitly assigning property rights over agricultural land to 
farmers. PES aims to compensate farmers for increasing the amount of positive externality 
above and beyond what they would have done (Antle 2007). Accordingly, a PES programme 
works on the basis of BPP (Engel et al. 2008), suggesting that an action provides a benefit 
must be compensated for.  
 
The following question is whether the transfered payment within PES programmes violates 
the PPP principle. For example, a perverse incentive can happen as farmers may use 
practices that degrade natural resources in order that they can participate in the PES 
programme. Salzman (2005) argued that this perverse incentive is unlikely unless the 
expected private benefits of poor land management exceed the costs of doing so. This is 
because worsening current land management practices for potential payments can cause a 
significant cost in long-term farm productivity. However, if policymakers suspect the 
existing of perverse incentive, an establishment of baseline for participation could reduce 
such perverse incentive (Antle 2007).  
 
There are several forms of payment mechanism depending on the characteristics of the 
commodity, sellers and buyers. The review in chapter 2 also showed that the most prominent 
payment mechanism for watershed services in developing countries is a government-
intermediary based transaction. As a collective entity, government pools funds from groups 
of buyers and channels through sellers, and this creates a monopsony situation because a 
government seemingly acts as a single buyer. This monopsony power is merely a market 
form where there is a dominant buyer and multiple sellers. As such, monopsony is not 
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relevant to the enforcement of either payments or cross compliance measures. Rather, it 
involves in a PES programme as an approach to reduce transaction costs, thereby increasing 
the potential to establish the PES programme (Kemkes et al. 2010; Salzman 2005).  
 
The success of some PES programmes was due to them being monopsony markets. For 
example, a case in USA where the New York water authority is a single buyer for water 
purification. It pays farmers in the Catskill and Croton watershed to undertake forestry 
BMPs (Salzman 2005; Landell-Mills and Porras 2002). The success of this scheme is from 
the fact that the buyer can control the quantities of service desired by the public and estimate 
the costs to obtain such a goal (Antle 2007). The monopsony power is not limited to only 
government, rather the purely private market can also act as a monopsony. An example is the 
Vittel company in France who pays 26 farmers for an adoption of agricultural BMPs. The 
success of this project is a trust-building and the development of a long-term participatory 
process between the buyer and sellers (Perrot-Maître 2006).  
 
Another issues relating to the payment mechanism is a payment schedule. Pagiola et al. 
(2005) stated that an appropriate payment schedule must be carefully designed and 
considered with care. For example, some BMPs have high front loading payments in the 
very first year, while certain BMPs have an equal instalment over the length of the contract. 
The suitable amount must be paid at the right time in order to induce farmers’ participation 
and protect perverse incentives, such as a mismanagement of fund.  
 
Apart from the considerations mentioned above, another issue to be considered is the total 
amount paid to providers in exchange for certain services. Pagiola et al. (2005) suggested 
that the payment amount is typically between the minimum a service provider is willing to 
accept in changing their land management and the maximum a service buyer is willing to 
pay for improved ecosystem service. As a rule of thumb, a total amount paid for sellers 
should cover their private opportunity costs, and direct costs incurred in the adoption of new 
practices (Sarker et al. 2008a). However, some farmers may not be interested only in direct 
cash compensation. Asquith et al. (2008) argued that non-cash incentives can be more 
effective than cash payment because they are seen to increase farmers’ welfare over the long 




Here, the results from the farm cost analysis in chapter 3 can give an indication on when the 
payment should be made and how much it should be. On a related point, findings from the Q 
study in chapter 6 could suggest what the potential non-cash payments are. The results 
revealed a few factors, such as technical supports, a marketing campaign and other forms of 
in-kind payments as needed to increase farmer’s participation. Acknowledging the existing 
of these requirements that may change farmers’ behaviours, the government can design a 
more responsive policy focusing on factors that may promote behaviour changes. 
 
7.3 Policy Implications 
 
7.3.1 Prerequisite conditions for PES programmes 
This section addresses the requirements to develop a PES programme in order to manage 
nonpoint source pollution and improve water quality in the Ping river basin. Table 7-2 
outlines some specific conditions that are needed to design the PES programme. The first 
condition is the geographical boundary of the PES programme which is defined to be the 
Ping river basin. The second condition defines the commodity for the PES programme. As 
water quality is not traded in a market, the BMPs are used as a service proxy.  
 
The third condition concerns the eligible stakeholders: sellers, buyers and an intermediary. 
Sellers are clearly defined as citrus farmers. Buyers include both users and non-users. Users 
are those who receive direct benefits from an improvement in in-stream water quality, such 
as fisherman, water treatment works and local tourists. On the other hand, non-users are 
people who may enjoy non-use values of improved water quality and can make up a 
significant portion of the demand for environmental improvement. An example is residents 
who do not receive direct benefits from policy changes but notice an improvement in their 
surroundings. To designate between users and non-users, it is useful to distinguish the 
political jurisdiction concerning an administrative area, and the economic jurisdiction 
incorporating all stakeholders who hold economic values for an environmental improvement 
(Bateman et al. 2006). Furthermore, policymakers must make sure that buyers are willing to 
pay for the additionality of ecosystem services. Otherwise, the government can paly a vital 




Table 7-2: Design of PES programme 
 
Project:  Watershed protection services through the adoption of BMPs  
 
Conditions Descriptions 
1 Location The Ping river basin, northern Thailand 
2 Ecosystem service Water quality 
Commodity BMPs (a service proxy, such as soil analysis) 
3 Potential sellers Citrus farmers, in particular small – to medium – scale 
farmers  
Potential buyers 1) Beneficiaries, including both users and non-users; or 
2) State government 
Intermediary 1) At the district level, the local government, such as TAOs*, 
could be an intermediary 
2) At the national level, the government agency such as the 
PCD could act as an intermediary 




1) Funding methods; for example, 
- For users, e.g. entrance fee for ecotourism services, or 
tax from ecotourism business 
- For non-users, e.g. charge on household water bill 
- For a collective buyer, e.g. fuel tax, international donors 
2) To induce farmers’ participation, the amount of payment 
should cover investment cost, annual maintenance cost 
and opportunity cost of land. The payment schedule must 
be stated at the enrollment. 
3) Other in-kind payments, such as training must be 
considered 
Notes: * TAO is a local government unit in Thailand. It forms the third administrative subdivision level 
below the district and province.  
 
As both sellers and buyers are scattered along the river, an intermediary is needed to 
facilitate the PES programme. An intermediary should also responsible for monitoring 
compliance and enforcing conditionality of the PES programme. For a PES development in 
the Ping river basin three options are suggested. If transactions occur at the local level, a 
local government agency could serve as an intermediary. If transactions occur at the national 
level, such as when the government acts as a collective buyer, the state government agency 
should be an intermediary. Alternatively, a partnership can be established to bring together 
all stakeholders of the Ping river basin so as to understand the needs and impacts associated 





The fourth condition determines contract types and payment levels. An intermediary-based 
transaction is suggested to control transactions and risks from an implementation of the PES 
programme. Sources of payment depend on who are the buyers. For example, if the 
government is a buyer, sources of funding may come from the national income such as fuel 
tax or international donors. The transfer payment should cover all costs incurred by farmers, 
and this payment should include both cash and in-kind payments. 
 
These four conditions are needed for designing a PES programme. Among the four 
conditions, perhaps the biggest challenge when it comes to implementing PES programmes 
in developing countries is to define the effective demands for ecosystem services (Sakuyama 
2006).  This is because the difficulty in measuring and valuing the non-use values, and the 
low willingness to pay (WTP) from low- to middle-income buyers. However, this issue 
could be solved if a government intervenes and acts as either a collective buyer or a main 
intermediary to sustain a long-term demand for ecosystem services. The next challenge is 
how to create a supply of the services. There are other requirements that are also needed to 
make the PES programme works. 
 
 
7.3.2 Conditioning supply responses  
 
Water quality has a characteristic of CPR, but the provision of a water regulating service is 
done through farm land, which is often privately-owned. Therefore, policies are needed to 
encourage farmers to provide such service (Kemkes et al. 2010). Behavioural changes are 
likely to be successful if policies are tailored to remove farmers’ concerns from the adoption 
of new conservation practices. Interventions to promote behavioural changes generally use 
informational strategies to change attitudes. To be effective, information provision should be 
combined with other strategies, such as rewards and increased ease to perform the target 
behaviour (Lucas et al. 2008). The following sections outline some necessary interventions 









7.3.2.1 What to do to start a PES programme 
 
1. A well-defined property right must be established: farmers must approve that 
they have the right over farmland. This right could be either landowner right or user 
right. This property right is to secure the conditionality of ecosystem service (Cobera 
et al. 2009).  
2. Additionality and baseline of ecosystem services must be established: to support 
their decision-makings, farmers may need to know how changes in their farm 
activities positively impact ecosystem services. A modelling, such as an ecological 
economic model, can assist an analysis of the supply of ecosystem services from 
agriculture. On the other hand, as a PES is a performance-based programme (Antle 
2007), a credible estimate of additional flows of environmental benefits is also 
useful to build social trust and create demands from prospective buyers. 
3. Incentives other then direct cash payment should be considered: the incentives 
should be designed to reduce perceived risks in the adoption of new technologies. 
Incentives could be in the forms of direct cash payment, technical assistance or in-
kind transfer. For example, a demonstration project is a medium to transfer new 
innovation from research to farm. It can improve a rate and extent of technology 
transfer by providing examples and facilitating visible accomplishments. 
4. Consideration should be given to flexibility in enrolment: a number of farmers 
stated that institutional barriers such as contract, regulatory procedures and 
environmental regulation deter adoption. Flexibility should be considered for 
enrolment options to meet individual needs, such as farmers in remote area. 
5. The objectives of BMP adoption must be made clear: the principles and 
objectives of BMP adoption must be made clear between sellers, an intermediary 
and buyers. This is also related to the condition in which payments will be paid in 







7.3.2.2 What to do to sustain a programme 
 
1. Appropriate technology is needed to monitor the compliance with the policy: as 
nonpoint source pollution is hard to control and monitor, an alternative is to establish 
a proxy for monitoring purpose. Policymakers may set criteria - whether to monitor 
output (e.g. amount of N and P loaded into water bodies), or to change agricultural 
inputs (e.g. fertiliser reduction), or to change land use (e.g. construction of terracing) 
2. Certified quality labels should be promoted amongst consumers: the adoption of 
some BMPs may lower fruit quality, such as colour and appearance. The literature 
shows that in Thailand there is a potential market for eco-friendly products (Roitner-
Schobesberger et al. 2008; Yiridoe et al. 2005). To gain a marketing advantage, 
consumers must be informed about detailed information of label background, such as 
production method. Information can be spread through mass media or discussion in a 
public forum. A marketing campaign might help to assuage concerns that farmers 
have about a market for their BMP products. 
3. The clear scientific message should be diffused to farmers: George et al. (2009) 
and Wunder et al. (2005) argued that basic knowledge of the linkage between land 
use and watershed services is required to sustain an effective implementation of PES 
programmes. To increase the effectiveness of communication, a two-way 
communication between scientists and farmers is needed, and scientific data must be 
diffused to the broadest possible audiences.  
4. Intermediary is accountable and its roles must be clearly defined: this is a case 
when an intermediary is needed to facilitate a programme.  
 
7.4 Nonpoint Source Pollution Management: What can be learned 
from the Ping river basin case? 
 
The development of environmental policies in Thailand is different from what has been done 
in Western countries. Rather than guided by demands from the general public, the emergence 
of pollution management policies in Thailand has increased in response to environmental 
conditionality linked to low interest loans from development agencies (Akihisa 2008; Boyle 
1998). Thus, the policies are normally top-down initiatives by governments themselves. 
When the Enhancement and Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act of 1992 
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was enacted, environmental policies moved toward a more bottom-up approach. Local 
authorities are allowed to formulate their own environmental management plans, which must 
be approved by the National Environmental Board (NEB) (ONEP 2010; Enhancement and 
Conservation of National Environmental Quality Act 1992).  
 
Impaired water quality from farm pollution is a location-specific problem. A decentralisation 
of public services may allow agri-environmental policies to be more tailored to local 
conditions. However, in Thailand, a reliance on paternalistic authority and bureaucratic 
institutions result in a bureaucratic hierarchy. This leaves local authorities little power to 
implement and regulate environmental policies. Further, the final decision for implementing 
environmental policies is made at the national level (i.e. the NEB), and farmers are often 
treated as a passive target. Because farmers are resource managers and they are the main 
actors who deliver changes, the lack of farmers’ voices impedes the effectiveness of agri-
environmental policies.  
 
Accordingly, this thesis aims to understand the circumstances within which farmers operate 
and how they make choices. It sets this within the context of a potential MBI (PES), which 
can lessen the water pollution from farms to some extent. The thesis applied a case of 
nonpoint source pollution management in the Ping river basin, and suggested BMPs as 
voluntary transactions to manage and control pollution at the farm scale. To investigate a 
farmer’s decision-making, this thesis introduced a social psychology theory, i.e. the TPB, 
and a psychology research method, i.e. Q-Methodology. Rather than being a stand-alone 
alternative to understand behaviour, the psychology theory was used as a complement to a 
human rationality embedded in neoclassical economics theory. The findings revealed that 
there were many factors affecting farmers’ behaviours. These factors were not limited to 
only external factors, such as farm environment, but also included internal factors, such as 
perception and attitudes. Policy implications based on these findings must proceed with 
cares. Policymakers should bear in mind that samples in this thesis included only small- to 
medium- scale farmers. One may argue that policy intervention with large-scale farmers may 
have higher impact on the management of water pollution. Howver, large-scale farmers who 
deal with higher benefit levels may have different behavioural responses to BMPs. Thus, this 




Overall, this thesis contributes to an improvement of our understanding of environmental 
policy using methods from the emerging field of Ecological Economics. Ecological 
Economics expresses human behaviour in terms of unbounded rationality and uncertainty, 
and suggests that an alternative model of human behaviour should include endogenous 
preferences and other social contexts to understand individual choices (Gowdy and Erickson 
2005; Spash and Hanley 1995). This thesis aligns with a concept central to Ecological 
Economics in that it incorporates social psychology theory to explore farmers’ behaviours. 
The findings confirmed that sometimes farmers do not make decisions based on a profit 
maximisation, and policy recommendations to induce pro-environmental behaviours were 
suggested based on incentives other than monetary incentives. 
 
Application of the results and recommended policies should proceed with caution. 
Psychology models are specifically designed to generalise behaviour and to predict 
aggregate outcomes, and policy changes will not affect farmers equally because farmers are 
influenced by various factors (Darnton et al. 2006). Though some constraints are prevailing 
in an application of psychology models to explain economic behaviours, an 
acknowledgement that behaviours are not solely governed by economic considerations (i.e. 
profit maximisation) could improve the effectiveness of agri-environmental policies to 
manage farm pollution in Thailand.  
 
As for a direction to develop PES programmes in Thailand, this thesis is useful, in that it 
pays particular attention to a supply side of the PES programme by focusing on small- to 
medium- scale farmers. The analysis centres on factors and conditions under which farmers 
are likely to adopt BMPs.  However, there is another aspect to be considered. Future work 
should look into the demand side of PES programmes. Key issues to be addressed are who 
the buyers are, and the degree to which buyers are willing and able to pay for services. For 
the first question, it is necessary to clarify if there is an existing private voluntary demand for 
the services, and how this demand be consolidated. Future work may also consider 
environmental regulations to create demand, and investigate the role of government to pool 
demand and, to some extent, to fund PES programmes.  
 
For the second question, future study can apply a TEV concept to assess the overall 
economic value of ecosystem services. Valuation techniques, such as stated preference 
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methods, could be applied to estimate WTP for non-traded environmental goods and 
services. Analysis may expand from the standard valuation model by examining WTP in a 
behavioural framework through the use of TPB. A few studies (for example: Spash et al. 
2009; Bernath and Roschewitz 2008; Luzar and Cosse 1998) showed that TPB is 
conceptually consistent with the process of contingent valuation. For example, the TPB 
could be used to investigate the motive behind payments by treating WTP as a behavioural 
intention, which could be predicted by attitudes toward payments, subjective norms with 
respect to payments and perceived behavioural control over payments.  
 
7.5 Limitations and Recommendations for Methodological 
Improvement 
 
7.5.1 Endogenous determinants in a psychology model 
TPB is an extension of a former TRA. To deal with behaviour over which people have 
incomplete volitional control, the TPB includes perceived behavioural control as another 
independent predictor of intentions (Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). The TPB assumes that 
behaviours are predicted by behavioural intentions, and these intentions are predicted by 
three cognitive predictors which are attitudes, subjective norms and perceived behavioural 
controls. The construct of the TPB postulates that these three cognitive predictors are 
conceptually independent (Montoya et al. 2000), and assumes that behavioural intentions are 
driven only by internal psychological constructs, while external variables are considered to 
influence intentions and behaviours through psychological predictors (Burton 2004; Conner 
et al. 2000; Ajzen and Fishbein 1980). 
 
With these underlying assumptions, the main limitation of the TPB model lies in its mediator 
and moderator effects19
                                                          
19  A moderator is a variable affecting the direction and/or strength of the relationship between an 
independent variable and a dependent variable. A mediator is a variable explaining the relationship 
between external physical event and internal psychological significance.  
 (Baron and Kenny 1986). Hence, it is unlikely to avoid the problem 
of endogeneity when conducting a statistical analysis. For example, Lam (1999) found that 
the three internal predictors may have mutual mediating effects to each other; Yzer et al. 




al. (2002) found that a moderating effect could influence a relationship between intentions 
and behaviours.  
 
7.5.2 Generalisation of the adoption model 
The question is how meaningful an adoption model will be if it is derived from one context 
and applied in a different one. A generalisation of the TPB results to other environments 
must be made with caution because the factors for intentions may be different. There are two 
issues that should be taken into account when making a generalisation. First, the Ping river 
basin is a notable source of water in northern Thailand, and thus farmers may be more 
inclined to support BMP programmes perceived to benefit them. Second, it should be noted 
that during their interviews, farmers were instructed to make decisions under the predefined 
condition termed as TACT. As such, there is a possibility that farmers’ decisions are 
bounded by this condition. A generalisation of the results is possible if the study is applied to 
closely related behaviours, or if there is a ‘fit’ in attributes of the samples and treatments 
between cases. For example, there is a wide range of attributes commonly shared between 
the samples. 
 
7.5.3 The incorporation of cost in the model 
The adoption model described in this thesis is a first step to understand attitude-behaviour 
relationships in BMP uptake. Though cost is one factor that influences adoption of new 
technologies, it is not incorporated in the adoption model for two main reasons. First, BMPs 
in this thesis are considered in the context of PES. The underlying principle of PES is that 
costs incurred by farmers are covered by transfer payments from beneficiaries. As such, 
costs are not involved in an economic decision. Second, the main aim of this thesis is to 
explain a change in behaviour and how this change can be affected.  In this sense, a 
psychology model is suitable to investigate economic behaviour.  
 
It has been recognised that costs in monetary form could not be incorporated into the 
psychological-based adoption model because the underlying principles of the psychology 
and economic theories are different (Pieters 1989). An alternative to investigate the effect of 
cost in behavioural change is to include a cost-evaluation statement in a questionnaire 
(Pieters 1989). For example, ‘I can easily afford to pay for any BMP measure’. This belief 
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statement reflects the costs incurred by farmers, and it indicates whether the farmers like or 
dislike the outcome as a consequence of behavioural change. This was done in this thesis. 
Further, a benefit-evaluation statement was also included in a questionnaire (Annex 5). In 
other words, this thesis offers an evaluation of subjective costs and benefits, rather than 
investigating the actual costs and benefits involved the BMP implementation. 
 
However, the incorporation of cost into the adoption model is an important step in the 
attempt to accurately predict adoption behaviours. Future study could look for another 
possible mechanism that would allow costs to be incorporated into the adoption model. To 
do this, it is necessary to apply a stated preference survey method, such as the contingent 
valuation, to capture farmers’ preferences toward costs. There is also an important 
assumption that farmers will adopt BMPs if they receive an amount of money in return. In 
other words, willingness to accept (WTA) is used to represent changes in the expenditure 
level of the farmers in response to changes in the level of ecosystem services provided. 
Applicability of the TPB in a contingent valuation could be done by replacing behavioural 
intentions with WTA (Pouta and Rekola 2001), and farmers may be further asked to bid on 
financial assistance. In this way, WTA will be predicted by attitudes, subjective norms, and 
perceived behavioural controls. This WTA will improve the understanding of the payment 
level that farmers are willing to adopt a certain BMP.  
 
7.5.4 The applicability of Q results 
Q-Methodology is a research method tailored for an in-depth investigation. Two main 
limitations in the use of Q-Methodology are: i) a generalisation of Q results is limited; and ii) 
an explanation that particular characteristics in one discourse will be consistently defining 
variables is unlikely20
 
. This is because the sample size is small, and it is not randomly 
selected. For the generalisation, one may increase the size of sample. But, this only increases 
costs for no purpose because a well-selected sample is adequate to define salient attitudes. 
For the explanation beyond current findings in the Q study, Danielson (2007) suggested 
three techniques to overcome this problem. 
                                                          
20  For example, though 8 out of 10 participants, who loaded on discourse A, were downstream 
farmers. It is not right to conclude that discourse A were represented by downstream farmers, as 




The first technique is a scale creation. To do this, one high-ranked statement and one low-
ranked statement are selected from each discourse. These statements will be randomly 
presented in the form of psychometric scales (i.e. 5-point likert scale) to former participants. 
The scores given by participants will be multiplied by the z-score of corresponding 
statements, and then summed up. These scores will be normalised by converting to T-scores. 
This technique allows an explanation based on the participants’ demographics. For example, 
Brown (2002) used this technique and was able to draw a general conclusion that perspective 
D is strongly represented among women21
 
.   
The second technique is a profile correlation. All distinguishing statements from the Q 
analysis will be presented in the form of likert scales to randomly selected participants. 
Then, a Spearman correlation is used to compute the correlation between each participant’s 
scores and the ranking of those statements in each discourse. The explanation of the 
discourse is based on the correlation-based scales. Danielson (2007) used this technique and 
found that; for example, household size and income were not related to the discourses, 
discourse H was likely to be participants with high levels of education22
 
. 
The third technique is a narrative evaluation. Statements that were highly loaded on each 
discourse will be summarised and written in a short description, and then presented to the 
former participants. Participants are asked a few questions on how much they agree with the 
narrative summarisation. An explanation is based on the final score that participants adhere 
to each discourse. Danielson (2007) used this technique and concluded that socio-
demographic variables were sporadically related to agreement with the discourse23
                                                          
21  A study of Americans’ views of the Clinton-Lewinsky affair. Discourse A was labelled as 
‘Kenneth Starr’, discourse B was ‘Moderates’, discourse C was ‘Clinton defenders’, and discourse 
D was ‘Opaque’. 
. Future 
study may consider applying these three techniques so as to enable researchers to match 
participants to each discourse. Hence, an explanation can be made based on a prevalence of 
statements among the participants and relationship to other variables. 
 
22  A study of public views toward wildfire management among Sydney residents. Four discourses 
were: F) Traditionalists; G) Responsible residents; H) Expert authorities; and I) Green democrats. 
 
23  A study of public views toward wildfire management in New Jersey. Five discourses were: A) 




7.6 Recommendations for Future Research: BMP Uptake within a 
Cost-Benefit Framework 
The results from the behavioural studies gave evidence about potential human behaviours 
and their responses to BMP adoption. To be more specifically, the results presented who the 
potential BMP adopters are and why they adopt BMPs. Perrot-Maître (2006) suggested that 
understanding farmer’ s choices and constraints offer a sustainable development rather than a 
short-term contract. However, only an understanding in the individual preference may not be 
enough for the effective policy. A technical aspect must be included when making policy for 
the management of water pollution. This aspect concerns with the understanding of how 
management practices affect ecosystem and the services provided. In other words, it is 
necessary to understand the effectiveness of BMPs in pollution control and how changes in 
policy affect the ecological production function of ecosystem. To do this, economists must 
work with ecologists and other natural scientists in order to integrate knowledge to do justice 
to the underlying bio-physical and socioeconomic complexities involved in the provision of 
ecosystem services (Figure 7-6) (Polasky 2008).  
 
Figure 7-6: Impact pathway of policy change 
Source: adapted from Defra (2007) 
 
According to OECD (2010), two major evaluations widely used in the policy development 
process are ex-ante and ex-post evaluations. For a development of new policy, an ex-ante 
evaluation can provide information on whether this policy is economically profitable. Ex-
ante assessments are based on a combination between economic and environmental models 
to evaluate economic responses to the proposed policy. However, ecosystem services have 
complex interactions within and between ecosystems from local to global scales. 
Furthermore, the characteristics and nature of nonpoint source pollution bring difficulties in 
the impact assessment. Firstly, accurate forecasts of environmental impacts may not be 
possible because farm discharge is stochastic and emissions cannot be directly measured. 
Secondly, the effectiveness of adopted practices is uncertain, especially in long term. Finally, 
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identifying sources of water pollution is difficult as polluters could be both point and 
nonpoint sources. Accordingly, current research in the domain of Ecological Economics 
either conducts a field experiment (for example: Poudel et al. 2010; Deasy et al. 2009; 
Vinten et al. 2006) or applies a simulation model (for example: Yang et al. 2009; Daily and 
Matson, 2008; Vinten et al. 2008; Volk et al. 2008) to capture these complexities (i.e. to 
understand the impacts of pollution loads from farms, the delivery of pollution loads to 
watercourses). The field study is superior in its capability to reflect natural climatic variation. 
However, a simulation model is more useful in assessing long-term watershed-level BMP 
effects because the field study can monitor only at a particular site and period of time (Veith 
2002). 
 
As an illustration, the behavioural studies in this thesis revealed that the most preferred BMP 
amongst farmers was the soil analysis, which focuses on the reduction of fertiliser 
application. Policymakers may want to understand how the adoption of this BMP could lead 
to changes in water quality. It is recommended that an experiment should be done at the 
fields or an adoption of simulation model, such as the Material Flow Analysis (MFA) 
(Brunner and Rechberger 2004) may be useful to assess ecosystem services in bio-physical 
terms by quantifying the impacts of reduction fertiliser application rates on water quality. 
MFA is a tool to investigate the flows and stocks of a material-based system defined in the 
space and time. It can present flows and stocks of the system in a more transparent way and 
assess the relevant flows and stocks in quantifiable terms (Baccini and Brunner 1991). For 
example, a previous study by Schaffner (2007) applied MFA to simulate nutrient loads in the 
Thachin river basin in central Thailand. The basic model approach from her study can be 
transferred to the Ping river basin provided the parametre sets are adjusted to match with the 
regional differences.  
 
Once the potential impacts of policy options on ecosystem services are identified, this needs 
to revert back to an economic valuation (Figure 7-6). Economic valuation refers to a process 
of monetisation of changes in environmental impacts as a result of a new policy (Pearce and 
Seccombe-Hett 2000). The economic and water quality impacts of agricultural BMPs at 
watershed scale in Thailand are poorly understood. To assess the economic and water quality 
impacts, an integrated framework is required. Consider Figure 7-6, an introduction of 
environmental policy induces changes in the reduction of pollution emission and improved 
water quality, and this quality improvement affects human welfare. This suggests that a 
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water quality modelling, designed for tracing pollutants loaded into river, can serve as the 
basis for an economic analysis, such as CBA. In other words, results from the model can 
provide essential information to evaluate the potential of achieving water quality 
improvement through reducing farm pollution.  
 
Water quality provides two broad classes of economic benefits which are withdrawal and in-
stream benefits (Bingham et al. 2000). Withdrawal benefits include abstraction benefits for 
municipal water supply and domestic use, agricultural irrigation and livestock watering, and 
industry process. In-stream benefits include use and non-use benefits. In-stream use benefits 
are defined as benefits associated with direct human interaction with water in the river, such 
as swimming and boatable benefits; and aesthetic value of water quality, such as stream side 
property owners. In-stream non-use benefits are values accruing to individuals regardless of 
whether or not they have direct interaction with water. These are stewardship value, altruistic 
value, bequest value, and existence value24
 
.  
To date, numerous economic valuation methods have been used to assign quantitative 
monetary values to environmental goods and services. Most of the literature has analysed 
human welfare changes within the framework of TEV (Hussain et al. 2010; Richardson and 
Loomis 2009; Moran and Dann 2008; Menegaki et al. 2007). Valuation techniques which are 
direct or stated preference, and indirect or revealed preference are applied to measure 
welfare changes in terms of WTP or WTA due to policy intervention (Pearce et al. 2006). 
For example, stated preference methods involve questioning survey respondents to determine 
their consumer surplus, whereas revealed preference methods use data from consumer 
market behaviour to estimate economic values. Alternatively, when limited time or funding 
precludes costly data collection and the development of new consumer surplus estimates, the 
method of benefit transfer (BT) can be used to tailor pre-existing consumer surplus estimates 
to fit new policy situations (Pearce et al. 2006; Boyle and Bergstrom 1992; Desvousges et al. 
1992).  
 
                                                          
24 A stewardship value is a belief that humans are responsible for maintaining the level of water 
quality though there is no withdrawal or in-stream use benefit. Altruistic value is the enjoyment 
people gain from knowing that the others enjoy use values. Bequest value is a benefit from ensuring 
that environmental goods are preserved for the future. Existence value represents enjoyment people 
perceive from knowing that some level of environmental quality exists.  
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With BT application, benefit estimates from existing direct or indirect valuation case studies, 
or study sites, are spatially and temporally transferred to a new case study, or policy site. 
There are four types of BT approaches, which are benefit estimate transfer (Boyle and 
Bergstrom 1992), benefit function transfer (Kirchhoff et al. 1997), meta-analysis (Bergstrom 
and Taylor 2006; Smith and Pattanayak 2002), and preference calibration (Pattanayak et al. 
2007). Benefit estimate transfer is the simplest method, where economic value on a per-unit 
basis is taken from study site(s) to a policy site. The function transfer relates an individual’s 
willingness to pay to a set of individual and site characteristics. Characteristics from the 
policy site are substituted into the model from the study site to tailor benefit estimates for the 
policy site. In the meta-analysis, WTP benefit estimates from numerous similar study site(s) 
serve as the dependent variable in regression analysis, and characteristics of the study site(s), 
such as water quality serve as the independent variables. BT in the context of preference 
calibration simply means using the estimates from multiple methods to establish numerical 
values for parameters that shape a specified preference function (i.e. an indirect utility 
function) for the policy site. Preference calibration was developed to avoid double counting 
of benefits by conducting transfer in a manner explicitly consistent with utility theory (Smith 
et al. 2002). 
 
In terms of transferability of BT values there is a particular concern about transfer of values 
from developed countries to developing countries. It is preferable to transfer benefits from a 
study site located close to a policy site as the socio-economic characteristics and cultural 
factors between two sites could be comparable (Ready and Navrud 2006; Krupnick 1993). 
However, the valuation of water quality improvement has been largely conducted in 
developed countries. Therefore, it is inevitable that BT involves transfer of a benefit estimate 
from high-income countries to low-income countries. Given that users between two sites 
have identical underlying preferences towards ecological services and WTP represents 
willingness to pay for an improvement of environmental goods and services in country (i) 
and time (t), Pattanayak et al. (2002) suggested the use of a conversion index to reflect the 
relevant change in value across time and space. Further, empirical studies also reveal the 
validity of international BT, provided the adjusted value transfer is used (Ready and Navrud 
2006; Brouwer 2000; Bergstrom and De Civita 1999; Kirchhoff et al. 1997; Chestnut et al. 




Another caveat to BT relates to the superiority of benefit function transfer relative to unit 
transfer. A number of studies have performed statistical convergent validity tests and value 
surface tests on BT values derived from both unit and function transfer approaches (Muthke 
and Holm-Mueller 2004; Barton 2002; Loomis et al. 1995). A major implication of these 
tests is that the degree of accuracy of BT value depends on how the results will be used 
(Bergstrom and De Civita 1999). The minimum degree of accuracy necessary is related to 
policy context such as policy goal and objective (Ready et al. 2004), and the cost of making 
a wrong decision based on the results of the BT (Filion et al. 2002) (Figure 7-7). In other 
words, when applying a BT study a trade-off must be made amongst the increased cost and 
delay associated with the new study, the reliability of results from a primary study (i.e. 
Contingent Valuation Method), and the expected loss related to making an incorrect 
decision. For example, Figure 7-7 shows that using BT to demonstrate how valuation can be 
used in an environmental assessment would require a middle level of accuracy, whereas a 
valuation of extremely scarce environmental attributes such as endangered species requires a 
primary study as the cost of making wrong decision may be high. 
 
 
Figure 7-7: Continuum of accuracy for BT analysis 
Source: Filion et al. (2002)  
 
To define prospective beneficiaries from policy changes, the conceptual framework of 
ecosystem services proposed by Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005) (Figure 7-8) 
offers a link to taking an economic valuation. For example, one of the most important 
services of an agricultural field is the natural purification of water (Swinton et al. 2007). An 
improper use of agricultural land threatens the existence of regulating and supporting 
ecosystem services (i.e. excessive uses of fertiliser in farm may affect the bioremediation of 
waste through dilution and oxidation process, and impair water quality) (Ruhl 2008). The 
adoption of BMP, such as reduction in fertiliser uses, results in improved water quality. A 
clear and well-defined link between ecosystem services and human-wellbeing can help avoid 
the problem of double counting of benefits because only the final services (i.e. benefits to 





Figure 7-8: From ecosystem processes and final services to economic goods 
Source: adapted from Bateman et al. (2010)  
 
On a related issue, Kemkes et al. (2010) argue that an understanding of the spatial 
distribution of ecosystem services is the key to identify potential beneficiaries. Spatial 
distribution defines the directional flow of the service and its geographical extent to which 
benefits accrue. In terms of water quality supply, the spatial distribution is known to be a 
benefit accruing downstream at a regional watershed scale (Costanza 2008). The 
quantification of impacts based on the conceptual framework of ecosystem services and 
spatial scale allows to systematically defining the groups of beneficiary being affected by 
changes in policies (and ecosystem services as a consequence). 
 
Bateman et al. (2006) differentiated two broad types of potential beneficiary: users and non-
users. Users will hold use and option-use values and may hold non-use values, while non-
users may hold option and non-use values. One of the contested issues is that users and non-
users may hold different preferences towards a site; therefore, they may have a different 
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WTP value. For example, users may hold higher WTP values than non-users regarding 
experiences with the site. On the other hand, there may be a cultural identity attached to the 
site and non-users express their higher non-use values (Hanley et al. 2003). Further 
discussion focuses on the issues such as: How to divide between users and non-users? and 
How many of them will benefit? Though it is complex to quantify the number of non-users 
benefiting from a policy change, it is necessary to estimate aggregate benefits based on a 
per-person benefit from both user types (Hanley et al. 2003). Furthermore, aggregate benefits 
should be considered by taking into account the conceptual framework of ecosystem services 
and a spatial distribution of ecosystem services. This makes it easier to consider the 
distributional impacts of the policy, and the benefit distribution could further suggest who 
should pay for the project and how much (Jenkins 1999). 
  
The economic efficiency of any new policy must be evaluated based on both positive and 
negative aspects. In the context of water quality, cost estimates for achieving a given 
reduction in pollutant inputs or of achieving target pollutant concentration in receiving 
waters, must be considered. In general, cost assessment is straightforward and can be 
determined by placing economic values on the amount of resources required to plan, 
implement, and complete a programme. Pearce et al. (2006) suggested that costs simply 
mean environmental losses or damages done by a project, and the sum of compliance and 
regulatory costs. Provided that all relevant economic values are taken into account, these 
values should be included in a CBA. To conduct a CBA, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB 1999) suggested that the with project situation (i.e. with the BMP adoption) should be 
compared with the without project situation (i.e. current farming practices).  
 
To make a comparison, CBA is a welfare-theoretical method to evaluate net social benefits 
of project, programme, or policy. The advantages of CBA are that it defines gainers and 
losers in spatial and temporal dimensions, and can supplement scientific and technical 
information with economic information that may help decision makers (Pearce et al. 2006). 
CBA has been used to inform policy decision-making; for example, the net positive benefit 
suggests that a project is viable and worthwhile. In the light of CBA, it is also important to 
conduct a sensitivity analysis (SA). SA indicates how the CBA outcome of a project reacts to 
changes in crucial input variables. The crudest approach is to increase or decrease gross costs 
and benefits (Vaughan et al. 2000). A particular attention is to the investigation of cost 
variation as past experience suggested that cost can be seriously understated (Pearce et al. 
195 
 
2006). Besides the uncertainties in net benefits, Just et al. (2004) argued that a choice of 
discount rate may contribute to a substantial difference in CBA outcome, and SA should 
examine the net benefits under the range of plausible discount rates rather than relying on a 
single rate.  
 
CBA can benefit from the input of a water quality model. Eisen-Hecht and Kramer (2002) 
agree that a simulation model allows for a more reliable prediction whether the proposed 
management activity would be effective in achieving its goal. A model also gives flexibility 
to compare costs and benefits for different management scenarios. In additional, the 
integration of economic valuation and ecosystem services could contribute to policy 
decisions, for at least in five domains (Fisher et al. 2008). Firstly, results have been passed to 
relevant agencies.  Secondly, results have been presented to intermediaries who are able to 
facilitate a PES programme. Thirdly, CBA is the first step to gain interests from 
policymakers. Fourthly, results have been used for a policy debate. Finally, CBA is a major 
stimulus for the launch of many conservation programmes and this is the greatest influence 
on the policy process.   
 
Agricultural land has long been perceived to supply ecosystem services, such as water 
purification (Ruhl 2008) (see for example: the Catskill watershed case in USA and the Vittel 
company in France (Rollett et al. 2008)). Farmers’ management decisions both affect and are 
affected by the biophysical and economic settings in which they operate, while land-use 
management influences supply of ecosystem services (Foley et al. 2005). In a development 
of PES programme, it is necessary to explicitly define how land-use management could 
contribute to ecosystem service provision. As long as changed land management practice 
continues to be the mechanism on which transfer payments are based, the knowledge of how 
new management practices affect environmental outcomes is needed to confirm that the 
potential positive impacts from adoption could occur.  
 
Under the concept of Ecological Economics, natural and social capitals become the limiting 
factors in economy growth (Costanza 2009a; Costanza 2009b). Thus, ecological processes 
should be taken into account before conducting a valuation exercise. This is a first step to 
address ecological sustainability in a rigorous way in environmental policy assessments. An 
integration of ecology and economics in a valuation of ecosystem services improves 
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understanding in an additionality of new farming practices. This additionality is used as an 
indicator offering a link to the estimate of economic benefits, thereby improving decision 
making by clarly illustrating both bio-physical and economic consequences of policy options 
(Iovanna and Newbold 2007). It is also recommended that policy should be simple enough to 
be implemented yet sophisticated enough to do justice to the underlying bio-physical and 
economics complexities involved (Polasky 2008). 
 
To sunmmarise, the ultimate aim of this study was to make policy recommendations in the 
development of PES programme in Thailand. PES is a new paradigm of conditional 
conservation potentially addressing the management of diffuse water pollution from 
agriculture. In this study, a suit of BMPs was proposed as tradable services in a PES 
programme, and psychological principles were used to examine factors and beliefs 
underlying intentions to adopt BMPs. From a policy perspective, the study to identify key 
cognitive factors influencing adoptions is important as long as diffuse water pollution is one 
of primary environmental concerns.  
 
However, there are at least two main limitations that need to be acknowledged regarding the 
present study. The first limitation concerns the employed methodologies, such as the 
generalisation of the adoption model and the applicability of the results. The second 
limitation is a lack of technical aspects of BMPs in particular on the role of bio-physical 
model in an estimation of BMP effectiveness. These limitations were crucially addressed and 
recommendations for future research were also discussed. It appears clearly from the study 
that BMP is a potential tool for water conservation in Thailand. Lessons learned from this 
study suggested that future research should focus on a combination of behavioural study, 
economic valuation, and integrated model in order to provide insights into sustainable and 
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Annex 1: Current Payment for Watershed Services Programmes 
Project area Country Market driver Commodity Payment mechanism References 
Bermajo river basin Argentina and 
Bolivia 
G & Mul Org Designed contract Pooled- transaction/ OTC- 
user fee 
Organization of American States  (2005) 
Hunter river Australia G Credit scheme/ 
emission trade 
G intermediary-based/ 
clearing house/ auction 
Environmental Protection Authority 
(2003)  
Liverpool Plains Australia G & NGOs Credit scheme Auction Liverpool Plains Land Management 
Committee and WWF (2005) 
Bubble licensing Australia G Emission trade G intermediary-based Kraemer et al. (2003) 
Macquarie river Australia G  & C Credit scheme G intermediary-based/ pooled-
transaction 
Perrot-Maître and Davis (2001) 
NSW/ dry land salinity Australia G Emission trade Auction Landell-Mills and Porras (2002); Perrot-
Maître and Davis (2001) 
Piracicaba river Brazil G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based UN-HABITAT (2006) 
State of Parana Brazil G Right re-allocation Redistribution mechanism Mayrand and Paquin (2004); Perrot-
Maître and Davis (2001); Monzoni 
(2001)  
Ribeira do Iguape Brazil G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based Monzoni (2001) 
Minas Gerais Brazil G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based Mayrand and Paquin (2004); Monzoni 
(2001) 
Paraiba do Sul river Brazil G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based Diz and Soeftestad (2004)  
RSP Canada C & G Designed contract G intermediary-based United Nations (2005)  
The Greencover Canada G Designed contract/ 
scientific proof 
G intermediary-based Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada 
(2007) 
Beijing, Hebei, Shanxi China G Right re-allocation Internal trading MWR (2003) 




Jinhua river China G Right re-allocation Direct negotiation/ G 
intermediary-based 
Liu (2005) 
Qujiang China G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based Bautista (2003) 
Wuhua China G Land tenure 
transfer 
G intermediary-based Deyi (1996) 
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Project area Country Market driver Commodity Payment mechanism References 
Valle del Cauca Columbia C & G Right re-allocation C intermediary-based/pooled-
transaction/ OTC-user fee 
Perrot-Maître and Davis (2001); 
Echavarria (2000);  Echavarria and 
Lochman (1998)  
RACs Columbia G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based Rodriguez Becerra and Ponce de Leon 
(1999) 
Energia Global Costa Rica G  Designed contract G & NGOs intermediary-
based/ pooled-transaction/ 
OTC-user fee 
Redondo-Brenes and Welsh (2006); 
Russo and Candela (2006) 
Platanar Costa Rica P Designed contract G & NGOs intermediary-
based/ pooled-transaction/ 
OTC-user fee 
Redondo-Brenes and Welsh (2006); 
Russo and Candela (2006) 
Monteverda Costa Rica G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based/ pooled-
transaction 
Hope et al. (2007); Russo and Candela 
(2006); Perrot-Maître and Davis (2001) 
Heredia Costa Rica G Right re-allocation Trust fund intermediary-based Kosoy et al. (2007); Redondo-Brenes 
and Welsh (2006) 
Del Oro Costa Rica P Eco-labelling Direct negotiation Porras et al. (2006) 
FONAFIFO Costa Rica G & NGOs & P Right re-
allocation/ Eco-
labelling 
G & NGOs  intermediary-
based/ OTC-user fee 
Redondo-Brenes and Welsh (2006); 
Russo and Candela (2006); Mayrand and 
Paquin (2004) 
Pimampiro Ecuador C & NGOs Right re-allocation NGOs intermediary-based Echavarria et al. (2003) 
Cuenca city Ecuador G Right re-allocation G & C intermediary-based/ 
OTC-user fee 
Echavarria et al. (2003) 
Yanuncay Ecuador C Designed contract Direct negotiation/ G 
intermediary-based 
Echavarria et al. (2003) 
Quito Ecuador G Designed contract/ 
right re-allocation 
Trust fund intermediary-
based/ pooled transaction/ 
OTC-user fee 
Echavarria (2002) 
AEMs Estonia G Designed contract G intermediary-based United Nations (2005) 
AEMs EU G Designed contract G intermediary-based United Nations (2005) 
Nestle water France P Designed contract Direct negotiation Déprés and Grolleau (2005) 




Project area Country Market driver Commodity Payment mechanism References 
Mangfall valley Germany P Designed contract Direct negotiation Déprés and Grolleau (2005) 
Sierra de las Minas Guatemala G Designed contract Pooled-transaction Méndez et al. (2004) 
El Escondido Honduras G Extra payment G intermediary-based Mayrand and Paquin (2004) 
Jesus de Otoro Honduras C & NGOs Designed contract/ 
right re-allocation 
NGOs  intermediary-based Kosoy et al. (2007); Kosoy et al. (2005)  
Himachal Pradesh India G Designed contract G intermediary-based/ internal 
trading 
Sengupta et al. (2003) 
Bhoj  India G Designed contract/ 
eco-labelling 
G intermediary-based Winrock International India (2005) 
Sukhomajari India G Water right trade G intermediary-based/ pooled-
transaction/OTC-user fee 
Sengupta et al. (2003) 
Hanyana India C Water right trade Direct negotiation Sengupta et al. (2003) 
Maharashtra India C Water right trade C intermediary-based Apte (2001) 
Madhya Pradesh India G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based Winrock International India (2005) 
Segara river Indonesia G Right re-allocation Direct negotiation/ G 
intermediary-based 
Munawir et al.(2003) 
Brantas river Indonesia G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based Munawir and Vermeulen (2007) 
Cidanau river Indonesia G Designed contract G intermediary-based Munawir et al.(2003) 
REPS Ireland G Designed contract G intermediary-based United Nations (2005) 
Coatepec Mexico G Extra payment G intermediary-based Mayrand and Paquin (2004) 
CONAFOR Mexico G Designed contract Trust fund intermediary-based Muñoz-Piña et al. (2005) 




G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based Arocena-Francisco and Salas (2004) 
Makiling forest reserve The 
Philippines 
G Right re-allocation Trust fund intermediary-
based/ OTC-user fee 
Perrot-Maître and Davis (2001) 
WfW RSA G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based King et al. (2003) 




Project area Country Market driver Commodity Payment mechanism References 
SFRA RSA G Emission trade OTC-user fee DWAF (2003a) 
Industry Charge RSA G Right re-allocation G intermediary-based DWAF (2003c) 
Phalaborwa barrage RSA G & NGOs Designed contract Pooled transaction CSIR and  IIED (2005) 
Intensive farming Switzerland G Designed contract G intermediary-based United Nations (2005) 
Portland, Oregon USA G Designed contract/ 
land tenure 
transfer 
G intermediary-based/ OTC 
user fee 
Johnson et al. (2002) 
Impaired water body USA G Emission trade G intermediary-based Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
(2002)  
New York USA G Designed contract/ 
land tenure 
transfer 
Trust fund  & NGOs 
intermediary-based 
Perrot-Maître and Davis (2001) 
CRP USA G Designed contract G intermediary-based Perrot-Maître and Davis (2001) 
Lower Boise river USA G Credit scheme Clearing house Perrot-Maître and Davis (2001) 




Ross & Associates Environmental 
Consulting (2000) 
Salmon-safe USA P Eco-labelling Retail based Smith et al. (2006) 
Ecolotree USA P Scientific proof OTC-user fee Ecolotree (2004)  
Tar-Pamilco basin USA G Emission trade Clearing house Environomics (1999)   
Great Miami river USA G Designed contract/ 
credit scheme 
G intermediary-based Miami Conservancy District (2005) 
National programme Vietnam  G Designed contract/ 
land tenure 
transfer 
G intermediary-based Wunder et al. (2005);  Sikor (2001)  
Notes:  
1) G = Government agency; P = Private agency; C = Community; Mul Org = Multilateral organisation ; NGOs = Non-government organisations 
2) OTC = Over the counter trade 
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Annex 2:  Cost worksheet 
 
T1 Ditch management (Cost per Rai)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 Earthwork of 1 ditch per rai (2.0T, 0.5B x 1.0) 50 cu.m.              -           45.00         2,250.00  
1.1 Planning of Irrigation Routes 10%               225.00  
1.2 Removing unwanted materials and trees from ditch lines 30%               675.00  
1.3 Excavation 60%            1,350.00  
       
2 Annual maintenance: Slope adjustment 60 sq.m.              -            5.00            300.00  
2.1 Removing unwanted plant 50%               150.00  
2.2 Ditch Maintenance 50%               150.00  
              
       
T2 Herbicide Application (Cost per Rai)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 Normal shadow area of citrus 3m x 3m 587.8 sq.m.              -            1.00            587.76  
1.1 Removing unwanted plants 100%               587.76  
       
2 Annual soil maintenance 587.8 sq.m.              -            0.50            293.88  
2.1 Removing new unwanted plants 100%               293.88  
              
       
T3 Pesticide application (Cost per Rai)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 Standard Equipment 0.1 Man/Rai              -           1,360.00  
1.1 Spraying Equipment 1.0 set 
       
550.00              -               550.00  
1.2 Gloves 1.0 set 30.00              -                30.00  
1.3 Glasses 1.0 set 
       
180.00              -               180.00  
1.4 Spraying suit 1.0 set 
       
450.00              -               450.00  
1.5 Helmet 1.0 set 
       
150.00              -               150.00  
       
2 Annual maintenance  times    
2.1 Sprayer equipment calibration     
 time 
consuming  
2.2 Record keeping     
 time 
consuming  
              
       
T4 Nutrient management (Cost per Rai)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 Soil analysis 0.1 Man/Rai          3,300.00  
1.1 Organic matter test 1.0 sample 
    
1,000.00           1,000.00  
1.2 Organic fertiliser 920.0 kg 
          
2.50           2,300.00  
       
2 Annual maintenance 1 times          1,650.00  
2.1 Organic matter test 1.0 sample 
       
150.00              150.00  
2.2 Organic fertiliser 600.0 kg 
          
2.50           1,500.00  





T5 Vegetative Cover (Cost per Rai)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 First-time grass growing 800.0 sq.m. 
          
0.50  
        
1.00         1,200.00  
1.1 Seeding/Planting 50%               600.00  
1.2 Plowing (tillage) 50%               600.00  
       
2 Annual maintenance: Grass field maintenance 1600.0 sq.m. 
             
-    
        
0.25            400.00  
2.1 Maintaining vegetative field 80%               320.00  
2.2 Replanting some destroyed area 20%                80.00  
              
       
T6 Mulching (Cost per Rai)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 First-time mulching (Buy-in some straw etc.) 587.8 sq.m. 
          
0.50  
        
1.00            881.63  
1.1 Procuring straw/dried plants 50%               440.82  
1.2 Improving soil surface 25%               220.41  
1.3 Paving 25%               220.41  
       
2 Annual maintenance: Field maintenance 293.9 sq.m. 
             
-    
        
1.00            293.88  
2.1 Remulching  (if necessary) 50%               146.94  
2.2 Paving 50%               146.94  
       
T7 Vegetative Buffer Strip (Cost in Lumpsum) for distance 15 m    
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 First-time planting (Buffer width 6m) 90.0 sq.m. 
          
2.50  
       
10.00         1,125.00  
 - including clearing, tilage, and planting      
1.1 Preparing soil surface 30%               337.50  
1.2 Procuring seeds/plants 5%                56.25  
1.3 Planting 65%               731.25  
       
2 Field maintenance 90.0 sq.m. 
             
-    
        
1.00              90.00  
2.1 Vetiver trimming 70%                63.00  
2.2 Replanting some destroyed area 30%                27.00  
              
       
T8 Grassed Waterway (Cost per Rai)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 Earthwork of 1 ditch per rai  (2.0T, 0.5B x 0.5)            1,365.00  
1.1 Preparing waterway routes 25%               341.25  
1.2 Excavation 50%               682.50  
1.3 Seeding/Planting 25%               341.25  
       
2 Annual maintenance 80 sq.m. 
             
-    
        
1.50            120.00  
2.1 Maintaining grass 40%                48.00  
2.2 Maintaining ditch 60%                72.00  
              




T9 On-site retention pond (Cost in Lumpsum) for citrus area 1 rai    
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 
First-time excavation (slope 1:1, depth 3 
m.) 12.65 m         15,155.54  
1.1 Preparing pond area 25%            4,211.85  
1.2 Excavation 50%            8,423.69  
1.3 Vetiver planting 25%            2,520.00  
       
2 Annual field maintenance 306.3 cu.m.              -            2.50            765.79  
2.1 Vetiver trimming 70%                63.00  
2.2 Replanting some destroyed area 30%                27.00  
              
       
T10 Terracing (Typical Soil Terracing for Orchard Bench Terrace)    
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
       
1 Earthwork for slope  1: 25           1,846.53  
1.1 Design&Preparing slope area 15%               276.98  
1.2 Excavation + Backfill 50%               923.27  
1.3 
Planting of vegetative cover in between citrus 
lines 35%               646.29  
       
2 Annual maintenance               935.00  
2.1 Maintaining soil surface for slope&terrace area 65%               260.00  
2.2 Maintaining planted area 35%               675.00  
              
       
T11 Permanent mix load and wash-down site      
 
Option I (farm size < 10 rais)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 Standard Building size 2.5m x 2.5m      
1.1 Excavation+Backfill 3.8 cu.m.              -    55.00          206.25  
1.2 RC. Slab 1.9 cu.m.  750.00  350.00          2,062.50  
1.3 Block wall 24.0 sq.m. 140.00  75.00          5,160.00  
1.4 Roofing 10.8 sq.m. 180.00   150.00          3,564.00  
1.5 Accessories (door, window, etc.) 1.0 lumpsum 2,500.00  500.00          3,000.00  
1.6 Electrical and Mechanical works 1.0 lumpsum 5000.00 2500.00         7,500.00  
1.7 Chemical Storage Tank 1.0 lumpsum 7500.00 1500.00         9,000.00  
1.8 Water Pump 1.0 lumpsum 3500.00 500.00         4,000.00  
1.9 Miscellaneous 10% 1.0 lumpsum              -                -            3,449.28  
 Sub-Total     19,570.00     5,630.00        37,942.03  
       
2 Standard deck 5m x 5m W/ deck 5m x 5m      
 Excavation+Backfill 12.5 cu.m.              -           55.00             687.50  
 RC. Slab 7.5 cu.m.        750.00       350.00          8,250.00  
 Sub-Total          750.00       405.00          8,937.50  
2.1 Design&Preparing site 5%               446.88  
2.2 Building + Pre-Load Area 50%            4,468.75  
2.3 Equipment 20%            1,787.50  
2.4 Labour 20%            1,787.50  
2.5 Construction tools 5%               446.88  
3 Yearly maintenance 1 times    
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 Miscellaneous (5% of building cost) 1.0 lumpsum           2,343.98  
3.1 Maintaining site condition 100%            2,343.98  
              
       
Option II (farm size 10.01 - 50 rais)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 Standard Building size 4m x 4m      
1.1 Excavation+Backfill 9.6 cu.m.              -           55.00             528.00  
1.2 RC. Slab 4.8 cu.m.        750.00       350.00          5,280.00  
1.3 Block wall 38.4 sq.m.        140.00         75.00          8,256.00  
1.4 Roofing 19.2 sq.m.        180.00       150.00          6,336.00  
1.5 Accessories (door, window, etc.) 1.0 lumpsum     5,000.00       500.00          5,500.00  
1.6 Electrical and Mechanical works 1.0 lumpsum 7500.00 2500.00       10,000.00  
1.7 Chemical Storage Tank 1.0 lumpsum 7500.00 1500.00         9,000.00  
1.8 Water Pump 1.0 lumpsum 3500.00 500.00         4,000.00  
1.9 Miscellaneous 10% 1.0 lumpsum              -                -            4,890.00  
 Sub-Total     24,570.00     5,630.00        53,790.00  
       
2 Standard deck 5m x 5m W/ deck 5m x 5m      
 Excavation+Backfill 12.5 cu.m.              -           55.00             687.50  
 RC. Slab 7.5 cu.m.        750.00       350.00          8,250.00  
 Sub-Total          750.00       405.00          8,937.50  
2.1 Design&Preparing site 5%               446.88  
2.2 Building + Pre-Load Area 50%            4,468.75  
2.3 Equipment 20%            1,787.50  
2.4 Labour 20%            1,787.50  
2.5 Construction tools 5%               446.88  
       
3 Yearly maintenance 1 times    
 Miscellaneous (5% of building cost) 1.0 lumpsum           3,136.38  
3.1 Maintaining site condition 100%            3,136.38  
              
       
Option III (farm size > 50 rais)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 Standard Building size 6.5m x 6.5m      
1.1 Excavation+Backfill 25.0 cu.m.              -           55.00          1,375.00  
1.2 RC. Slab 15.0 cu.m.        750.00       350.00        16,500.00  
1.3 Block wall 48.0 sq.m.        140.00         75.00        10,320.00  
1.4 Roofing 30.0 sq.m.        180.00       150.00          9,900.00  
1.5 Accessories (door, window, etc.) 1.0 lumpsum   10,000.00       500.00        10,500.00  
1.6 Electrical and Mechanical works 1.0 lumpsum 12500.00 2500.00       15,000.00  
1.7 Chemical Storage Tank 1.0 lumpsum 10000.00 1500.00       11,500.00  
1.8 Water Pump 1.0 lumpsum 6000.00 500.00         6,500.00  
1.8 Miscellaneous 10% 1.0 lumpsum              -                -            8,159.50  
 Sub-Total     39,570.00     5,630.00        89,754.50  
       
2 Standard deck 5m x 5m W/ deck 5m x 5m      
 Excavation+Backfill 12.5 cu.m.              -           55.00             687.50  
 RC. Slab 7.5 cu.m.        750.00       350.00          8,250.00  
 Sub-Total          750.00       405.00          8,937.50  
2.1 Design&Preparing site 5%               446.88  
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2.2 Building + Pre-Load Area 50%            4,468.75  
2.3 Equipment 20%            1,787.50  
2.4 Labour 20%            1,787.50  
2.5 Construction tools 5%               446.88  
       
3 Yearly maintenance 1 times    
 Miscellaneous (5% of building cost) 1.0 lumpsum           4,934.60  
3.1 Maintaining site condition 100%            4,934.60  
              
       
T12 Riparian Setback (for an area of 1,296 m2)      
No. Description Q'ty Unit Material Labour Total 
1 First-time planting (Buffer width 36m) 1296.0 sq.m.           0.50          3.50         5,184.00  
 - including clearing, tilage, and planting      
1.1 Preparing riparian area 25%            1,296.00  
1.2 Planting/Seeding 75%            3,888.00  
       
2 Annual maintenance 1296.0 sq.m.              -            0.50            648.00  
2.1 Maintaining riparian plant 70%               453.60  
2.2 Replanting some destroyed area 30%               194.40  
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Annex 3: Cost estimate of a mix-load and wash-down site 
 
Assumptions & Calculations: 
1. The permanent station comprises of  
Installation costs 
a. Wash-down and mixing –loading area, and  
b. Pesticide storage area 
The literatures show that the size of functional areas of an operation is dependent on the 
amount of pesticide stored at the facility and the number of employees (Kammel and O’Neil 
1990). Thus, the wash-down and mix-load area will be treated as fixed installation cost, 
while the storage area will be treated as variable installation cost. The total cost has a 
characteristic of mixed-cost with a step-function relationship with farm size.  
Further, the maintenance cost and opportunity cost will vary depending on the total mixed-
cost  
2. For the fixed installation cost it is assumed that the effective functional area of wash-down 
and mixing-loading area is 5m x 5m (or 25 m2) for every farm size. The total fixed 
installation cost is 1,787.50/ rai/ year 
3. For the variable installation cost, based on the observation of chemical purchasing behaviour 
of farmers the analysis will divide farm size into three categories. These are 
a. Farm size < 10 rais 
b. 10.01 – 50 rais, and  
c. Farm size > 50 rais 
4. It is assumed that the chemical procurement is done twice a year. 
5. A basic 2-storey shelf with an area of 1m2 can store pesticide package sized 2m2. 
6. A work by Dean (2004) states that at least 10% more space than that needed for the largest 
amount of pesticide even expected to be stored is what farmer must have. The total amount of 
pesticide to be stored is calculated based on the pesticide application surveyed by Uchiyama 
et al. (2007).  
7. The storage was calculated based on engineer estimation  
Farm size (rai) Storage area required (m2) 
< 10 rais 2.5m x 2.5m = 6.25 m2 
10.01 – 50 rais 4m x 4m = 16m2 
> 50 rais 6.5m x 6.5m = 42.25m2 
8. The total variable costs is thus, 
Farm size (rai) Total variable cost (THB)/ rai/ year 
< 10 rais 7,588.41 
10.01 – 50 rais 10,758.00 































1. The maintenance cost is 5% of total installation costs. Thus,  
Maintenance costs 
Farm size (rai) Total maintenance cost (THB)/ rai/ year 
< 10 rais 468.80 
10.01 – 50 rais 627.72 
> 50 rais 5,654.26 
 

























1. The opportunity cost is as follows:  
Opportunity costs 
Farm size (rai) Land opportunity cost (THB)/ rai/ year 
< 10 rais 5,121.84a 
10.01 – 50 rais 7,682.76b 
> 50 rais 12,804.60c 
Notes: a) four trees removed; b) six trees removed; c) ten trees removed 
 
2. A step function of total opportunity cost and farm size is plotted to find a representative 
equation  
   
 
3. The total cost equation shows that the average total opportunity costs is 3,841.40THB/ rai/ 







Annex 4: Questions for elicitation study 
Guide for Interviewer 
Good morning. We are from … and we conduct a study of citrus growers in the Ping river basin. We 
are interested in the reasons why growers do or do not adopt BMPs in their farms. Please tell us what 
you are really thinking. There is no right or wrong answer. 
The scenarios describing 1) benefits from watershed services, 2) effects of farm nonpoint source 
pollution, and 3) BMPs will be given to participants, and then questions will be asked.  
 Participants will be notified that  
- BMPs are voluntary measure which is likely to be promoted by the state government in the 
near future. 
- There is no ideal management practices system for controlling a particular pollutant in all 
situations. The system should be designed based on the type of pollutant, the source of the pollutant, 
the cause of pollutant, the agricultural climatic and environmental conditions, and the willingness and 





Age: ………. years  





1 Given three scenarios, will you adopt BMPs? (yes/no) 
2 On the scale 1 to 7, how difficult is it for you to make a decision? (1 = not at all difficult, 7 = 




3 What do you believe are the advantages of BMPs adoption? 
4 What do you believe are the disadvantages of BMPs adoption? 
5 Is there anything else you associate with your own views about BMPs adoption? 
 
D: Subjective norms 
 
6 Are they any individual or groups who would support or facilitate if you are going to adopt 
BMPs? 
7 Are they any individual or groups who would resist or retard if you are going to adopt BMPs? 
8 Is there anything else you associate with other people’s views about BMPs adoption? 
 
E: Perceived behavioural control 
 
9 What factors or circumstances enable you to adopt BMPs? 
10 What factors or circumstances make it difficult or impossible for you to adopt BMPs? 
11 Are there any other issues that come to mind when you think about BMPs adoption? 
 
F: Current situation 
 
12 At present, is there any conservation practice done in you fields, and if ‘yes’ what? 
13 In your opinion, which practices are likely to be done (by yourself) in your farm, and which 








































Annex 6: Illustrations for presentation 
 







Nonpoint source pollution from farm activities 
    









































[DataSet1] H:\nan_SPSS\analysis\DUMMY\Dummy new cutpoffpoint.sav 
 
Step Summary 
Model Action Effect(s) 
Model Fitting Criteria Effect Selection Tests 
AIC BIC 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Squarea df Sig. 
Step 0 0 Entered Intercept 340.065 346.834 336.065 .   
Step 1 1 Entered PBC1g3 335.615 349.153 327.615 8.451 2 .015 
Step 2 2 Entered PBC2g2 330.383 350.690 318.383 9.232 2 .010 
Step 3 3 Entered SN1g2 327.587 354.662 311.587 6.796 2 .033 
Step 4 4 Entered SN1g3 321.767 355.612 301.767 9.820 2 .007 
5 Removed PBC1g3 322.111 349.187 306.111 4.344 2 .114 
Stepwise Method: Forward Stepwise      
a. The chi-square for entry is based on the likelihood ratio test.    
          
Model Fitting Information 
Model 





Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 340.065 346.834 336.065    
Final 322.111 349.187 306.111 29.954 6 .000 
 
Goodness-of-Fit 
 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 420.348 420 .486 
Deviance 301.952 420 1.000 
 
Pseudo R-Square 





Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC of Reduced 
Model 
BIC of Reduced 
Model 
-2 Log Likelihood 
of Reduced Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 322.111 349.187 3.061E2 .000 0 . 
PBC2g2 326.574 346.881 314.574 8.463 2 .015 
SN1g3 333.586 353.893 321.586 15.475 2 .000 
SN1g2 332.114 352.421 320.114 14.003 2 .001 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. 
The reduced model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all 
parameters of that effect are 0. 
a. This reduced model is equivalent to the final model because omitting the effect does not increase the 




Category of the 1st ordera B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence 







Intercept .252 1.163 .047 1 .828    
[PBC2g2=0] .899 .488 3.400 1 .065 2.457 .945 6.388 
[PBC2g2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SN1g3=0] -2.700 1.052 6.587 1 .010 .067 .009 .528 
[SN1g3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SN1g2=0] -2.106 1.091 3.724 1 .054 .122 .014 1.033 
[SN1g2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
Structural 
practice 
Intercept -3.435 .719 22.841 1 .000    
[PBC2g2=0] .975 .422 5.352 1 .021 2.652 1.161 6.060 
[PBC2g2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SN1g3=0] .372 .408 .830 1 .362 1.451 .652 3.230 
[SN1g3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SN1g2=0] 1.394 .592 5.546 1 .019 4.031 1.263 12.862 
[SN1g2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
a. The reference category is: Good husbandry.       





Good husbandry Vegetative practice Structural practice 
Percent 
Correct 
Good husbandry 157 0 0 100.0% 
Vegetative practice 24 0 0 .0% 
Structural practice 37 0 0 .0% 



























Annex 8: Forced entry method (SPSS 16.0) 
 
Nominal Regression 
[DataSet1] H:\nan_SPSS\analysis\DUMMY\Dummy new cutpoffpoint.sav 
 
 
Model Fitting Information 
Model 
Model Fitting Criteria Likelihood Ratio Tests 
AIC BIC 
-2 Log 
Likelihood Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept Only 344.224 350.993 340.224    




 Chi-Square df Sig. 
Pearson 363.276 374 .645 









Likelihood Ratio Tests 
Effect 










Model Chi-Square df Sig. 
Intercept 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
nPRIg3 345.208 548.278 225.208 8.660 2 .013 
nPRIg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
nGOVg2 336.813 539.883 216.813 .265 2 .876 
MEMg2 337.804 540.873 217.804 1.256 2 .534 
DT1 338.270 541.340 218.270 1.723 2 .423 
IN1 336.899 539.969 216.899 .351 2 .839 
LANDg2 338.344 541.414 218.344 1.796 2 .407 
PT1 336.918 539.988 216.918 .370 2 .831 
FW1 341.817 544.887 221.817 5.269 2 .072 
SOILg3 338.957 542.027 218.957 2.410 2 .300 
SOILg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
STREAMg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
UT 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
SIZEg4 348.499 551.569 228.499 11.951 2 .003 
SIZEg2 341.099 544.169 221.099 4.551 2 .103 
HEALTHg2 336.808 539.877 216.808 .260 2 .878 
PAST1 339.080 542.150 219.080 2.532 2 .282 
CROPg2 350.182 553.251 230.182 13.634 2 .001 
GENg2 339.745 542.815 219.745 3.197 2 .202 
EDU1 340.427 543.497 220.427 3.879 2 .144 
AGEg5 338.302 541.371 218.302 1.754 2 .416 
AGEg3 337.606 540.676 217.606 1.058 2 .589 
AGEg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
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SN1g2 356.323 559.393 236.323 19.775 2 .000 
PBC2g2 347.231 550.300 227.231 10.683 2 .005 
SN1g3 356.507 559.577 236.507 19.959 2 .000 
AGEg2 338.198 541.268 218.198 1.650 2 .438 
AGEg4 338.102 541.171 218.102 1.554 2 .460 
EDUr 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
GENg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
CROPg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
PASTr 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
HEALTHg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
SIZEg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
SIZEg3 337.379 540.449 217.379 .831 2 .660 
SIZEg5 354.376 557.446 234.376 17.828 2 .000 
DT 339.131 542.201 219.131 2.583 2 .275 
STREAMg2 337.027 540.097 217.027 .479 2 .787 
SOILg2 337.187 540.256 217.187 .639 2 .727 
FWr 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
PTr 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
LANDg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
INr 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
DTr 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
MEMg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
nGOVg1 340.548 550.387 2.165E2 .000 0 . 
nGOVg3 336.718 539.788 216.718 .170 2 .918 
nPRIg2 344.120 547.190 224.120 7.572 2 .023 
The chi-square statistic is the difference in -2 log-likelihoods between the final model and a reduced model. The reduced 
model is formed by omitting an effect from the final model. The null hypothesis is that all parameters of that effect are 0. 




Category of the 1st ordera B Std. Error Wald df Sig. Exp(B) 
95% Confidence Interval for 
Exp(B) 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
Vegetative 
practice 
Intercept -23.172 7.831 8.755 1 .003    
[nPRIg3=0] 20.813 .000 . 1 . 1.094E9 1.094E9 1.094E9 
[nPRIg3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[nPRIg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[nGOVg2=0] .367 .795 .214 1 .644 1.444 .304 6.861 
[nGOVg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[MEMg2=0] -.169 .785 .046 1 .829 .844 .181 3.935 
[MEMg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[DT1=0] .078 .750 .011 1 .917 1.081 .248 4.704 
[DT1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[IN1=0] .445 .769 .336 1 .562 1.561 .346 7.040 
[IN1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[LANDg2=0] -.815 .898 .825 1 .364 .443 .076 2.571 
[LANDg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PT1=0] .302 1.029 .086 1 .769 1.353 .180 10.165 
[PT1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[FW1=0] 2.854 1.421 4.033 1 .045 17.363 1.071 281.476 
[FW1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
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[SOILg3=0] .956 .756 1.597 1 .206 2.601 .591 11.452 
[SOILg3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SOILg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[STREAMg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[UT=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SIZEg4=0] 2.194 1.389 2.494 1 .114 8.970 .589 136.583 
[SIZEg4=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SIZEg2=0] 1.998 .995 4.028 1 .045 7.373 1.048 51.874 
[SIZEg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[HEALTHg2=0] .291 .696 .175 1 .675 1.338 .342 5.231 
[HEALTHg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PAST1=0] .653 1.017 .412 1 .521 1.921 .262 14.102 
[PAST1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[CROPg2=0] 1.118 .729 2.351 1 .125 3.060 .732 12.784 
[CROPg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[GENg2=0] .168 .680 .061 1 .805 1.183 .312 4.485 
[GENg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[EDU1=0] 1.382 .837 2.726 1 .099 3.981 .772 20.523 
[EDU1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AGEg5=0] -2.770 2.201 1.584 1 .208 .063 .001 4.680 
[AGEg5=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AGEg3=0] -2.051 2.068 .984 1 .321 .129 .002 7.401 
[AGEg3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AGEg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SN1g2=0] -2.774 1.271 4.767 1 .029 .062 .005 .753 
[SN1g2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PBC2g2=0] 1.651 .731 5.110 1 .024 5.214 1.246 21.827 
[PBC2g2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SN1g3=0] -3.625 1.239 8.562 1 .003 .027 .002 .302 
[SN1g3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AGEg2=0] -2.061 1.952 1.115 1 .291 .127 .003 5.841 
[AGEg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AGEg4=0] -2.372 2.004 1.400 1 .237 .093 .002 4.744 
[AGEg4=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[EDUr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[GENg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[CROPg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PASTr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[HEALTHg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SIZEg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SIZEg3=0] .624 1.019 .375 1 .540 1.866 .253 13.755 
[SIZEg3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SIZEg5=0] 1.137 1.540 .545 1 .460 3.117 .152 63.749 
[SIZEg5=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[DT=0] -.694 1.068 .422 1 .516 .500 .062 4.056 
[DT=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[STREAMg2=0] -.535 .772 .481 1 .488 .586 .129 2.659 
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[STREAMg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SOILg2=0] .672 1.120 .360 1 .548 1.958 .218 17.574 
[SOILg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[FWr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PTr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[LANDg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[INr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[DTr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[MEMg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[nGOVg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[nGOVg3=0] -.319 .905 .124 1 .725 .727 .123 4.286 
[nGOVg3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[nPRIg2=0] 2.301 1.005 5.236 1 .022 9.980 1.391 71.605 
[nPRIg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
Structural 
practice 
Intercept -1.666 5.548 .090 1 .764    
[nPRIg3=0] 1.556 1.753 .787 1 .375 4.739 .152 147.309 
[nPRIg3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[nPRIg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[nGOVg2=0] -.108 .633 .029 1 .865 .898 .260 3.102 
[nGOVg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[MEMg2=0] .672 .640 1.104 1 .293 1.959 .559 6.867 
[MEMg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[DT1=0] .791 .608 1.694 1 .193 2.206 .670 7.265 
[DT1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[IN1=0] -.036 .547 .004 1 .947 .964 .330 2.819 
[IN1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[LANDg2=0] .930 1.078 .744 1 .388 2.533 .307 20.936 
[LANDg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PT1=0] -.369 .742 .247 1 .619 .691 .161 2.961 
[PT1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[FW1=0] .882 .872 1.022 1 .312 2.415 .437 13.352 
[FW1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SOILg3=0] -.515 .710 .527 1 .468 .597 .149 2.401 
[SOILg3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SOILg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[STREAMg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[UT=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SIZEg4=0] -2.451 .942 6.773 1 .009 .086 .014 .546 
[SIZEg4=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SIZEg2=0] -.260 .827 .099 1 .753 .771 .152 3.903 
[SIZEg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[HEALTHg2=0] .209 .646 .105 1 .746 1.233 .348 4.371 
[HEALTHg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PAST1=0] -.816 .606 1.818 1 .178 .442 .135 1.448 
[PAST1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[CROPg2=0] 2.308 .789 8.556 1 .003 10.056 2.142 47.223 
[CROPg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[GENg2=0] -1.068 .620 2.971 1 .085 .344 .102 1.158 
[GENg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
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[EDU1=0] -.355 .561 .399 1 .527 .701 .233 2.107 
[EDU1=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AGEg5=0] -.193 1.093 .031 1 .860 .824 .097 7.028 
[AGEg5=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AGEg3=0] -.178 1.053 .028 1 .866 .837 .106 6.590 
[AGEg3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AGEg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SN1g2=0] 2.277 .782 8.473 1 .004 9.752 2.104 45.190 
[SN1g2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PBC2g2=0] 1.318 .584 5.101 1 .024 3.736 1.190 11.724 
[PBC2g2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SN1g3=0] .877 .638 1.887 1 .170 2.404 .688 8.402 
[SN1g3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AGEg2=0] -.828 1.043 .631 1 .427 .437 .057 3.373 
[AGEg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[AGEg4=0] -.206 1.086 .036 1 .849 .814 .097 6.835 
[AGEg4=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[EDUr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[GENg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[CROPg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PASTr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[HEALTHg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SIZEg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SIZEg3=0] -.570 .931 .375 1 .540 .565 .091 3.506 
[SIZEg3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SIZEg5=0] -4.108 1.164 12.459 1 .000 .016 .002 .161 
[SIZEg5=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[DT=0] 1.016 .750 1.836 1 .175 2.763 .635 12.018 
[DT=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[STREAMg2=0] -.058 .590 .010 1 .922 .944 .297 2.998 
[STREAMg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[SOILg2=0] -.398 .866 .211 1 .646 .672 .123 3.666 
[SOILg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[FWr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[PTr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[LANDg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[INr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[DTr=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[MEMg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[nGOVg1=0] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[nGOVg3=0] -.205 .791 .067 1 .796 .815 .173 3.837 
[nGOVg3=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
[nPRIg2=0] 1.392 .765 3.309 1 .069 4.023 .898 18.032 
[nPRIg2=1] 0b . . 0 . . . . 
a. The reference category is: Good husbandry.       














Good husbandry Vegetative practice Structural practice Percent Correct 
Good husbandry 145 5 7 92.4% 
Vegetative practice 14 8 2 33.3% 
Structural practice 19 1 17 45.9% 












Annex 9: Q-Sample 
 
 Social aspect Ecological aspect Economic aspect 
Water resource 
management 
Our water here is as 
safe to drink as 
anywhere in the 
country (1) 
I can no longer fish 
from river that used to 
be a food source for a 
decade (4) 
I have never discharged 
waste into natural 
watercourses (2) 
Natural watercourses are 
contaminated with 
chemicals (5) 
Good water quality is 
a social benefit (3) 
If I adopt BMPs, the 
natural watercourse will 
be cleaner and water 
can be re-used for 
planting other crops (6) 




advisory services on 
soil management (7) 
I do not know which 
tree could reduce soil 
erosion effects (10) 
To control weeds and 
grass, I prefer to use a 
power lawnmower than 
herbicides (8) 
Soil on my farm is easily 
eroded (11) 
Vetiver (local plant) 
can stabilise farm 
ditches, but I cannot 
afford to buy the 
plants (9) 
I do not have enough 
land to allocate to BMP 
activities (12) 
Pest management Chemically sprayed 
citrus from my farm is 
safe to eat (13) 
Applying the dosage 
of chemicals 
suggested on the label 
will not harm human 
health (16) 
We should use organic 
substances instead of 
chemical pesticides on 
citrus farms (14) 
Chemicals do not always 
imply toxicity (17) 
If I do not apply 
pesticide as I have 
been accustomed to 
do, the fruit quality 
may drop (15) 
Chemical-free labels on 
food are important for 
consumer purchasing 
decisions (18) 
Nutrient management I tend to use fertilisers 
that are widely used 
by my neighbours 
(19) 
I am happy to use 
fertilisers introduced 
by agricultural input 
retailers (22) 
An application of 
organic fertiliser rather 
than chemicals will 
reduce pollution (20) 
Growers should apply the 
right amount of fertiliser 
to match the trees’ need 
because over-application 
will harm the 
environment (23) 
The application of 
organic fertiliser will 
give better fruit 
quality (21) 
Without an application 
of chemical fertiliser, 
trees do not provide 
good yield (24) 
Overall views about 
BMPs 
BMPs are needed to 
stop fighting between 
citrus growers and 
residents (25) 
My neighbours will 
support me if I adopt 
BMPs (28) 
Man cause pollutant 
emission, therefore we 
should take some 
actions to lessen 
pollution (26) 
We can gain more 
watershed benefits if we 
can restrict pollution from 
our farm production (29) 
Growers can comply 




In the long run, BMPs 
help enhance 
competitiveness in 
terms of chemical-free 
product (30) 
The BMPs will lead 
to more red-tape, but I 
can adopt them 
despite this (31) 
We could not 
introduce BMPs 
correctly because we 
do not have enough 
understanding (34) 
We should restrict citrus 
cultivation to designated 
areas (32) 
Most citrus growers are 
not aware of water 
availability in the 
watershed (35) 
Labour requirement 
for BMPs is a big 
problem (33) 
I cannot adopt BMPs 
because I do not have 
enough funds (36) 
Note: Number in parenthesis indicates statement number 
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Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort 
 
                Loadings 
 
 QSORT             1         2         3         4 
  
  1 CM1          0.3062   -0.0586    0.4928X   0.2276  
  2 CM2          0.3420    0.1158    0.0163    0.5009X 
  3 CM3          0.2720    0.2319   -0.0365    0.5737X 
  4 CM4          0.6053X   0.1591    0.2339    0.4061  
  5 CM5          0.3581    0.1662    0.3165    0.5553X 
  6 CM6          0.0518    0.4431    0.2401    0.4541X 
  7 CM7          0.4593X   0.1195    0.2959    0.1761  
  8 CM8          0.4587X   0.1033    0.4185    0.0549  
  9 CM9          0.2984    0.5869X   0.0974    0.4776  
 10 CM10         0.3189    0.2283   -0.2594    0.1641  
 11 CM11         0.1889    0.4872X   0.3512    0.4761  
 12 CM12         0.1010    0.0798    0.4583    0.5997X 
 13 CM13         0.1282    0.4199    0.3013    0.6045X 
 14 CM14        -0.1757    0.1263    0.3144    0.7014X 
 15 CM15         0.3877    0.0093   -0.0148    0.5801X 
 16 CM16         0.5869X   0.2663    0.0605    0.3292  
 17 CM17         0.2451    0.1225    0.3338    0.2391  
 18 CM18         0.3076    0.3391    0.0429    0.6311X 
 19 KP19         0.6342X  -0.2676    0.2283    0.2641  
 20 KP20         0.2431    0.4904X   0.4316    0.4499  
 21 KP21         0.1530   -0.0369    0.5194X  -0.5805  
 22 KP22         0.3969    0.3417    0.4252X   0.0776  
 23 KP23         0.7164X   0.1396    0.2560    0.0388  
 24 KP24         0.0069    0.2166    0.7126X  -0.0891  
 25 KP25        -0.1192    0.1552    0.7456X   0.0899  
 26 KP26         0.3101    0.5841X   0.1290    0.3767  
 27 KP27         0.4347X   0.2724    0.3655    0.3291  
 28 KP28         0.1312    0.3024    0.4866X   0.2403  
 29 KP29         0.2228    0.7924X   0.0423    0.1017  
 30 KP30         0.0682    0.7325X   0.0854    0.0942  
 31 KP31         0.1554    0.2564    0.4869X   0.0520  
 32 KP32         0.6241X   0.1090    0.5272    0.0257  
 33 KP33         0.6669X   0.3166   -0.2797   -0.0630  
 34 KP34         0.5929X   0.2602    0.1479    0.0575  
 35 NK35         0.3370    0.1090    0.2796    0.1668  
 36 NK36         0.4688    0.4789X   0.1172    0.3132  
 37 NK37         0.2758    0.5042X   0.3430    0.3957  
 38 NK38         0.3882    0.5174X   0.4586    0.3208  
 39 NK39         0.2942    0.0128    0.5179X   0.3233  
 40 NK40        -0.1210    0.2707   -0.4654   -0.1447  
 41 NK41         0.3915    0.5713X   0.4156    0.0187  
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Factor Matrix with an X Indicating a Defining Sort (continued) 
 
                Loadings 
 
 QSORT             1         2         3         4 
  
 43 CM43         0.0864    0.3790   -0.1313    0.4471X 
 44 CM44         0.4063X   0.2499    0.1270   -0.0722  
 45 CM45        -0.1409    0.2426    0.2515    0.5246X 
 46 CM46         0.2899    0.5153X   0.2576    0.1850  
 47 CM47         0.4584    0.4911X   0.2444    0.4763  
 48 CM48         0.0480    0.1179    0.5138X   0.2669  
 49 CM49        -0.1484    0.4240X   0.2156    0.0345  
 50 CM50         0.4652X   0.0046    0.3490    0.4045  
 51 CM51        -0.4102    0.2238    0.0460    0.2916  
 52 CM52        -0.0664    0.4293    0.4679X   0.3214  
 53 MHS53        0.3639X   0.0492    0.0565    0.3095  
 54 MHS54        0.0798    0.2172    0.1272    0.7485X 
 55 MHS55        0.0716    0.4552X   0.0889    0.4391  
 56 MHS56        0.2868    0.1305    0.4876X  -0.0548  
 57 MHS57        0.3047    0.0838    0.2234    0.4908X 
 58 MHS58        0.2148   -0.1037    0.4907X   0.4345  
 59 MHS59        0.2031   -0.1433    0.2505    0.5759X 
 60 KP60         0.1186    0.1746    0.4751X   0.2126  
 61 KP61         0.3036    0.1417   -0.0528    0.2311  
 62 KP62         0.2379   -0.0860    0.3219    0.4087X 
 63 KP63         0.3152    0.0102    0.5931X   0.3049  
 64 KP64         0.1257   -0.0351    0.2542    0.6253X 
 65 KP65         0.2923    0.4256X   0.3645    0.2424  
 66 KP66         0.3152    0.2798    0.2819    0.3934  
 67 KP67        -0.0467    0.5573X   0.0169   -0.1016  
 68 KP68         0.0006    0.2946    0.6220X   0.1901  
 69 KP69         0.0405    0.1482    0.5178X   0.4085  
 70 KP70         0.1003    0.0800    0.1540    0.4401X 
 71 LP71         0.3562    0.2908    0.4488X   0.1409  
 72 LP72         0.7646X  -0.1738    0.0927    0.3398  
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Distinguishing Statements for Factor 1 
 
 (P < .05; Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01) 
 
Both the Factor Q-Sort Value and the Normalized Score are shown. 
 
                                                                        Factors 
 
                                                                              1           2           3           4 
 No. Statement                                                   No.    RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   
 
  18 Label is importance for buying decision                      18      2  1.17     1  0.60     1  0.81     0  0.34  
  20 Applying of organic fertiliser reduces pollution             20      2  1.01     1  0.60     3  1.38     1  0.64  
  26 Letting thing takes care doesn't mean pollution              26      2  0.91*    0  0.05     0  0.14     0  0.22  
  29 More watershed benefit will be gained                        29      1  0.67     0  0.26     0 -0.20     3  1.20  
   2 I've never discharged waste into watercourse                  2      1  0.61*    4  2.16    -1 -0.33     4  1.85  
  21 Organic fertiliser use give better fruit quality             21      0  0.52    -1 -0.33     2  0.96     0  0.14  
   9 Though vetiver stabilise hedge, I can't afford                9      0  0.49     2  0.95     0 -0.18    -2 -1.19  
  28 Neighbours will support if I adopt                           28      0  0.35     0 -0.21     1  0.84     1  0.74  
   4 I can't fish from lake used to be food source                 4      0  0.21*   -2 -1.02    -1 -0.49    -2 -1.49  
   5 Watercourse is contaminated with chemicals                    5      0  0.10*   -3 -1.27    -3 -1.56    -1 -0.61  
  35 Most of us aren't aware of water quantity                    35     -1 -0.50    -1 -0.91    -4 -1.74    -2 -0.92  
  33 Labour requirement is a big deal                             33     -1 -0.57    -2 -0.94    -3 -1.51     0  0.02  
  11 Soil in my farm is easily eroded                             11     -1 -0.65*   -3 -1.11    -2 -1.35    -3 -1.58  
  13 Sprayed fruit is not dangerous to consume                    13     -2 -1.09*    1  0.68     2  0.97     2  1.00  
  24 W/O chemical fertiliser, citrus can't boost crop             24     -2 -1.22*    0 -0.09     0  0.09     1  0.38  
  16 Apply suggested dosage won't harm human health               16     -3 -1.34*    1  0.40     0 -0.20     1  0.43  
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Distinguishing Statements for Factor  2 
 
 (P < .05 ;  Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01) 
 
Both the Factor Q-Sort Value and the Normalized Score are shown. 
 
                                                                        Factors 
 
                                                                              1           2           3           4 
 No. Statement                                                   No.    RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   
 
  15 If not use pesticide as I did, fruit quality drop            15     -3 -1.56     2  1.04*    1  0.28     0  0.16  
   9 Though vetiver stabilise hedge, I can't afford                9      0  0.49     2  0.95     0 -0.18    -2 -1.19  
  29 More watershed benefit will be gained                        29      1  0.67     0  0.26     0 -0.20     3  1.20  
  10 I don't know which tree protect soil erosion                 10     -1 -0.64     0 -0.01*   -1 -0.71    -3 -1.63  
  28 Neighbours will support if I adopt                           28      0  0.35     0 -0.21*    1  0.84     1  0.74  
  21 Organic fertiliser use give better fruit quality             21      0  0.52    -1 -0.33*    2  0.96     0  0.14  
  23 Put right amount of fertiliser                               23      1  0.86    -1 -0.37*    1  0.88     2  0.90  
  30 BMP enhance food safety competitiveness in LR                30      1  0.52    -1 -0.55*    0  0.13     2  0.78  
  33 Labour requirement is a big deal                             33     -1 -0.57    -2 -0.94    -3 -1.51     0  0.02  
   4 I can't fish from lake used to be food source                 4      0  0.21    -2 -1.02*   -1 -0.49    -2 -1.49  
  31 BMP brings red tape, but I can adopt                         31      0 -0.28    -3 -1.09*   -1 -0.28     0  0.06  
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Distinguishing Statements for Factor  3 
 
 (P < .05 ;  Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01) 
 
Both the Factor Q-Sort Value and the Normalized Score are shown. 
 
                                                                        Factors 
 
                                                                              1           2           3           4 
 No. Statement                                                   No.    RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   
 
  27 We can comply if got monetary support                        27      1  0.55     1  0.39     4  2.01*    2  1.04  
  20 Applying of organic fertiliser reduces pollution             20      2  1.01     1  0.60     3  1.38     1  0.64  
   3 Good water quality is a social benefit                        3      4  1.98     3  1.90     3  1.26*    3  1.77  
  21 Organic fertiliser use give better fruit quality             21      0  0.52    -1 -0.33     2  0.96     0  0.14  
  30 BMP enhance food safety competitiveness in LR                30      1  0.52    -1 -0.55     0  0.13     2  0.78  
  12 I don't have enough land                                     12     -1 -0.53    -1 -0.64     0 -0.11    -2 -1.26  
   9 Though vetiver stabilise hedge, I can't afford                9      0  0.49     2  0.95     0 -0.18*   -2 -1.19  
  16 Apply suggested dosage won't harm human health               16     -3 -1.34     1  0.40     0 -0.20*    1  0.43  
  29 More watershed benefit will be gained                        29      1  0.67     0  0.26     0 -0.20*    3  1.20  
   1 Water is as safe to drink as anywhere                         1     -4 -1.97    -4 -2.44     0 -0.23*   -4 -2.04  
   2 I've never discharged waste into watercourse                  2      1  0.61     4  2.16    -1 -0.33*    4  1.85  
   4 I can't fish from lake used to be food source                 4      0  0.21    -2 -1.02    -1 -0.49*   -2 -1.49  
  36 Can't adopt because of no fund                               36      0 -0.30     0 -0.26    -2 -1.18*   -1 -0.15  
  32 Cultivation are should be restricted                         32      0 -0.04     0 -0.20    -3 -1.49*   -1 -0.30  
  33 Labour requirement is a big deal                             33     -1 -0.57    -2 -0.94    -3 -1.51*    0  0.02  
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Distinguishing Statements for Factor  4 
 
 (P < .05 ;  Asterisk (*) Indicates Significance at P < .01) 
 
Both the Factor Q-Sort Value and the Normalized Score are shown. 
 
                                                                        Factors 
 
                                                                              1           2           3           4 
 No. Statement                                                   No.    RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   
 
  29 More watershed benefit will be gained                        29      1  0.67     0  0.26     0 -0.20     3  1.20* 
  27 We can comply if got monetary support                        27      1  0.55     1  0.39     4  2.01     2  1.04* 
   8 I prefer power lawnmower to herbicide                         8      3  1.39     2  1.20     2  1.22     1  0.53* 
  17 Chemicals don't always imply toxicity                        17     -1 -0.75    -2 -0.93    -1 -0.57     0  0.24* 
  21 Organic fertiliser use give better fruit quality             21      0  0.52    -1 -0.33     2  0.96     0  0.14  
  33 Labour requirement is a big deal                             33     -1 -0.57    -2 -0.94    -3 -1.51     0  0.02* 
  14 We should use organic substance                              14      2  1.05     2  0.96     2  1.23    -1 -0.16* 
  34 Not in correct way because of low understanding              34     -2 -1.16    -2 -1.00    -2 -1.17    -1 -0.57  
   5 Watercourse is contaminated with chemicals                    5      0  0.10    -3 -1.27    -3 -1.56    -1 -0.61* 
   9 Though vetiver stabilise hedge, I can't afford                9      0  0.49     2  0.95     0 -0.18    -2 -1.19* 
  12 I don't have enough land                                     12     -1 -0.53    -1 -0.64     0 -0.11    -2 -1.26* 
   4 I can't fish from lake used to be food source                 4      0  0.21    -2 -1.02    -1 -0.49    -2 -1.49* 
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Consensus Statements  --  Those That Do Not Distinguish Between ANY Pair of Factors. 
 




                                                                                       Factors 
 
                                                                              1           2           3           4 
 No.  Statement                                                   No.    RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   RNK SCORE   
 
   6  If I adopt, water is cleaner and reused                       6      3  1.27     3  1.52     3  1.59     3  1.19   
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